B
Brock
Guest
I find this argument quite humours, as to how many posters have suggested that the C-130 and C-17 are the only options. Canada does have a strategic airlifter in the form of 4 A310 multirole transport (MRT), aka: the CC-150 Polaris with 2 of the 4 being converted to multirole tanker transport standard (MRTT); a fifth is a dedicated MRT-VIP variant with limited stategic capability. The CC-150 MRT/MRTT are great for airline style strategic airlfit. However, the CF's Future Strategic Airlift (FSA) project is designed to acquire a roll-on/roll-off airlfiter for "out-sized" loads, ie. light armoured vehicles, large wheeled support vehicles (HLVW), bulky cargo, helicopters, and the like. The C-130J/J-30 is not a strategic airlifter. The C-130J/J-30 has only been inlcuded as a competitor b/c Lockheed Martin is a very powerful defence manufacturer; indeed if you read the reports over the last few years the C-130 was openly excluded by CAF officers in the FSA project office in interviews. The only options presented were and are the C-17, improved variants of the Il-76 (a Ukrainian, not Russian aircraft), the A400M, and lease arrangements of civillian owned strategic airlfiters. In reality, the only legitimate options are the A400M and the C-17.
I believe the procurement, operating, and support costs of the C-17 are too prohibitive for the CF. The CF could procure only small numbers of the C-17 a maximum of 8, if the CF went head over heels for the C-17. The procurement of even 4 C-17 would be extremely draining on the CF's capital procurement budge. 4 X C-17 @ $300 million would cost $1.2 billion, but only be useful for strategic airlift, because they are not designed for anything else other than heavy tactical airlfit. Even the Americans who operate over 100 and are building 220 of the C-17 use the C-17 primarly as a strategic airlifter, b/c they are such a precious resource. Don't get me wrong, the C-17 is an incredible aircraft, but will come at the cost of reduced numbers of Hercules, if that aircraft is retained. If a decision was made to procure substantial numbers of C-17 it would come in the form of at most 12 C-17, and no more Hercs, which would amount to $3.6 billion, but a large number of dedicated SAR and light transport aircraft would be needed as the C-17 can not be used affordably in the SAR and in the light transport role. More importantly, small numbers of C-17 would be less flexible in terms of availability and the loss of just 1 C-17 due to accident or an operational destruction would see a huge loss in airlfit capability. Furthermore, the C-17 can not be used as a tactical air-to-air refueller as the CC-130H (T) is used today. Could the C-17 be used in the operational and training tactical airlift role, probably not; I do not believe the CAF would risk flying a $300 million dollar aircraft at low level, an inherently dangerous type of flying. Is there a better strategic airlfit alternative?
For those of you who don't know the A400M is a strategic-tactical airlfiter a third more expensive than the C-130J/J-30, but half the cost of a C-17 with twice the payload of the C-130J-30; for more detailed performance info check out www.airbusmilitary.com .The A400M is entering production with orders for Great Britain (25), Belgium (7), France (50), Germany (60), Spain (27), Luxembourg (1), and Turkery (10); these are all NATO countries. The A400M was specifically designed to overcome the strategic shortcomings of the C-130 sized aircraft while simultaneously maintaining equal or reduced operating costs. The CAF could acquire 24 A400M for the same cost of 32 C-130J-30, but would acquire the lifting capability equivalent 48 C-130J-30. I would suggest complementing the A400M with a buy of roughly 24 C-27J for SAR and light transport duties within Canada, with some capable of overseas deployment when a light tactical airlifter is preferrential. The cost of a fleet of 24 A400M and 24 C-27J would amount to $3.6 billion and $1.2 billion respectively for the actual procurement and a comprehensive initial support training package. The latter amounts to $150 million and $50 million for the A400M and C-27J each respectively. It is important to note that this cost would not come in one year, but would be most likely spread out over decade--as most projects costs are--and the cost would come from within the yearly defence budget rather than as an additional defence cost as most Canadians believe. This is the biggest problem with defence procurements as I see it, the media, likely some politicians, and most Canadians ignorantly believe, big defence projects are additional costs, but they are always from within the planned defence budgets. A procurement of A400M and C-27J is the best option to replace the CC-115, CC-130E/H/H (T)/H-30 fleet while simultanously dramatically improving strategic airlift capability. The one downside to the A400M is that the first aircraft will only begin to come off the production line in 2007 and we need to begin replacing the 19 C-130E and 6 CC-115 as soon as possible. The easy solution is to bulk buy the C-27J between 2007 and 2010 or as quickly as possiblel to take the light transport and SAR burden off the C-130 fleet and begin procuring the A400M around 2010 at a rate of 3-6 per year of 4 to 8 years. This would be a cost and military effective way of replacing existing capabilites while simultaneously enhancing strategic airlift.
On an important note, strategic airlift is one component of strategic transport. Strategic transport is not an effective manner of providing large scal strategic transport (above army battle group level or equivalent). Sealift must be incorporated as the primary manner of strategic transport. Personally, I believe and I would argue know that the Joint Support Ship (JSS) is not a good idea, but that is another subject altogether.
I believe the procurement, operating, and support costs of the C-17 are too prohibitive for the CF. The CF could procure only small numbers of the C-17 a maximum of 8, if the CF went head over heels for the C-17. The procurement of even 4 C-17 would be extremely draining on the CF's capital procurement budge. 4 X C-17 @ $300 million would cost $1.2 billion, but only be useful for strategic airlift, because they are not designed for anything else other than heavy tactical airlfit. Even the Americans who operate over 100 and are building 220 of the C-17 use the C-17 primarly as a strategic airlifter, b/c they are such a precious resource. Don't get me wrong, the C-17 is an incredible aircraft, but will come at the cost of reduced numbers of Hercules, if that aircraft is retained. If a decision was made to procure substantial numbers of C-17 it would come in the form of at most 12 C-17, and no more Hercs, which would amount to $3.6 billion, but a large number of dedicated SAR and light transport aircraft would be needed as the C-17 can not be used affordably in the SAR and in the light transport role. More importantly, small numbers of C-17 would be less flexible in terms of availability and the loss of just 1 C-17 due to accident or an operational destruction would see a huge loss in airlfit capability. Furthermore, the C-17 can not be used as a tactical air-to-air refueller as the CC-130H (T) is used today. Could the C-17 be used in the operational and training tactical airlift role, probably not; I do not believe the CAF would risk flying a $300 million dollar aircraft at low level, an inherently dangerous type of flying. Is there a better strategic airlfit alternative?
For those of you who don't know the A400M is a strategic-tactical airlfiter a third more expensive than the C-130J/J-30, but half the cost of a C-17 with twice the payload of the C-130J-30; for more detailed performance info check out www.airbusmilitary.com .The A400M is entering production with orders for Great Britain (25), Belgium (7), France (50), Germany (60), Spain (27), Luxembourg (1), and Turkery (10); these are all NATO countries. The A400M was specifically designed to overcome the strategic shortcomings of the C-130 sized aircraft while simultaneously maintaining equal or reduced operating costs. The CAF could acquire 24 A400M for the same cost of 32 C-130J-30, but would acquire the lifting capability equivalent 48 C-130J-30. I would suggest complementing the A400M with a buy of roughly 24 C-27J for SAR and light transport duties within Canada, with some capable of overseas deployment when a light tactical airlifter is preferrential. The cost of a fleet of 24 A400M and 24 C-27J would amount to $3.6 billion and $1.2 billion respectively for the actual procurement and a comprehensive initial support training package. The latter amounts to $150 million and $50 million for the A400M and C-27J each respectively. It is important to note that this cost would not come in one year, but would be most likely spread out over decade--as most projects costs are--and the cost would come from within the yearly defence budget rather than as an additional defence cost as most Canadians believe. This is the biggest problem with defence procurements as I see it, the media, likely some politicians, and most Canadians ignorantly believe, big defence projects are additional costs, but they are always from within the planned defence budgets. A procurement of A400M and C-27J is the best option to replace the CC-115, CC-130E/H/H (T)/H-30 fleet while simultanously dramatically improving strategic airlift capability. The one downside to the A400M is that the first aircraft will only begin to come off the production line in 2007 and we need to begin replacing the 19 C-130E and 6 CC-115 as soon as possible. The easy solution is to bulk buy the C-27J between 2007 and 2010 or as quickly as possiblel to take the light transport and SAR burden off the C-130 fleet and begin procuring the A400M around 2010 at a rate of 3-6 per year of 4 to 8 years. This would be a cost and military effective way of replacing existing capabilites while simultaneously enhancing strategic airlift.
On an important note, strategic airlift is one component of strategic transport. Strategic transport is not an effective manner of providing large scal strategic transport (above army battle group level or equivalent). Sealift must be incorporated as the primary manner of strategic transport. Personally, I believe and I would argue know that the Joint Support Ship (JSS) is not a good idea, but that is another subject altogether.
