Heavy lift conundrum

[Sam69]

A speaker at the U of M's Transformation of Warfare seminar stated "Do we buy the equipment to go into the planes or to we buy the planes to transport the equipment"  I apoligize to the speaker for paraphrasing. 

The main argument I remember from government against Strategic lift was that no other nation with a military proportional to ours has Strategic Lift,,, so we don't need it,,,  but unlike many other nations, Canada is geographically isolated from potential hot spots in the world, a balance is needed between, airlift for rapid deployable forces and sealift for heavy follow on forces,
So far the CF has been able to deploy to hotspots (Haiti and the Stan) so how high of a priority is Strategic Airlift?

First point, the U of M speaker is guilty of an egregious logical fallacy: that of the false dillema. There is no evidence that this is an "either or" discussion. One could also say that the things that go into the planes are of little value if they lack the ability to go anywhere within a strategically relevant timeframe.

Second, as Kirkhill has so properly mentioned already: moving within Canada itself often engenders crossing what are widely considered to be strategic distances anywhere else.

One of the most powerful arguments for owning Strat Air Lift is the need for assured and timely access. Should the "big one" hit the West Coast, we simply cannot wait for days or weeks to get a contract in place for an Antonov. The oft quoted argument that they have always been there when we needed them is specious, to say the least. They have always been there because we have always adjusted our deployment plans to meet their availability.

If I could buy just one capability for the CF, it would be a Sqn of C-17s to provide the missing strat lift capability that we have been identifying as a top Departmental shortfall for years now (see, for example: "Capability Outlook 2002-2012")/

Sam

 

[Gobsmacked]

Just to add some more 'food for thought',
an Excellent Op-Ed that was released at CANSEC 2004 in April,
from  http://www.frontline-canada.com/content/AprMay.html


OP-ED: STRATEGIC AIRLIFT  by Mark Romanow
Canada's Waning Role of Pride and Influence

True to tradition, Budget 2004 has yet-again ignored DND's desire for an integral
Strategic Airlift capability. With this in mind, you may recall some recent government
comments:
"¢ Prime Minister (PM) Paul Martin affirmed "I believe that we should increase defence
spending... we have to invest in both military personnel and also equipment -
no doubt about that. That also is going to require further military spending.â ?
"¢ The 2004 Speech from the Throne stated: "We want for Canada a role of
pride and influence in the world... it is time to... meet our responsibilities, carry
our weight. Our foreign policy objec-tives require a meaningful capacity to
contribute militarily in support of collective efforts to safeguard international
peace and security. Some things how-ever, need not wait for the (defence)
review - because they are urgently needed, or because the right course of
action is already clear. To this end, the Government will make immediate
investments in key capital equipment, such as... replacements for the (40 year
old) Sea King helicopters.â ?
"¢ The Honourable David Pratt, Minister of National Defence, while SCONDVA*
Chairman, recommended that the government "increase the annual base budget
for DND to between 1.5% to 1.6% of GDP [over] three years.â ? He also recommended
that DND acquire "heavy lift transport aircraft and replace older
models to ensure the strategic... capacity required to rapidly and effectively
deploy the personnel and equipment required for overseas operations... [plus]
meet the domestic needs of Canada.â ?
The Minister advised a minimum infusion of C$1.5 billion yearly, although
private sector institutes and the Liberal Senate Defence Committee advise
greater increases.
"¢ February 2004: At a CDIA Seminar, Minister Pratt confirmed the defence
review will look at deployability. "The government must be able to swiftly
send our personnel and equipment where they're needed, whether it's
across the country or around the world.â ?
"¢ The PM's post-Budget affirmation - "We must focus on national security and our
armed forces. The demands on our mili-tary are not only increasing in number,
they are changing in nature. We must adapt and we must be ready.â ?

These reaffirm well-documented National Defence (DND) urgent requirements for an
integral outsize/oversize Future Strategic Airlift capability of six C-17 equivalent
strategic airlifters for "C$2,320.639M" required to replace 40-year-old CC-130Es,
plus an immediate substantial infusion to DNDs base budget to reduce the rust-out
of ageing equipment and prevent rising maintenance costs from squeezing the
procurement budget.

Integral strategic airlift for the Canadian Forces (CF) could be a source of
pride for all Canadians, especially if Canadian troops and equipment were seen
arriving on Canadian airlifters instead of chartered Russian/Ukranian transports
(with first year of Op Athena requiring a minimum US$65M chartered airlift), and a
way to serve both our own national interest in this dangerous world, such as rapid
deployment airlift for JTF2 and DART that is currently lacking, instead of the embarrasement
of a Hercules fleet that flies less-than half the time. 

Yet Budget 2004 provided a mere C$245M in supplemental top-up funding
in FY04-05 to cover ongoing mission costs, plus C$30M annual 'tax-relief' for personnel
overseas - a clever 'Bait and Switch' tactic to appease overstretched personnel and
disguise the fact that there was no 'base' FY04-05 increase. The only positive was
yearly C$300M in accelerated capital spending from FY05-06 onwards to cover
accelerated procurement of FWSAR aircraft - but no Strategic Airlift mention.

Astonishingly, an Alberta consortium's innovative BC-17X Canadian CAMAA
(Commercial Application of Military C-17 Airlift Aircraft) joint venture bid, submitted
with tacit pentagon-level USAF support, was seemingly ignored - even with potential
massive C-17 cost increases after February 2006.  DND acknowledges the
"proposal certainly attempts to... provide the CF with the sort of airlift capability that
meets our country's needs and within our budget allocations,â ? while in December
2003, the Chief of the Air Staff advised the consortium that the Canadian CAMAA
solution "may be a candidate to meet our future airlift needs,â ? with the Director Air
Requirements confirming "that a project to procure airlift capability is under develop-ment
and, in due course, a competition is anticipated.â ?

The Canadian CAMAA solution would allow DND to acquire the C-17 equivalent
guaranteed capability of eight BC-17X (134% capacity of six C-17s), for some
70% of the six C-17 option cost - just C$400M more than maintenance of present
inadequate Hercules fleet until 2038. Canadian CAMAA provides significant
30-year life cycle cost savings exceeding C$14B, allowing DND to recapitalize its
ageing Air Mobility fleet by 2009, while rectifying severe personnel shortages
identified under Project Transform.

The Canadian CAMAA proposal - best value at lowest cost - should grasp the
attention of a Liberal government whose leader affirms "a dollar misspent is a dollar
unavailable for health care or education.â ?

The poor optics of procrastination, potentially spending additional billions for
Strategic Arilift down-the-road, should Canadian CAMAAs window disappear by
early-2005, in conjunction with a reluctance to expedite replacement of ageing
Hercules (labelled the new Sea Kings by Global News), should read very poorly to a
voting Canadian public.  :-[

Mark Romanow is a defence analyst, and can be reached at defencegeopol@shaw.ca
*SCONDVA: Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.
FL  I FrontLine Magazine I  May 2004


Of Note: even though they are needed for airlift missions (ie. not enough operational Hercs to go around) - the VCDS decided that alongside the Comox based Buffalos, 10x CC-130Es would be given up to acquire 15x FWSAR.

Some NOTABLE Strat Air comments that appeared in an associated FL Arcturus SAR article:


An internal business case analysis of DND's operational basis for Air Mobility
Fleet recapitalization, finalized one day before the unexpected April 2003 shut-down
of the FSA project, affirmed "the 23 CC-130E and H73 aircraft will be retired
during the 2005-2012 period. To avoid any significant refurbishment costs to the
CC-130E/H73s, it's assumed that the FSA will achieve full operational capability
[FOC] between 2005 and 2009, and that the FWSAR will achieve FOC between
2009 and 2012." However, the budget announcement of "acceleratedâ ? FWSAR
acquisition from 2005 seemingly ignores DND's timelines and intends to save the
upgrade costs apportioned to 10 CC-130Es of "about C$300M, all of which could be
avoided if the aircraft are retired at ELEâ ? of 2010.

This also contradicts the 2002 DND DAR2 document "AIR MOBILITY CONCEPT the
Futureâ ? which stressed that "due to a significant shortfall in strategic lift capacity, the
FSA acquisition must precede the new FWSAR acquisition. No CC-130 aircraft
can be retired from service until an FSA solution is delivered. This, in fact, under-scores
the importance of proceeding immediately with the FSA acquisition,â ? as
CC-130E cost avoidance savings from FWSAR replacement are only realistic if an integral
FSA capability is concurrently introduced.

End Excerpt


Basically, once both FWSAR and Herc Replacement (the retitled FSA acquisition) were complete,
DND was aiming to focus on the following Air Mobility Fleet:

15 x C-27J Spartan or C-295 -SAR role with light Utility tactical lift (within Canada/USA only);
9 x C-130H Hercules (2 x C-130H-30, 2 x C-130H84) - Tactical Airlift with light strat lift & (5 x C-130H90T) tactical air-to-air refuelling (CF-18's);
6 x C-17 III Globemaster - Strategic/Tactical Airlift - No specialized airport facilities required as with CC-150;
3 x CC-138 Twin Otter - Northern Canada SAR and resupply;
6 x CC-115 Challenger - VIP transport & general utility transport;
5 x CC-150 Polaris - (2 x MRT) Strat Cargo Lift, Troop transport, (2 x MRTT) strategic air-to-air refuelling - Note: No capability to refuel JSF, which requires boom, as probe & drogue equipped only, (1 x 001) VIP/troop transport.

 

[DJL]

Note: No capability to refuel JSF, which requires boom, as probe & drogue equipped only

That depends on the version.....the B and C both have probes.

 

[Brock]

The FSA was looking at procuring 4-6 C-17 before the Governent refused to push forward with the project.  For those of you who think we can get "barely used" C-130J/J-30, I say bollocks.  First of all there are barely any in service anywhere.  Only the Australia Air Force, USAF & USMC, the Danish Air Force, and Italian Air Force actually operate the C/KC-130J/J-30.  There will not be any "spare" ones available anytime soon.  The C-130 can not conduct strategic transport of the LAV series of vehicles, the LAV weighs roughly the max payload of the C-130J series and puts extreme limits on the C-130J series flight performance.  In addition, the LAV barely physically fits on the C-130; there are literally ijust inches to spare on either side of the cargo hold of the C-130J/J-30 when it is loaded on the aircraft.

The A400M while not flying will fly in 2007; a contract is signed for 180 aircraft.  The A400M has been in development for a decade and it is highly unlikely that there will be any other major delays.  Furthermore, the A400M program delays were mostly the result of internal German government politics, but the government resolved the issue over a year ago.  Program delays due to technology are unlikely as the A400M is not using untested and untried equipment with the exception of the engine--which has resolved all technical issues as per the contract.  Airbus Military would not agree to the contract without ensuring technical issues were resolved by contract signature.

The only criticism of the aircraft that I find valid is that of entry into operational service.  To those of you seem to belived this a German and French aircraft...what are you taling about, are you kindergarten?  Airbus Military is a transnational defence company, not owned by the German or French governments, but by aerospace manufacturers based out of the member countries of Great Britain, France, Spain, Germany, Turkey, Belgium, and Luxembourg.

More specifically:

"Airbus Military was established in January 1999 to manage the European A400M military transport aircraft project. The company was re-structured under its current name, Airbus Military SL (Sociedad Limitada) prior to the contract signature in May 2003. Its shareholders comprise AIRBUS (representing EADS & BAE SYSTEMS), EADS-CASA of Spain, TAI of Turkey and FLABEL of Belgium." (Airbus Military)

I personally would like to see Canada procure 8 X C-17, 16 X C-130J-30, and 16 C-27J to replace and enhance the capabilities provided by the CC-130 and CC-115 series of aircraft, but unfortunately the cost would be unaffordable and leave Canada with too few aircraft for day to day operations.  The cost would be too great at 8 X $300 + 16 X $100 + 16 X $50 =$4 billion dollars.  The high cost isn't in the actual procurement cost, but in the operating, training and support costs or through-life support costs.  The CF will not get good value out of the C-17 except in emergency situations which are far and few between...if we had a great budget and great public/gov't support for the military it would great.  That scenario would leave Canada short of medium transport aircraft with too much strategic airlift capacity.  The beauty of the A400M design is that it is designed to effectively operate in both roles, it is basically the 21st century Hercules, it is an affordable and capable do everything aircraft.

In regard to delivery timelines, immediatly procuring the C-27J will take an enormous amount of stress off the existing Hercules aircraft lengthening their service life and thus ensuring the A400M can be delivered soon enought to replace the Hercs.

 

[canuck101]

Does anyone know what the unit price of a a400m is going to be.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Does anyone know what the unit price of a a400m is going to be.

From earlier in the thread:

The cost of a fleet of 24 A400M and 24 C-27J would amount to $3.6 billion and $1.2 billion respectively for the actual procurement and a comprehensive initial support training package.  The latter amounts to $150 million and $50 million for the A400M and C-27J each respectively.

Of course, you could always try Google...

 

[DJL]

The CF will not get good value out of the C-17 except in emergency situations which are far and few between...if we had a great budget and great public/gov't support for the military it would great.  That scenario would leave Canada short of medium transport aircraft with too much strategic airlift capacity

Care to elaborate?

The beauty of the A400M design is that it is designed to effectively operate in both roles, it is basically the 21st century Hercules, it is an affordable and capable do everything aircraft.

Read designed. Also, how can it be the "21st century Hercules", when it hasn't been proven(unlike the Herc) yet?


You say affordable, but what if we purchase it, then major design flaws are later found and we are stuck with it? I'd think it to be more prudent to purchase an aircraft(s) that we know the concrete performance of, rather then an unproven design.

 

[ghazise]

For capital aquistions,  How high of a priority is Strategic Lift?

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Could you not use the C17 for things like jump courses if they weren't being used for national emergencies or taking kit oversea's?

 

[canuck101]

For capital aquistions,  How high of a priority is Strategic Lift?

it should be very high.

 

[ghazise]

Airlift, Sealift, in what ever form it takes shape in the CF, will be an enabling factor,  allow the CF equipment (old or new) to be transport to the Area of Operations,

Equipment a dependent factor, no matter how state of the art, is not effective if you can't get it to the AO,

I believe Canada needs it's own Strategic Lift Capability because if CDN government see's a priority that the US and our NATO allies do not agree with or want to participate with, we need to be able to have the capability in taking the lead role in that operation,,,  I think it was in Liberia last year a CDN Member of Parliament, determined that their was a need to deploy to the Liberia on Humanitarian Basis and he cited the shortfall of strategic lift,  if anyone know the name of the MP please add a post

 

[canuck101]

The only way we are going to get any new equipment is telling the Canadian Public want we need and what it will do for us.  We will have to go out and sell them on it. Tell them that we need new Strategic Lift Capability.  Show them that the planes that we have now are 40 years old and need replacement's.

Open up information Booth's in ever large mall in Canada promoting the Canadian armed forces and the equipment we have and what we are getting.  If a citizen is interested in joining setup an appointment at the nearest recruiting office.  We have to be aggressive in our search for more personnel.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Or perhaps a lobby group.?

 

[Kirkhill]

Here's Liberal Senator Colin Kenney passing the word to the Canadian public.

$340,000,000 (Canadian) per year to rent-to-own 10 C17s immediately.  800 hours and operational support.

That and 3 ATS/LSD(A) ships and we would be good to go.

Canada is stuck on the ground
 
Colin Kenny
National Post


November 6, 2004



Canadian troops have two options when they want to move quickly to emergencies. They can hitch-hike. Or they can hail a cab. Sometimes they can't do either.

This isn't just embarrassing. It's stupid.

Developing a first-rate strategic lift capacity for our Armed Forces would allow Canadian troops to move rapidly and safely to where they need to be. It would also have the valuable side effect of restoring Canada to the list of international players -- a list that any country needs to be on if it expects to advance its own interests at international bargaining tables.

Begging rides isn't the way to exert influence. Most recently, Canada couldn't even manage to get its Disaster Assistance Response Team to Haiti in the wake of the devastating tropical storm Jeanne. In 1992, we relied on the U.S. Air Force to transport armoured vehicles to Somalia. In 2002, we had to depend upon a combination of civilian rentals and U.S. military aircraft to deploy infantry to Afghanistan.

It gets more humiliating closer to home. During the devastating 1998 ice storm in eastern Canada, we had to rent planes and turn to the Americans to move our troops and equipment across our own country. Poor, bedraggled Canada.

Yes, we do have some planes that can carry troops. Little planes. Little antique planes. The Canadian military has between 16 to 24 Hercules tactical lift transport planes (out of a fleet of 32) available on any given day.

Admittedly, the C-130 Hercules tactical lift transport plane isn't tiny, the way an executive jet is tiny. But it is tiny in the context of carrying troops and equipment. It takes 26 separate Hercules lifts to move the Disaster Assistance Response team, compared to the six lifts it would require if Canada operated the Boeing C-17s used by the United States and Britain. It has been estimated that hundreds of pieces of Canadian military equipment cannot be fitted into a Herc without being dismantled.

The most elderly of our Hercs, which first flew for us in the 1960s, have the dubious distinction of being the oldest operating Hercules used for military purposes anywhere in the world. Canadian military people shudder to recall the deployment of Canada's peacekeeping force from Canada to East Timor several years ago -- the plane was forced to return to base three times because of faulty equipment before finally lumbering to its destination.

Moreover, Hercs don't have the range to get our troops to far-off places quickly. So, if they can't hitch a ride, the Canadian Armed Forces rent transport planes -- often old, rickety planes from suppliers in Russia and the Ukraine. The planes we rent -- mostly Antonovs -- have uncomfortable similarities to the Yakovlev-42 that crashed in Turkey last year, carrying 62 Spanish peacekeepers to their death.

It would only take one crash like that one to wipe out more of our troops than have been killed on a single deployment since the Korean War. It is one thing to put our troops in harm's way in a theatre of conflict. It is another to do so on aircraft past their prime.

Canada requires large, new, military transport planes. We don't need to fiddle around endlessly trying to decide which model to buy: the two options are the Boeing C-17 and the incipient European Airbus A400M, but the Airbus won't be ready until 2010 at the earliest, and by the time Canada's turn on the waiting list comes around -- given inevitable production delays -- it will probably be 2015.

The C-17 is in production, and it's good. Ten C-17s would cost us $340-million annually, including all costs associated with 800 flying hours a year on a rent-to-lease agreement. The U.S. Air Force would likely be willing to give up some of its own priority spots on the order line so we could have these planes flying for us in two years. They did so for the British recently.

Meanwhile, we could retire our entire fleet of Hercs, saving about $265-million a year and we would not have to rent commercial strategic lift, saving about $50-million a year. Bottom line: the net annual cost to the Department of National Defence would be around $30-million a year. This amounts to peanuts in terms of the kind of money Canada should be spending to modernize its military.

Very few countries have a strong airlift capacity. Many need to get their troops from place to place to perform UN missions. They, like Canada, are forced to rent. With our own C-17s, we could rent them out to other countries when we do not need them and make a little money, while offering a safer option than the ageing Antonovs and Yakovlevs.

Having a formidable airlift capacity would mean that Canada, whether it was sitting around the NATO table, the UN table or just conferring with allies, would feel less pressure to come up with ground troops when crises arise. When we chose to, we would be able to help -- and help quickly, which we cannot do today.

The Senate committee on national security and defence is conducting a review of Canada's defence policy. It will complete hearings by June and report by the end of the summer.

There are some initiatives that need to be taken now to reinvigorate our Armed Forces that are so obvious that they don't need to wait for a review. This is one of them.

Let's get our thumbs out of the air, put our hands in our pockets and come up with a modest sum of money to help restore Canadian military respectability, help ensure our troops' safety and help the world deal with its emergencies. We need strategic airlift - and the sooner, the better.

© National Post 2004

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

$340 million per annum for 10 C-17's including all maintenance sounds like an outstanding deal to me.

Quick sign the deal!!!!



Matthew.    ;D

 

[Kirkhill]

Only problem Matthew is that I think 340 Million per year is roughly equivalent to the Air Force's entire capital budget.

Mo' Money, Mo' Money, Mo' Money......

By the way I agree with you.

 

[Long in the tooth]

Yesterday I had the opportunity to listen to one of the Generals of the Air Staff speak.  The CAS has stated that there's "no new funding, no new personnel, no reduction in tempo and no reduction in infrastructure".  Increased military funding is nowhere on this minority government's radar (surprise!), so don't expect any new kit soon.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Only problem Matthew is that I think 340 Million per year is roughly equivalent to the Air Force's entire capital budget.

Mo' Money, Mo' Money, Mo' Money......

By the way I agree with you.

But that's part of the point isn't it.  The $340 million includes both capital + maintenance.  What are we forking out now to maintain the Herc's that are only airworthy about 50% of the time and have perhaps 15%-20% of the capability of the C-17's?

Kirkhill, it's sad that you and I don't get to sign the cheques....



Matthew.   ;D

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Yesterday I had the opportunity to listen to one of the Generals of the Air Staff speak.   The CAS has stated that there's "no new funding, no new personnel, no reduction in tempo and no reduction in infrastructure".   Increased military funding is nowhere on this minority government's radar (surprise!), so don't expect any new kit soon.

So what you're saying is that Paul Martin lied to the Canadian Public during the election and people were stupid enough to buy it again?



Matthew.   :blotto:

 

[Kirkhill]

And there's a surprise.............

Shock, horror and dismay :