claybot said:
From what I understand about this site is that it is an area for open discussion on the CF.
In theory
Ive found the less value placed on cheap shots whose only content of a post is to attack another member of army.ca a topic the better. A post could debate the issues or disagree, that's what discussion forums are for. Everyone has opinions... some won't agree with you or me. Some can discuss others just take shots at others. Involve yourself with those who discuss, wave away the rest.
claybot said:
Has the Light Infantry Battalion/Airborne proved its worth in the Canadian Army based on the above statement?
If so how and on what missions (list)? (World War 2 doesn't count)
One fundamental of conflict is to have a means to resolve/defeat/dislocate the opposing nation/faction/policy. It is always possible for an OpFor to contain as one means it performs conflict to have human beings with small arms, blades, clubs or even just punching and kicking. As such there will ALWAYS be a need to address this and that will take a human being with preferablly better equipment to go deal with them. Tanks, planes, missiles, shells all have their use. It is only the infantry which can deal with the "up close and personal" issues.
Now the degree to which an OpFor uses or is effective in using "minimally equipped infantry" (MEI for an abbreviation) will vary. During the cold war NATO plans where focused on massvie armored battles in Germany, MEI where not likely to appear. In Veitnam the MEI in the jungle where a serious contender. MEI where also a serious tactical problem in Mogadishu and a major issue currently in Iraq.
Clauzwitz in "On War" points out that infantry is the least dispensible unit. It has the least mobility and the least firepower (recall the time period being horse cavalry, wooden wheeled cannon and infantry). His key points on the control of territory still remain true. It is infantry which has the manpower vs cost to "control" an area. In modern operations it is more a matter of "police" than control but the manpower issue is still key.
Tanks and aircraft of today also require significant logistic support, supplies, fuel and down time for maintenance. When the tanks are being fixed who protects them and the front if not the infantry. Who protects the airbase... which for a flight of 100 planes could have 1,000 technicians, refuellers, ATC and other necessary personel if not the infantry.
You will need some form of "light" infantry with better equipment and training than the MEI."Foot Infantry" with few vehicles, at least in the tactical sense, will always be the effective means to deal with control and many MEI situations. They also need to carry armament system to deal with regular forces which they might find themselves engaged with. Either when first establishing control of an area or if another country decides to support the MEI.
For the latter consider the Veitcong and the NVA. The communist equipped NVA regulars eventually came to supplement the Vietcong. While Canada wasn't the fighting force the light infantry have proven they are needed for jungle terrain.
Jungle terrain will involve light infantry.
Since WW2 we have the creation of mobile strategic units. Battalions, regiments and divisions with the tactical forces moving at wheeled or tracked speeds. These where highly effective until they came into contact with cities. In the modern day you see in Afganistan and Iraq that we are having to deal with the "control" or "policing" of urban terrain.
Armor proves itself to be useful in supporting but not leading such terrain. Able to "bunker bust" the armor they carry assists safely getting their weapon into play. "Bunkers" in urban terrain can be plentiful with an industrial section of a city being a series of fortresses immune to small arms. Tanks though are either unable or a dangerous choice to follow up investigation or pursuit into a building. They still need the infantry.
Aircraft have shown they are of very limited use with urban terrain. They can hit facilities and disable their systems, such as factories or communication. Without the use of nuclear munitions one question from an air strike "how long is it out". Damage by a bomb hitting the exterior of a radio site knocks out the tower, so OpFor raises another for the same transmitter. A deep penetration bomb may get the radio equipment but how do you know for sure. Further, whether effective in an attack or not aircraft have one vital tactical issue in their limited loiter time. At some point they must land to get more fuel. Again infantry need to "control" the refuel/rearm point and only infantry can assure "control" of an area.
And what of the MEI in urban terrain? With the massive amounts of cover some of the equipment differences disappear. Usually their familiarity with the terrain (its their home town) also restores some or all of the mobility issues, at least within the city.
The "Black Hawk Down" incident saw MEI vs a modern force. A summary for this discussion shows that airmobile succeeded in seizing the target for a brief time. An armored (insufficiently armored) force then meet with them to escort the objective out. It was NOT possible for the armor and airmobile force to remain in control of the city. It would have taken a large infantry force to have accomplished that (if "control" rather than "seizure" had been the objective).
Urban warfare, the armor forces and air forces necessitate the existence of light infantry.
Outside of these closed terrain there is the more conventional vision of mechanized infantry. In offense that is of providing the infantry forces for confirmation, security and clearance of pockets while the Armor and Air forces contain to smash through the countryside. In defense it is of providing the security to the supply lines, laying ambushes and in effect creating pockets that the enemy forces would need their own infantry to resolve.
Rapid mechanized warfare also calls for infantry, of light or some other form.
Other threads have discussed some matters pertaining the CAR, parachuting and paratroops. First for this post it is recognized that the increased training, the spirit and the creation of a goal of achievement for our forces of the paratroops is considered by myself and others highly valuable. What is less certain is the physical act of a parachuting (which yes can be argued as not completely separable from the previous factors).
Canada has not conducted a large "air drop" in decades. Nor does it seem that we are likely to. Our country has not been one to initiate "coups" such as the USA paradrop on Panama.
For discussion lets consider two sizes of air drop, a small raid (company or smaller) or a large invasion (battalion or higher).
The small raid is what we have the aircraft and funding to achieve. Targets for a small raid can be a person or a surprise on a facility. Unless contacted by a larger force the small raid is unlikely to survive for long in contact with the nations response forces likely to be of battalion or larger forces. Therefore the small para force alone must go into evasion. For a human target this limits them to killing or capturing a significant person which is not how Canada deals with the world. A facility could be destroyed, guarded until relieved or given a true "surprise inspection", which is a possible means for Canada to deal with a situation.
If a small raid plan does involve a relief force then there is the possibility that an advance party of the relief force, such as a light infantry group, could also have achieved the objective. Not always but it would be a consideration. Light infantry, the topic of this thread, could achieve some small paradrop objectives but there are many ones which it could not.
The larger paradrop is generally considered beyond our means. It is at the large size of force that you see the ability to hold for an extended time an objective while at the same time holding the drop zone for resupply. Such operations may be to open interior fronts during a major invasion, a major invasion of which Canada is unlikely to do on its own for funding and policy reasons.
A large paradrop could also be response to an international terrorism to quickly establish "control/police" of the area. These possible targets though are generally limited popularity and could usually find an airstrip some place near. Even the US paratroops would rather walk off their planes then come down with guns blazing at them, not just for safety but for cohesion. A near field landing does create a significant gap of time in which the leaders or terrorists could respond, such as by fleeing or going into caves. Thus if you wanted to "grab" the terrorist force you would need to "grab" quickly which a large paradrop could do.
In either the small or large paradrop the one aspect that para forces have is rapid strategic deployment. By being a force which can be thrown out a perfectly good aircraft they can also get all their gear into that same aircraft. Not all forces can. Even the US has issues the number of aircraft which can flay some of their equipment. One US response is the reforger units where sets of equipment are already on ships or in depots around the world. A huge stockpile of funding sitting idle on the chance that it might be needed is also beyond Canada's means.
All of these paradrop possibilities though are based on light infantry for the simple reason it's the bulk of what we can deploy by parachute. There is artillery and sometimes tanks (Sheridan or MGS) that can go with them. The amount of this "heavy" equipment is in the a supporting rather than primary role.
Paradrop operations are infantry, and the ultimate in light infantry.
There is also the idea of airmobile forces. For this post airmobile refers to an infantry force capable of remounting its air transport quickly. Typically this is by helicopter. It could in future see such things as tilt rotor, such as the Osprey, or very short take off and landing transport planes (a next generation Hercules of instance).To load onto the air transport the airmobile force is usually of an infantry force.
To make use of the airmobile on a large scale they could be deploying to a location isolated from friendly forces. This means establishing their own "control" or security perimeter. They have the same needs of infantry to protect their equipment, guard the landing/recovery areas, take the objective, sweep through the objective and then guard the objective. The may also have artillery, light tanks, LAVs but they as Clauzwitz pointed out find that infantry is the indispensable part of their force.
A small airmobile operation could possibly be of mostly a non-infantry force. If they are foregoing their "aerial remount" then they do not need to guard their landing zone. Alternatively they could be planning on finding another suitable area to "aerial remount". This could be to conduct a patrol, such as those done in Vietnam, or in future war to send out a raiding party or deploy a sensor vehicle. It is unlikely though that an airmobile raid does not either include light infantry or plans on meeting up with it.
The airmobile force, with all its tactical wonders, also has the issue of having aircraft. While deployed airmobile forces may or may not have infantry they need an airbase of some sort. That means technicians, fuel, ammunition and repair shacks all of which returns to the need to "control" its base of operations with light infantry.
From the above you see Airmobile operations will need infantry.
For the final consideration on the need for light infantry consider the third branch of the service of, the navy. The goal of the navy is the control of sealanes for our use while denying that to others. The whole of sea control is to get goods from one place to another. They need to be loaded onto the ships requiring a port. Then you need to get the goods off the ship to be used also requiring a port. If the port is friendly and under "control" from local police forces all is well. If there is an issue, such as rioting, how would you ensure Canadian bound or delivered goods are not destroyed in the docks and warehouses? A harpoon missile wont do it.
To complete the role of the navy you may potentially need infantry.
In these roles, historical instances and "what if" scenarios, you have seen there is and will always continue to be the need for light infantry.
