Good ROF, bad drill

[Petard]

I recently came across this video, which from the equipment around the gun, looks to be fairly recent. In anycase it shows some bad habits that have evolved, certainly out of a good reason, to achieve a high rate of fire, but none the less have some potential risks I don't believe the gunners realise they're taking.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kb3tfk8dxvU

Just to give you some background, I have been involved with the implementation of the M777 in Canadian service from the beginning, and I'm still in regular contact with the  project office, life cycle manager and units deploying this gun, and yes I've been to theater outside the wire. I'm saying this to qualify what I'm about to say as being based on some history and lessons learned, so I'm not just "horning off" here.

First: having a round on the loading tray while gun is firing
It might seem to speed up your ROF in the short term, but in the long term it results in  stress on the hydraulics used to raise and lower the tray that it was not designed for, which eventually means it begins to fail, and the det has to use the trunnion pump to raise and lower the tray, resulting in a slower ROF. This practice has also resulted in damaged rounds, usually the fuse. This has been going on for some time and everyone I've talked to, from the engineers at Hattiesburg where the gun is assembled, to the instructors at the Canadian and American Artillery Schools say this is an unnecessary and bad habit. The same ROF can be sustained without having to put a round on the tray. It just takes practice to get the timing down, I have seen it.

Second: one guy ramming - this has resulted in bad rams and rounds falling short, so why do it?

Third; propellant in path of muzzle blast - white bag at that
This propellant has had a problem with secondary blast and is why they're supposed to be fired with an extra flash reducer, but leaving propellant in line of possible flash from the muzzle is asking for trouble. The charge needs to be handy to the number 5 but it doesn't take much to shield the propellant a bit better than this.

I'm well aware of the urgency with which the Troops throw themselves into the task, and I have a good idea which FOB this is, and they're not just wearing their PPE because there's a camera on, they're definitely motivated to get a high ROF. So I'm not doubting their soldierly qualities, their drive is something to be admired and used as an example, but there is something to be learned here.
Despite some having been bit in the ass by some of these bad habits, a lot of them are still going on, and an Arty Lesson's Learned document is about to make it way out to deal with some of these, but in the meanwhile maybe this video and this post can help start some discussion on how others can learn how to avoid the same bite marks.

 

[Old Sweat]

Keep fighting the good fight. All three errors are serious, and the last two Petard mentions are also just plan dangerous. For those not in the know, the white bags you see on the ground are filled with propellant. Believe me, as one who has burned a lot of charge bags at the end of a day's shooting, the intensity of multigrain cordite burning is astounding. I used to light a line of unused bags at the downwind end by standing a paper match on end head up in a small pile (say shot glass sized) of propellant and then lighting it with another match and vacating the area before it burned down. When the line of bags started to burn, the flames would leap up ten or twenty feet, the heat was intense and the whole thing produced a roar like a blast furnace. It wouldn't take much to ignite one and then the gun detchment would be in a world of hurt.

And if that isn't enough, there probably should be courts martials for the detachment commander, the TSM and the Troop Commander.

 

[muskrat89]

I love good gun drill  :nod:

Thanks Petard - great video, great points

 

[SeaKingTacco]

And if that isn't enough, there probably should be courts martials for the detachment commander, the TSM and the Troop Commander.

With a Youtube video as the primary article of evidence for the Prosecution.

I remember burning charge bags on phase training. The heat and intensity of the fire was unbelievable.

I can understand why the detachment might cheat on ramming and placement of the next round to be loaded, but I can't understand why the propellant is coming to the gun anywhere but from a 45 degree arc from the rear.  I'm not sure I could comfortably walk through muzzle blast with that much unguarded propellant in my arms. 

 

[Infanteer]

With a Youtube video as the primary article of evidence for the Prosecution.

I think he was referring to a likely COA should the bags go up.

 

[Old Sweat]

And the likely response to being told not to put the round on the loading tray before firing and not to have only one gun number on the rammer will be, "@&*$ from the school doesn't know what the .... he's talking about. We're in a FOB and he's trying to feed us peacetime Gagetown crap."

A bad drill developed re the round on the tray (I first saw it in clips of the 06 and 07 TFs) and it has persisted for so long it will take a lot of arse kicking and grief to fix it. The rammer drill can probably be corrected more easily, and the propelling charge in the line of muzzle blast is just so frigging dumb that it should correct itself. 

 

[dapaterson]

... the propelling charge in the line of muzzle blast is just so frigging dumb that it should correct itself.

Unfortunately, the self-correction might only come through catastrophe.  Ask the Engineers about the Slesse Demolition Range incident... http://www.canadianptsd.com/John's%20Story%20Page%201.htm

 

[Old Sweat]

I knoiw about the Slesse Range incident, both for professional reasons and because an officer training classmate's son was one of the folks killed.

 

[GAP]

I love good gun drill  :nod:

Thanks Petard - great video, great points

ditto

with my 20 yr old going in next month for artillery...I sent him the link for the video.....

 

[SeaKingTacco]

I think he was referring to a likely COA should the bags go up.

Yes, I know.  I was pointing out the irony that, in the event of an accident, all of the evidence for the prosecution already existed on Youtube.

Further tangent: the guy tamping the charge at Slesse Range was a colleague of mine at RRMC.  He was thrown a great distance, but lived.  The brother of one of the officers cadets in my troop on phase two with was not so lucky.  He was quickly pulled from the field to attend his brother's funeral.

I may be a long time out of the Artillery, but it didn't take an IG course for me to know that drills exist for a reason.  Follow them or someone eventually gets hurt or killed.

 

[Nfld Sapper]

Unfortunately, the self-correction might only come through catastrophe.  Ask the Engineers about the Slesse Demolition Range incident... http://www.canadianptsd.com/John's%20Story%20Page%201.htm

Lets not bring this one up again please.

It was a series of errors that lead to what happened.

EDITED TO FIX QUOTE.

 

[dapaterson]

NFLD Sapper:  it's the same mindset that may be present here - if we do not learn from past errors, we'll repeat them.  And it appears that parts of the artillery community are getting sloppy, taking unnecessary risk and leadership is ignoring those failings - just as happened 253 months ago.

Saying "Let's not talk about it" is a failure of leadership - hiding errors , particularly fatal ones, does no one any favours.  The engineer community ignored some very basic knowledge and lost six on the range that day in a training accident.  Hopefully, the artillery community can correct itself without such an incident.

 

[Bass ackwards]

Since it's semi-germane to the topic at hand, here's a photo I took in Shilo in 1984 of charge bags being burned.
In the photo, only a handful of bags were being burned. They were the unused "charge 7" (and possibly "charge 6") bags from a C-1 howitzer shoot. They would have been less than the size of the pile of charge bags at the front of the M-777 in the video.

Edit: Apologies for the poor quality of the photo. It was taken with a 15-year-old Kodak 110 that had been kicked around a zillion beach parties and camping trips all across the country. Great little camera.

 

[Tem]

Lets not bring this one up again please.

It was a series of errors that lead to what happened.

EDITED TO FIX QUOTE.

I read all the comments on the subject of the Sleese Range Demolition Accident in this thread, and I have to make comment.  NFLD Sapper Say's it was a "series of errors".  I agree to a point, it was a "series of errors of the military leadership" to ensure safe demolition practices were being followed, safe equipment was being used and safe "training practices" where being implemented.  It was NOT a "series of errors" by the actual trainee's being taught that day.  They did EXACTLY  what they were being taught, and the were under direct SUPERVISION of "trained" personnel who were suppose to ensure that no student did anything that was "unsafe".  So I just want to make sure that everyone understands that "yes, there was a series of errors, that needed to be corrected" but those error were LEADERSHIP errors.

I feel I am qualified to make the above statements, because I was there, that day in June, and saw my friends and classmates killed.

 

[Nfld Sapper]

Tem I will not argue with someone that was there on that day in June but that being said, yes leadership  had its part in it but also the mixing of military grade explosives and commercial explosive had another.

I was at CFSME last year when they rededicated a monument within the school to Slesse, some of the survivors and the families of the fallen where there.

20 years later the wounds are still fresh for those that where involved.

to all those involved at Slesse.

 

[George Wallace]

I feel I am qualified to make the above statements, because I was there, that day in June, and saw my friends and classmates killed.

This, to me, indicates a very biased view.  I have no idea of what your qualifications were later in life, but at the time of the incident, they would have been next to nil.  At this moment, I don't feel shifting the blame, or placing it solely on "the Leadership", is justified.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

The thread is about artillery drills. Keep it there.

Milnet.ca Staff

 

[Mikeg81]

My experience comes from being with E Bty during 3-06, including Op Medusa. The battery fired about 6800 rounds total of 155 and 81mm during the 6 mos we were there(with about 20 or so of 120mm mortar, but that is another story).

1: The round on the loading tray: The only broken fuses we had were from gun numbers missing the tray while putting the round on, and the tip of the C32's broke off. Happened about 3 times total, on my det. OK, bad drill there.

If the tray can't hold the 98 lb HE round on there with out the hydarulics taking a crap, how is it going to cope with a 120 lb MACS round there instead? It seems less of a drills problem and more of a gun problem. The rounds don't rattle around or jump when the gun is fired...

2: One man ram: When one guy is on sentry, one on the gate, two on leave, and two are on GD on the FOB, or out on a convoy, we make do with what manpower we have.

I saw/heard one(that's right, 1) fall back my whole tour, on another gun, in another troop. Non-problem from my experience.

 

[Gun Shy]

Obviously, you lack experience  and knowledge, to justify that these should be acceptable operating procedures.

 

[Dissident]

The vengeful striking fucking hammer of the gods the M777 are.

Regarding the one man ram I was going to say what Mike81 said.