TangoTwoBravo
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The thread on Equipment and Doctrine has had me thinking and looking at how Doctrine evolves. I came across a good little paper titled The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War. It is authored by Timothy Lupfer from the West Point History Department as part of the Leavenworth Papers in July 1981. It is a relatively easy read and provides an excellent overview of the German doctrinal process during the war. The book opens with a quote from Wilhelm Balck ,a WWI German divisional commander and writer on tactics (his son should be known to students of WWII), that "Bullets quickly write new tactics." Two developments that receive attention in the book are the elastic defence adopted in 1917 and the offensive tactics of 1918.
The elastic defence grew out of German studies of the defensive battles of 1916, particularly the Somme. While British commentators focus on the horrific British losses of the Somme, the Germans also suffered high casualties trying to hold forward positions in the face of heavy artillery preparation. Out of this experience grew the idea of an elastic defence based on several lines of defence. Forward lines would be lightly held and the enemy would essentially be allowed to enter into a battle zone within the depth of the defence. Machine gun posts would engage the advancing enemy from the flanks and the rear, while the artillery would hold fire during the preparation phase and focus on hitting the advancing enemy within the main line of resistance. Counterattacks would then hit the isolated and confused enemies. Ground was not seen as important in and of itself.
The offensive tactics employed in 1918 have been given many names by non-German observers, ranging from Hutier Tactics to Storm Troop tactics. The author prefers the term infiltration but he notes that the term infiltration it goes beyond individual infantry sneaking up but rather refers to a combined arms team bypassing enemy centres of resistance. Key aspects of these tactics are a short but sharp artillery barrage (hours instead of days) and several waves of infantry working their way forward identifying and bypassing enemy centres of resistance. The first wave was essentially scouts finding strong points. The second wave would have support weapons and flamethrowers (the Storm Troops) who would seek to press forward and bypass enemy strong points. A third wave would also consist of Storm Troops but would have heavier support weapons with the task of supporting and protecting the second wave. Regular infantry elements would follow the Storm Troops to deal with the isolated enemy strong points. The foundation for these tactics had been laid in the counter-attacks developed as part of the elastic defence, so one change evolved into another in this sense.
German Armies established Storm Troop battalions (alternatively called Storm Battalions or Storm Units) with specialized training, equipment and oganization, while some Divisions had ad-hoc Storm Troop battalions. A battalion might have up to five infantry assault companies, two heavy machine gun companies, a flame thrower section, an infantry gun battery and a trench mortar company. The infantry assault companies were based at their lowest level on the group (Gruppe). A group had two squads (Trupps). One squad had a light machine gun (a relatively new innovation of the time) with four soldiers while the other squad had eight men (leader and seven riflemen). It is noted that the primary purpose of the riflemen was to protect the light machine gun.
The German adaptations to the tactical situation on the Western Front are compared with French and British practices. The French adopted a rolling barrage with which the infantry had to keep up. This lead to disasters in Nivelle's 1917 offensive. The author makes the point that the French tied their infantry to the artillery, while the Germans reversed that and essentially tied the artillery to the infantry. The author does, however, credit a French officer named Captain Laffargue with writing an article in 1915 that inspired German thoughts on what eventually became their infiltration tactics. The British seized on the tank as a solution along with heavy artillery preparation.
Of interest to me (I live in the doctrine and training world) were the details on how the Germans went about developing these changes. The Army High Command on the Western Front (OHL) had an Operations Section consisting of twelve staff officers with a Major as the chief of operations (compare that to us today...). In addition to running the war on the Western Front (as well as Italy and the Middle East) these officers collected observations from the field and analysed the information. They consulted captured enemy doctrinal notes as well as their own. They then produced doctrine through a rather collaborative effort. A certain Captain Geyer is credited with writing both the elastic defence and infiltration tactics. The OHL then promulgated and trained the units on the Western Front in these ideas, and the overall Commander tolerated criticism and debate. It is also interesting that the commander did not call these tactics "his" but rather "ours." Nivelle, on the other hand, seemed to take this innovations somewhat personally.
Lupfer offers the following description of the German doctrinal change process:
a. perception of a need for change
b. solicitation of ideas
c. definition of the change
d. dissemination of the change
e. enforcement throughout the army
f. modification of the organization and equipment
g. thorough training
h. evaluation of effectiveness
i. subsequent refinement
All in all an interesting little read that I recommend to those who can find it.
Cheers
T2B
The elastic defence grew out of German studies of the defensive battles of 1916, particularly the Somme. While British commentators focus on the horrific British losses of the Somme, the Germans also suffered high casualties trying to hold forward positions in the face of heavy artillery preparation. Out of this experience grew the idea of an elastic defence based on several lines of defence. Forward lines would be lightly held and the enemy would essentially be allowed to enter into a battle zone within the depth of the defence. Machine gun posts would engage the advancing enemy from the flanks and the rear, while the artillery would hold fire during the preparation phase and focus on hitting the advancing enemy within the main line of resistance. Counterattacks would then hit the isolated and confused enemies. Ground was not seen as important in and of itself.
The offensive tactics employed in 1918 have been given many names by non-German observers, ranging from Hutier Tactics to Storm Troop tactics. The author prefers the term infiltration but he notes that the term infiltration it goes beyond individual infantry sneaking up but rather refers to a combined arms team bypassing enemy centres of resistance. Key aspects of these tactics are a short but sharp artillery barrage (hours instead of days) and several waves of infantry working their way forward identifying and bypassing enemy centres of resistance. The first wave was essentially scouts finding strong points. The second wave would have support weapons and flamethrowers (the Storm Troops) who would seek to press forward and bypass enemy strong points. A third wave would also consist of Storm Troops but would have heavier support weapons with the task of supporting and protecting the second wave. Regular infantry elements would follow the Storm Troops to deal with the isolated enemy strong points. The foundation for these tactics had been laid in the counter-attacks developed as part of the elastic defence, so one change evolved into another in this sense.
German Armies established Storm Troop battalions (alternatively called Storm Battalions or Storm Units) with specialized training, equipment and oganization, while some Divisions had ad-hoc Storm Troop battalions. A battalion might have up to five infantry assault companies, two heavy machine gun companies, a flame thrower section, an infantry gun battery and a trench mortar company. The infantry assault companies were based at their lowest level on the group (Gruppe). A group had two squads (Trupps). One squad had a light machine gun (a relatively new innovation of the time) with four soldiers while the other squad had eight men (leader and seven riflemen). It is noted that the primary purpose of the riflemen was to protect the light machine gun.
The German adaptations to the tactical situation on the Western Front are compared with French and British practices. The French adopted a rolling barrage with which the infantry had to keep up. This lead to disasters in Nivelle's 1917 offensive. The author makes the point that the French tied their infantry to the artillery, while the Germans reversed that and essentially tied the artillery to the infantry. The author does, however, credit a French officer named Captain Laffargue with writing an article in 1915 that inspired German thoughts on what eventually became their infiltration tactics. The British seized on the tank as a solution along with heavy artillery preparation.
Of interest to me (I live in the doctrine and training world) were the details on how the Germans went about developing these changes. The Army High Command on the Western Front (OHL) had an Operations Section consisting of twelve staff officers with a Major as the chief of operations (compare that to us today...). In addition to running the war on the Western Front (as well as Italy and the Middle East) these officers collected observations from the field and analysed the information. They consulted captured enemy doctrinal notes as well as their own. They then produced doctrine through a rather collaborative effort. A certain Captain Geyer is credited with writing both the elastic defence and infiltration tactics. The OHL then promulgated and trained the units on the Western Front in these ideas, and the overall Commander tolerated criticism and debate. It is also interesting that the commander did not call these tactics "his" but rather "ours." Nivelle, on the other hand, seemed to take this innovations somewhat personally.
Lupfer offers the following description of the German doctrinal change process:
a. perception of a need for change
b. solicitation of ideas
c. definition of the change
d. dissemination of the change
e. enforcement throughout the army
f. modification of the organization and equipment
g. thorough training
h. evaluation of effectiveness
i. subsequent refinement
All in all an interesting little read that I recommend to those who can find it.
Cheers
T2B