Hmmm, it appears I'm not alone re: small carriers....

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Link in Spanish: http://www.revistanaval.com/noticias.php?ID=2-2004-10-09-AUSTRALIA

Article graciously translated by Tank-Net.org Member Swerve:

"IZAR has signed a contract with the Australian Navy for development of a strategic projection ship. The first phase, a feasibility study, is for $2 million.

(bit of puff for IZAR)

The requirements of the Australian Navy match about 95% the strategic projection ship contracted for the Spanish Navy. IZAR has only one competitor in this race, the French DCN.

The first phase of the project, the viability study, will take 6 months. When this phase concludes, if the viability study results in selection, it will proceed to the negotiation of new contracts for the two other phases contemplated: the functional project and the project of design and construction. Those contracts, (bugger - my dictionary's downstairs . . er .. ) will require an important transfer of technology, including technical assistance during construction.

(bit about IZARS technical capability)

The strategic projection ship is a hybrid between an aircraft carrier and an amphibious ship, & (that word "supone" again - I should look it up. Go with the context ..) combines an amphibious platform with an important embarked air arm. Its capacity for helicopters permits its utilisation in rescue missions and aid in case of natural disasters.

(reassurance that the margins on this job are positive, & it won't compromise IZARs financial situation)"

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bottom Line:  I've argued that this capability is essential for Canada to have any sort of projection capability specifically as it relates to adequately supporting deployed ground forces.  If Spain and now Australia are looking to that model, why shouldn't Canada as well?

Discuss....



Matthew.  ;D

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Bottom Line:  I've argued that this capability is essential for Canada to have any sort of projection capability specifically as it relates to adequately supporting deployed ground forces.  If Spain and now Australia are looking to that model, why shouldn't Canada as well?

What of area air defence? What of re-supply for these carriers and their escorts? What of upgrading the CPFs so they do remain viable? Where are you getting the manpower for these carriers? Training for the crews and airgroups? Selection for the type of aircraft for the air groups? Etc Etc Etc

I know this topic has been discussed time and time again and each time it has been indicated to you why carriers are not feasible for the military.

 

[Jungle]

Then how is it feasible for the Aussies, who have a Military similar to ours ?

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

I'm not worried about what other countries get their armed forces, I am more concerned with the CF maintaining what capabilities we have an improving where we can.

 

[Jungle]

But you realize we can learn from others, right ? Maybe they have ways of dealing with problems that we didn't see. I don't think we should just close the door and say "we can't do it". This is certainly not the attitude I was trained with.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Hey if we could do that great but how about addressing the basics before we get the gucci kit(carriers) for the navy as I pointed out above.

 

[Kirkhill]

In fairness to ExDragoon the Aussies plan also calls for 3 Theatre-High Altitude Area Air Defence Destroyers (think seabased NMD), upgraded oilers and the carriers themselves are supposed to carry supplies to support accompanying vessels.  As to manpower --- their hiring them.  As to aircraft they are buying them  - Tiger AHs, up to 60 NH 90s and some CH 47s.

One issue though that remains to be discussed is in what environment the vessels are to be deployed.  The Aussies, Spanish, Dutch and most other countries, including arguably the Brits, are assuming a permissive environment.  Either the enemy has no effective air force or long range missile threat (true of most peace support operations) or else the Americans will supply air superiority and provide a permissive environment.

If that is the case then we don't need a full battle group.

All we really need to do what the Aussies are doing.....a plan, commitment and money.......

 

[Jungle]

All we really need to do what the Aussies are doing.....a plan, commitment and money.......

My point exactly...

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

The Aussies, Spanish, Dutch and most other countries, including arguably the Brits, are assuming a permissive environment.  Either the enemy has no effective air force or long range missile threat (true of most peace support operations) or else the Americans will supply air superiority and provide a permissive environment.

The navies in question also have credible air defence, ASuW, ASW and replenishment assets.

 

[canuck101]

I agree with Ex-Dragoon on this; it would be nice to be able to have a ship like that but we have to work on getting a replacement for the destroyers and the mid-life refit of the CPF first.  The three JSS ships that may come our way will have the capability of transporting more equipment then we can now.  It may not be the total package but we are going to have to live with it and adapt to it as the CF as done in the past.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

What of area air defence? What of re-supply for these carriers and their escorts? What of upgrading the CPFs so they do remain viable? Where are you getting the manpower for these carriers? Training for the crews and airgroups? Selection for the type of aircraft for the air groups? Etc Etc Etc

I know this topic has been discussed time and time again and each time it has been indicated to you why carriers are not feasible for the military.

My vote would be to plan for it all at once.  

Say: "Here is our objective force including:
(2) LHD's (with E-2C, JSF and CH-148 Cyclones)
(2) JSS (refueling, supply and transport capability with utility version of H-92)
(2) Arleigh Burke-equivalents
(4) Halifax-class Frigates

Operational Target Date: 2010

Capital Costs:   $XX billion
Infrastructure Costs: $X billion
Operational Costs: $X billion/year

For these funds, you will get the following additional capabilities....[and list them]"

My take is right now we can't do much which makes it hard to ask for and get more money.

Offer a new capability that would allow us to take a more proactive role in places like Sudan and I think politicians will get in line to support it.

The one thing I am certain of, is I don't think we can do any worse than we're doing right now so why not try an alternate approach to change things.

That's just me.

Cheers Ex-Dragoon,


Matthew.    

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Just an add-on, this is from the site linked in the article on the British LPD's, and is exactly what NDHQ needs to put on the table.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Joint Rapid Reaction Forces

The ending of the Cold War has placed new demands on the UK Armed Forces.   Rather than primarily intended to confront the Warsaw Pact in Europe and the North Atlantic, they must now be able to move quickly to wherever they are needed around the world, but still be hard hitting and flexible.

The need for a new force with these capabilities was originally recognised with the formation of the Joint Rapid Deployment Force in 1996. The 1998 Strategic Defence Review acknowledged the strengths of the Joint Rapid Deployment Force and sought to build on them to produce more capable, better supported joint forces with the strategic transport to make them truly deployable to crisis around the world.

Establishment of JRRF

Setting up the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces has proved to be a major undertaking, it is taking longer than anticipated to put all of the capabilities in place but the MoD continues to regard it as a priority implementation.

Since SDR the Ministry of Defence has begun to create a pool of Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, bringing together all readily available forces from all three Services.   From this pool can hopefully be drawn the right mix of forces to mount short-notice, medium-scale operations of all kinds - from disaster relief to high intensity war-fighting â “ under NATO, European, UN coalition or national auspices. Joint Rapid Reaction Forces will be ready to deploy in phases â “ or echelons â “ supported by a range of enabling capabilities.

Initial Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) capability was declared on 1 April 1999 and elements of the JRRF pool were deployed effectively soon after as part of the UK's contribution to the NATO operation in Kosovo during June 1999.   The lessons drawn from the Kosovo conflict validated the JRRF concept and re-affirmed the need for the capabilities identified during the Strategic Defence Review.   Although early implementation milestones were met, the establishment of JRRF operational capability by the target date of October 2001 had by early 2000 slipped to late 2002 due to operational commitments (Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, etc.) and overstretch. Since then a number of reasons, including delay in the full implementation of the Army's Formation Readiness Cycle, have led to a further revision to late 2002/03.   By this time delivery of JRRF Phase 2 capability â “ the ability to mount and sustain a single, non-enduring, medium scale warfighting operation, in addition to continuing commitments in the Balkans â “ should be achieved.   Additional capability will be introduced incrementally as it becomes available.

In support of the JRRF, during 2000 the Ministry of Defence announced the decision to lease four C-17 aircraft for a period of seven years. Contracts have been signed and the aircraft will come into service during 2001. A PFI contract for the provision of six roll-on roll-off container ships has also been announced, with an in-service date of 2005, though the full service is expected to be available from 2003.   Chartering arrangements for up to four ships as an interim service are now expected to come into force in March 2001 and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary's current roll-on roll-off shipping will be kept in service until then.

Enabling Capabilities

Whatever the size of force package deployed, several key 'enabling capabilities' will be required. These include:

command and control (including a deployable joint task force headquarters), joint communications and information systems, intelligence support, and administrative support;
joint logistics support, including deployed medical support; and,
strategic transport - usually provided by MOD-controlled transport assets for first echelon forces, and by a combination of MOD and commercially contracted strategic transport assets for follow-on forces.

The First Echelon

First echelon forces are available at very high readiness. The most readily available elements of the first echelon will be "Spearhead Forces".  

The pool will include:
Special Forces;
an attack submarine, surface warships and a support ship;
a spearhead task force based on a light infantry battalion or commando group, drawn from 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, 3(UK) Mechanised Division's "ready brigade" or 16 Air Assault Brigade; and
a mix of offensive and defensive combat aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, helicopters, short-range air defence units and supporting tactical air transport and air-to-air refuelling aircraft.

The balance of first echelon forces could be drawn from:
additional Special Forces;
shipping to generate a maritime task group centred on an aircraft carrier or helicopter assault ship, and including amphibious shipping if necessary to support the lead Commando task force;
lead task forces, to provide a broad choice of capabilities, including:
a lead Commando task force equipped with Lynx anti-tank helicopters (Westland Apache Attack helicopter when in service), support helicopters and all-terrain vehicles;
a lead airborne task force, based on a parachute battalion;
a lead aviation/armoured reconnaissance task force, with Lynx anti-tank helicopters (Westland Apache attack helicopter when in service), armoured reconnaissance and infantry sub-units;
a lead armoured task force with Challenger tanks and Warrior armoured infantry vehicles; and,
combat support and logistic support groups with artillery, air defence, engineer and other assets;
a range of high capability air assets, including additional offensive and defensive combat aircraft, helicopters and support aircraft.

By the beginning of 2001, most elements of this pool of forces are available.

The Second Echelon

The second echelon of forces will be available at high readiness to provide greater hitting power should the first echelon require strengthening, or to conduct subsequent operations. These forces would probably use a combination of MOD and commercially contracted transport assets to get to the crisis.

The pool would comprise:
additional maritime forces to form a second or larger, more capable maritime task group, including an amphibious capability if necessary to support 3 Commando Brigade;
a choice of ground force brigades drawn from:
3 Commando Brigade, including specialist capabilities for amphibious, mountain and cold weather operations;
a mechanised "ready brigade" from 3 (UK) Mechanised Division;
an armoured "ready brigade" from 1 (UK) Armoured Division; and
tactical air-landed capability;
substantial additional air assets to enable operations across the full spectrum of airpower roles to provide a robust air contribution to the Joint Task Force.

The pool of forces available for the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces will vary from time-to-time but its final approximate size and shape will include.
around 20 major warships (aircraft carriers, attack submarines, amphibious ships, destroyers or frigates);
about 22 other vessels (mine warfare and support ships);
four ground force brigades;
about 110 combat aircraft;
over 160 other aircraft.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Bottom Line:   If you don't know where you're going, you're probably never going to get there.



Matthew.  

 

[DJL]

Say: "Here is our objective force including:
(2) LHD's (with E-2C, JSF and CH-148 Cyclones)
(2) JSS (refueling, supply and transport capability with utility version of H-92)
(2) Arleigh Burke-equivalents
(4) Halifax-class Frigates

E-2C? As in Hawkeyes? You understand that Hawkeyes are "Conventional Take Off and Landing" (CTOL) aircraft? Thats quite the LHD you are planning..........

My take is right now we can't do much which makes it hard to ask for and get more money.

Offer a new capability that would allow us to take a more proactive role in places like Sudan and I think politicians will get in line to support it.

Or have our elected government decide what role it is we as Canadians want to take in the world, base our foregin policy around it, then adjust funding for foregin aid and defence spending so as to be able to meet the said objectives.

 

[Kirkhill]

Reference the Hawkeye.  Howabout replacing the Hawkeye with an Unmanned Dirigible cruising at +60,000 feet?  You can reduce the size of your LHD and get rid of those nasty steam catapults and arrester wires.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Reference the Hawkeye.   Howabout replacing the Hawkeye with an Unmanned Dirigible cruising at +60,000 feet?   You can reduce the size of your LHD and get rid of those nasty steam catapults and arrester wires.

I hadn't thought about that alternative.

Thanks Kirkhill.   I like it a lot....



Matthew.

 

[GGboy]

If the Aussies can do it, why the hell can't we? The ADF is almost exactly the same size as the CF, albeit slightly better funded, but seems to have a huge advantage over us in vision. Towit: they know what they want to do and prepare in the long, medium and short term to do it.
Where the hell is the senior leadership of the CF when we really need them? A group of retired generals/admirals has already formally proposed something like this, a concept called Sea Horse which would include both the JSS and something like the U.S. Navy's San Antonio class of LPDs ... the response from atop the twin towers at 101 Col. By Drive has been a deafening silence.
It's not really a question of money (the US could probably be convinced to lease us an LPD or two on very generous terms), or even of gearing up personnel to man these ships (with enough lead time even the infamous recruiting group should be able to find enough people), or even - heaven forfend! - of getting generals used to the idea of REAL joint ops. I contend it's a question of leadership: it seems to me the CDS and the chiefs of staff are currently sitting around waiting for the government to finish its by now mythical defence review (currently scheduled to be done next summer, if ever) instead of being pro-active and pushing a plan like this with the government. Or if not this, then any plan ... anything's gotta be better than sitting around on our heinies waiting for the 280s to rust into oblivion or the last Herc to go U/S.
:

 

[Kirkhill]

Agreed GGboy

 

[DJL]

If the Aussies can do it, why the heck can't we?

I agree.........but things are not always that simple, look at the different mindset of both peoples. One lives next to a large Islamic state well the other lives next to the worlds only superpower.

The ADF is almost exactly the same size as the CF, albeit slightly better funded, but seems to have a huge advantage over us in vision. Towit: they know what they want to do and prepare in the long, medium and short term to do it.
Where the heck is the senior leadership of the CF when we really need them?

Before you start comparing both militarise, you must understand that the ADF has also shared many of the problems the CF has.......look at their Navy, they have had problems with their Collins program, they retired their Charlie Adams destroyers without a concurrent replacement, their ANZAC and Perry frigates are nothing to really toot about, they paid a fortune for the aging ex-American tank landing ships they bought and converted, and they paid a fortune for the handful of rebuilt Seasprites for their ANZAC figs.

WRT calling down the senior leadership of the CF for all the failings of todays Canadian Forces, that is rather short sighted. Some blame can be placed, but IMHO most have done the best that can be expected with the limited resources.

A group of retired generals/admirals has already formally proposed something like this, a concept called Sea Horse which would include both the JSS and something like the U.S. Navy's San Antonio class of LPDs ... the response from atop the twin towers at 101 Col. By Drive has been a deafening silence.
It's not really a question of money (the US could probably be convinced to lease us an LPD or two on very generous terms), or even of gearing up personnel to man these ships (with enough lead time even the infamous recruiting group should be able to find enough people), or even - heaven forfend! - of getting generals used to the idea of REAL joint ops.

With a pricetag of close to a billion a pop, and possably a reduction in orders by up to 25%, I'm all but sure the USN would jump on that idea   :

I contend it's a question of leadership: it seems to me the CDS and the chiefs of staff are currently sitting around waiting for the government to finish its by now mythical defence review (currently scheduled to be done next summer, if ever) instead of being pro-active and pushing a plan like this with the government. Or if not this, then any plan ... anything's gotta be better than sitting around on our heinies waiting for the 280s to rust into oblivion or the last Herc to go U/S.

Define "being pro-active and pushing ".

 

[Kirkhill]

With a pricetag of close to a billion a pop, and possably a reduction in orders by up to 25%, I'm all but sure the USN would jump on that idea

http://www.mod.uk/dpa/projects/lpdr.htm
http://www.mod.uk/dpa/projects/landing_ship_dock_auxillary.htm

You don't need the San Antonios.

4 of the Dutch Rotterdam Landing Ship Dock (Auxilliary) cost the Brits 320 MUKP or about 640 MCAD, 160 MCAD "a pop"
2 Landing Platform Docks cost them 800 MUKP the pair or about 800 MCAD each

1 LPD(Command) and 3 LSD(A)s would cost about 1.4 BCAD, require 629 crew and transport from 1372 to 1772 troops, more than 4000 line-meters of vehicles and at least a dozen helicopters.  If it came out of the JSS budget that would still leave some 700 MCAD for the Navy to build dedicated RAS vessels without having to worry about including Hospitals, Vehicle space, Trailer Space, Troop Space and Land Command space.

 

[DJL]

You don't need the San Antonios.

4 of the Dutch Rotterdam Landing Ship Dock (Auxilliary) cost the Brits 320 MUKP or about 640 MCAD, 160 MCAD "a pop"
2 Landing Platform Docks cost them 800 MUKP the pair or about 800 MCAD each

1 LPD(Command) and 3 LSD(A)s would cost about 1.4 BCAD, require 629 crew and transport from 1372 to 1772 troops, more than 4000 line-meters of vehicles and at least a dozen helicopters.  If it came out of the JSS budget that would still leave some 700 MCAD for the Navy to build dedicated RAS vessels without having to worry about including Hospitals, Vehicle space, Trailer Space, Troop Space and Land Command space.

That idea sounds more feasible, but you still have to take into account the lifetime operating costs of your four LPDs and the two AORs, compared to three JSS.

Now since you and others floated some ideas (Which I took shots at), it would be proper if I too floated my "ideas". If the JSS project's funds are what we are "playing with", I'd jump onto the American AOE-X program with the aim of purchasing three vessels, then with my remaining funds, purchase or lease (depending on what i have left over) "USNS like" 55K + ton Ro/Ros.

Fire away.  :warstory: