I found this memo from CWO Richard very informative and agreeable to. Read the part about our soldier skills. Alot of people complain when we go practice with our bang sticks. Here is the cold hard truth to prove that being a soldier is first .
Memorandum
11 Sep 2006
Info
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
1. The history of the Signal Corp was founded under fire during the world wars. Today it seems that for the most part, that portion of the Signal’s history has been relegated to the sidelines. The tendency/perception in today’s more modern and technological army is to concentrate on technical skills vice basic soldiering skills. Unlike anything experienced in the past, present day soldiers are facing threats in an asymmetrical theatre of operation. The premise that “Technical Job Knowledge” is the "be all to end all" is no longer true. A soldier in today’s Canadian Forces needs to be well trained in the basic soldier skills, including the ability for junior Non-Commissioned Members to be able to make informed and decisive decisions in a timely manner while under duress. These basic skills are not being taught in favour of a more technical career progression.
2. C & E Branch soldiers employed in an operational theatre such as OP ARCHER, in Afghanistan, require what would at first glance be seen as a new toolbox of skills. This in fact is not so. What is required is a more concentrated training regime of basic soldier skills ultimately including leadership training possibly in the form of a more advanced and field intensive PLQ course (in line with the once mandated Combat Leaders Course). As an example, prior to this deployment the unit participated in BTE 05 in Wainwright Alberta. Although the training was sufficient for the yearly qualification, it failed to address some of the key concerns that were passed back in the Lessons Learned series and other Army periodicals. Being cognizant of this fact, it was quite apparent that our Signallers were not ready to be employed outside the confines of the Kandahar Airfield (KAF). Therefore once in theatre, approval was sought to further the competency level of our soldiers. An intense training regime was developed and implemented to ensure our soldiers received the mandated training. Prior to our soldiers being given the “Green Light” to proceed outside the confines of KAF, an intense validation exercise was conducted. The training in question erased all doubts and gave them the confidence they desperately sought and required to act and react to every situation. To this day, I still firmly believe that given the volatile conditions that our soldiers faced daily during this deployment, that without the added training, they, we would have suffered much more tragic losses.
3. Training progression at this time does not address the problem. The normal career progression for a member of the C & E Branch for most MOCs / MOS ID, at this time would be (approximately) as follows:
a. Basic Soldier Qualification (DP1)– St. Jean – 33 Training Days;
b. Specific Trade Training – Varied by Course;
c. Primary Leadership Qualification (DP2) – 8 weeks; and
d. Intermediate Leadership Qualification – 24.5 Training Days non-inclusive of the DL package.
4. Some of the C & E Branch personnel that are presently on OP ARCHER have been exposed to a myriad of situations that they were not sufficiently trained for prior to the deployment. Although as mentioned above, the annual training was at one time considered sufficient for a deployment, this is no longer the case. During this deployment, C & E Branch personnel have been employed on various tasks including combat patrols both mounted and dismounted with the in place Canadian Battle Group, as well as with foreign countries, such as Task Force WHITESHARK (Romanians), to being responsible for the Camp security as members of Force Protection, manning the Entry Control Points (ECP), clearance patrols, as members of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF). Some of them have been exposed to Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), small arms fire and rocket propelled grenade attacks from the enemy as well as rocket and mortar attacks on the Main base as well as various PRT locations. Many also administered real time Combat Casualty Care on badly injured and maimed comrades. These soldiers for the most part have adapted remarkably well, usually with an extremely short training period, completing the tasks assigned of them, usually under situations of extreme stress. Soldiers that deploy outside the wire are expected to have an exceptional background of combat casualty care, convoy operations, IED training, ECM TTPs, as well as of course their basic soldier skills including a high level of technical knowledge within their own trade group. The expectations of the higher leadership far out weigh the skill-sets of the soldiers and junior leaders in some cases until they have been exposed to the different situations.
5. All the above leads to the conclusion that more theatre specific training is required, including pushing for individual soldiers to complete both the DP2 and the DP3 phases of their careers. This will ultimately allow soldiers to expand on the theoretical knowledge that they have gained when placed in more stressful and demanding situations. Some of the suggested training is listed below, keep in mind though that the actual Battle Task Standards (BTS) will be issued by the Standards cell of the mounting Brigade or units:
a. Force Protection Tasks – This area of training encompasses a variety of subjects, including conduct of checkpoints, roadblocks and escort tasks. Some of the personnel within this unit were tasked with force protection at the onset of the mission once they had arrived on the ground. Normally this is not a problem if they are to be simply employed as augmentation to more “qualified” units such as the Infantry. In this case though, Signal’s personnel provided the leadership as well as the troops to complete various tasks:
i. Personnel Searches – An important skill to learn. Explosives and weapons can be concealed in a myriad of items, from on the body itself to a cell phone being turned onto a single shot pistol. On this deployment, Force protection personnel have access to newer technology such as walk through metal detectors, that are calibrated to be extremely sensitive, and a personnel X-Ray machine that will basically enable to see through all items of clothing. All soldiers involved must master proper body search techniques that ideally should be instructed by a SME, such as the Military Police; and
ii. Vehicle Searches – Due to the high number of large vehicles that are required to sustain the camp itself, proper search techniques for any contraband is essential. Items that are confiscated range from electronics (radios, phones etc.) to drugs. Although the vehicles are given a preliminary search utilizing scent dogs (Explosives), a vehicle search team must be extremely cognizant of the fact that contraband can be hidden in many different locations on a vehicle. There have been incidents where dashboard gauges have been replaced with assemblies that hold cameras, cell phones or other items. All soldiers involved must master proper veh search techniques that ideally should be instructed by a SME, such as the Military Police.
b. Instinctive Shooting – Although members of the Sqn received only a 2 day introduction to instinctive shooting, it was a great success, not only for the actual skilled acquired, but also for the individual soldiers as their confidence while using their personal weapon increased immensely. This is a time (5 Training Days) and resource (ammunition) intensive phase of the training, but ideally all personnel deploying on operations, and in fact all personnel should also complete this training on an annual basis. The training schedule and resource list can be obtained from 3 PPCLI;
c. Convoy Ops training – No specific period of time has been designated for this subject, however, due to the nature of this and possibly future operations, it should receive more than just lip service. A method of instructing as well as practical exercises should be incorporated into the pre-deployment training. This could be done (conveniently enough) in Wainwright utilizing the CMTC facilities. This will allow for an accurate assessment of drills etc. There remains a distinct possibility that with the arrival of the new Battle Group, that the day-to-day operation of supporting elements will change, in turn changing the TTPs and SOPs that are used at this time;
d. Electronic Counter-measures – Although a fairly new field of expertise, especially to the level it is now being employed on operation, this is a vital phase of training, not just for the technical aspects but also more for the testing and operation procedures. The soldiers who employ these devices need to be absolutely confident of its abilities. During the training it should be stressed that the equipment is only as good as the operator’s knowledge of its operation and limitations. TTPs for ECM are still in the developmental stage at this time. The TTPs that have been developed at this time remain classified, and therefore that information would be passed on a need to know basis, once in theatre;
e. Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) – Although this is covered during pre-deployment training, due to the nature of these conflicts, this subject must be constantly stressed and reviewed during the deployment. Included in the training should be a complete introduction to any new equipment (such as the new tourniquet, blood clotting agent and the Israeli field dressing) that is available to all personnel. A comprehensive training package for this subject should be available from the integral medical resources. As a note, a qualified and experienced medic or Doctor must present this subject;
f. Casualty Extraction – As has been seen during this deployment, the number of IED strikes and vehicle accidents is at a rate never before experienced by the Canadian Forces. Training to ensure that a casualty is extracted from a disabled vehicle without exacerbating the injuries is essential. Although most personnel would believe that extracting a casualty from a disabled vehicle is a simple thing, variations of the injured soldiers mass as well as the final resting position of the vehicle, make this an important topic to be extensively practiced;
g. Vehicle Recovery – There will always exist situations when vehicle crews must be able to self-recover their own vehicles due either to battle damage or because they simply broke down. Ideally all convoys should have integral support with them, but that is logistically impossible. Convoys, at a minimum, should deploy with serviceable vehicles, with tow chains/cables. Best-case scenario would be to deploy with “A-Frames” to tow any disabled vehs. Proper recovery techniques will prevent injury and further damage to the disabled vehicle. This information must be presented by a Maintainer, and must also include recovery procedures for all types of SMP in use at the time; and
h. Pairs/Group/Section Fire & Movement – Although nobody expects that Signals personnel become as proficient at “the Art of War” as the Infantry, being a member of one of the Signals trade does not mean that they should not be proficient with their personal weapons either individually or as part of a small group. Fire & Movement training up to and including Group size manoeuvre elements should be a requirement for deploying soldiers. Fire & Movement up to Section level would be preferred in the long run. It must be considered that Signal’s soldiers can be employed with the Battle Groups, and as such must have the training that will, if required allow them to fight along side the Infantry, regardless of the situation, be it a Patrol, Advance to Contact or an Ambush.
6. Leadership – Although the proficiency of the leadership skills at the junior level is very good at this time, there must exist more training that is relevant to what the Army is facing today. Leadership courses must evolve away from the classroom-based instruction and focus more heavily on the practical “hands on” aspects of leadership. More challenging teaching scenarios that force the potential Jr. NCO to perform under greater levels of stress and duress can accomplish this. Simply completing a “Management” style course is insufficient given the situations that these junior leaders may find themselves in. An abundance of initiative must be stressed at all times during their training, ensuring that they can find the best solution for any problem they may encounter. The training progression with regards to the CF PLQ is currently under review, and has been previously identified as being insufficient for the training of Jr. leaders at this time.
7. TTPs and SOPs are subject to constant change, dependent on the user at the time. Signals units that are slated to deploy will be given a Task Matrix, consisting of identifiable BTSs that must be completed as part of the training. The matrix in itself should be used as a guide with regard to it being the MINIMUM standard that is required from soldiers and units prior their deployment. Every effort must be made to obtain the most up-to date information that is available, and use that as a training block. This will ensure that all soldiers are equipped and prepared for the deployment.
8. There appears, at this time to be a “disjoint” in the training that is received by the C&E Branch personnel. During the DP1, all soldiers are supposed to receive an introduction to Field craft, Platoon Weapons operation and deployment and basic field operations as is shown below:
a. PO 101 – Participate In Dismounted Offensive Operations;
b. PO 102 - Participate In Dismounted Defensive Operations;
c. PO 103 – Patrol;
d. PO 104 – Fire The C7 With The C79 Optical Sight Unit;
e. PO 105 –Fire the General Purpose Machine Gun, 7.62mm, C6;
f. PO 106 – Fire the Light Machine Gun, 5.56mm, C9;
g. PO 109 – Throw Grenades;
h. PO 110 – Perform Individual Field craft;
i. PO 111 – Operate Tactical Communication Equipment;
j. PO 114 – Perform Army Physical Training;
k. EdO 101 – Leadership in Peace and WAR; and
l. Edo 102 - Law of Armed Conflict.
9. It should be noted again that the DP1 course is approximately 33 days long, and some of the subject matter listed above is not covered, or not covered with any detail. From talking to several of the newer members to the unit, the majority of weapons training and field training took place once the members were in this unit, and not during their basic training. This leaves most of the C & E Branch soldiers without the basic skills necessary to perform as soldiers. However the majority of them are technically proficient at their MOC following their journeyman’s training.
10. At this time, the soldiers are expected to pick up this “Hard Field” knowledge by utilizing a form of osmosis at the units that they get posted to. Sometimes, depending on the unit, this is not a major problem. However, when these newer soldiers are posted to a front line field unit, employed for example as a Coy Signaller, they are expected to assimilate the information and skills as quickly as possible. This leaves them at a distinct disadvantage. As a possible remedy for this problem, I am suggesting that at a minimum, a course be implemented at the Signal Unit level. This course would address the shortcomings that we are seeing at this time, and will ultimately make for a more rounded soldier, able to conduct his/her job within Combat Arms units, with a more specific background with regards to training. This suggested course is as follows:
a. a Unit run, field intensive package of approximately 2-3 weeks in duration, that will encompass all of the above (para 9) subjects, including the weapons training, less the EdOs. This “package” could be compared to the Land Environmental Training or the Infantry annual Battle Schools that were run in the past, to ensure that the skills of all personnel within a unit were at a relatively high standard. Ideally this should be run after the soldier arrives at a field unit, and may be run as part of the annual training exercises. The opportunity exists also for “importing” SMEs to assist with the training; and
b. this training may also be conducted as a “Pre-Course” for the DP2, Primary Leadership Course (Land), enabling the soldiers to have a more solid knowledge base for the conduct of an important career course. This will ultimately lead to soldiers with a more rounded experience, able to perform leadership under stress roles not only in Canada, but also when deployed overseas.
11. In closing, it is to the benefit of all C & E soldiers to complete more in-depth training, including more “Theatre Specific” training. Training that will prepare them and also allow Jr. leaders the opportunity to take the initiative, and lead subordinates on the ground during times of greater stress. This added training has and will continue to save lives. In my opinion, all soldiers posted to Combat Arms units, or elsewhere should at a minimum, be mandated to achieve the same standards required of an Engineer, an Artilleryman, a Crewman or a Vehicle Technician (Veh Tech’s are now also mandated to attend PLQ (land)). Soldiers should never be placed in a situation destined to fail. They must have the confidence and the ability to react in all combat scenarios, and if they cannot, then we have failed to properly prepare them. Not only do our Signallers need to be proficient tradesmen/tradeswomen, they above all must be soldiers first to survive these adverse and volatile conditions.
RJ Richard
CWO
Task Force Mercury
Memorandum
11 Sep 2006
Info
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
1. The history of the Signal Corp was founded under fire during the world wars. Today it seems that for the most part, that portion of the Signal’s history has been relegated to the sidelines. The tendency/perception in today’s more modern and technological army is to concentrate on technical skills vice basic soldiering skills. Unlike anything experienced in the past, present day soldiers are facing threats in an asymmetrical theatre of operation. The premise that “Technical Job Knowledge” is the "be all to end all" is no longer true. A soldier in today’s Canadian Forces needs to be well trained in the basic soldier skills, including the ability for junior Non-Commissioned Members to be able to make informed and decisive decisions in a timely manner while under duress. These basic skills are not being taught in favour of a more technical career progression.
2. C & E Branch soldiers employed in an operational theatre such as OP ARCHER, in Afghanistan, require what would at first glance be seen as a new toolbox of skills. This in fact is not so. What is required is a more concentrated training regime of basic soldier skills ultimately including leadership training possibly in the form of a more advanced and field intensive PLQ course (in line with the once mandated Combat Leaders Course). As an example, prior to this deployment the unit participated in BTE 05 in Wainwright Alberta. Although the training was sufficient for the yearly qualification, it failed to address some of the key concerns that were passed back in the Lessons Learned series and other Army periodicals. Being cognizant of this fact, it was quite apparent that our Signallers were not ready to be employed outside the confines of the Kandahar Airfield (KAF). Therefore once in theatre, approval was sought to further the competency level of our soldiers. An intense training regime was developed and implemented to ensure our soldiers received the mandated training. Prior to our soldiers being given the “Green Light” to proceed outside the confines of KAF, an intense validation exercise was conducted. The training in question erased all doubts and gave them the confidence they desperately sought and required to act and react to every situation. To this day, I still firmly believe that given the volatile conditions that our soldiers faced daily during this deployment, that without the added training, they, we would have suffered much more tragic losses.
3. Training progression at this time does not address the problem. The normal career progression for a member of the C & E Branch for most MOCs / MOS ID, at this time would be (approximately) as follows:
a. Basic Soldier Qualification (DP1)– St. Jean – 33 Training Days;
b. Specific Trade Training – Varied by Course;
c. Primary Leadership Qualification (DP2) – 8 weeks; and
d. Intermediate Leadership Qualification – 24.5 Training Days non-inclusive of the DL package.
4. Some of the C & E Branch personnel that are presently on OP ARCHER have been exposed to a myriad of situations that they were not sufficiently trained for prior to the deployment. Although as mentioned above, the annual training was at one time considered sufficient for a deployment, this is no longer the case. During this deployment, C & E Branch personnel have been employed on various tasks including combat patrols both mounted and dismounted with the in place Canadian Battle Group, as well as with foreign countries, such as Task Force WHITESHARK (Romanians), to being responsible for the Camp security as members of Force Protection, manning the Entry Control Points (ECP), clearance patrols, as members of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF). Some of them have been exposed to Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), small arms fire and rocket propelled grenade attacks from the enemy as well as rocket and mortar attacks on the Main base as well as various PRT locations. Many also administered real time Combat Casualty Care on badly injured and maimed comrades. These soldiers for the most part have adapted remarkably well, usually with an extremely short training period, completing the tasks assigned of them, usually under situations of extreme stress. Soldiers that deploy outside the wire are expected to have an exceptional background of combat casualty care, convoy operations, IED training, ECM TTPs, as well as of course their basic soldier skills including a high level of technical knowledge within their own trade group. The expectations of the higher leadership far out weigh the skill-sets of the soldiers and junior leaders in some cases until they have been exposed to the different situations.
5. All the above leads to the conclusion that more theatre specific training is required, including pushing for individual soldiers to complete both the DP2 and the DP3 phases of their careers. This will ultimately allow soldiers to expand on the theoretical knowledge that they have gained when placed in more stressful and demanding situations. Some of the suggested training is listed below, keep in mind though that the actual Battle Task Standards (BTS) will be issued by the Standards cell of the mounting Brigade or units:
a. Force Protection Tasks – This area of training encompasses a variety of subjects, including conduct of checkpoints, roadblocks and escort tasks. Some of the personnel within this unit were tasked with force protection at the onset of the mission once they had arrived on the ground. Normally this is not a problem if they are to be simply employed as augmentation to more “qualified” units such as the Infantry. In this case though, Signal’s personnel provided the leadership as well as the troops to complete various tasks:
i. Personnel Searches – An important skill to learn. Explosives and weapons can be concealed in a myriad of items, from on the body itself to a cell phone being turned onto a single shot pistol. On this deployment, Force protection personnel have access to newer technology such as walk through metal detectors, that are calibrated to be extremely sensitive, and a personnel X-Ray machine that will basically enable to see through all items of clothing. All soldiers involved must master proper body search techniques that ideally should be instructed by a SME, such as the Military Police; and
ii. Vehicle Searches – Due to the high number of large vehicles that are required to sustain the camp itself, proper search techniques for any contraband is essential. Items that are confiscated range from electronics (radios, phones etc.) to drugs. Although the vehicles are given a preliminary search utilizing scent dogs (Explosives), a vehicle search team must be extremely cognizant of the fact that contraband can be hidden in many different locations on a vehicle. There have been incidents where dashboard gauges have been replaced with assemblies that hold cameras, cell phones or other items. All soldiers involved must master proper veh search techniques that ideally should be instructed by a SME, such as the Military Police.
b. Instinctive Shooting – Although members of the Sqn received only a 2 day introduction to instinctive shooting, it was a great success, not only for the actual skilled acquired, but also for the individual soldiers as their confidence while using their personal weapon increased immensely. This is a time (5 Training Days) and resource (ammunition) intensive phase of the training, but ideally all personnel deploying on operations, and in fact all personnel should also complete this training on an annual basis. The training schedule and resource list can be obtained from 3 PPCLI;
c. Convoy Ops training – No specific period of time has been designated for this subject, however, due to the nature of this and possibly future operations, it should receive more than just lip service. A method of instructing as well as practical exercises should be incorporated into the pre-deployment training. This could be done (conveniently enough) in Wainwright utilizing the CMTC facilities. This will allow for an accurate assessment of drills etc. There remains a distinct possibility that with the arrival of the new Battle Group, that the day-to-day operation of supporting elements will change, in turn changing the TTPs and SOPs that are used at this time;
d. Electronic Counter-measures – Although a fairly new field of expertise, especially to the level it is now being employed on operation, this is a vital phase of training, not just for the technical aspects but also more for the testing and operation procedures. The soldiers who employ these devices need to be absolutely confident of its abilities. During the training it should be stressed that the equipment is only as good as the operator’s knowledge of its operation and limitations. TTPs for ECM are still in the developmental stage at this time. The TTPs that have been developed at this time remain classified, and therefore that information would be passed on a need to know basis, once in theatre;
e. Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) – Although this is covered during pre-deployment training, due to the nature of these conflicts, this subject must be constantly stressed and reviewed during the deployment. Included in the training should be a complete introduction to any new equipment (such as the new tourniquet, blood clotting agent and the Israeli field dressing) that is available to all personnel. A comprehensive training package for this subject should be available from the integral medical resources. As a note, a qualified and experienced medic or Doctor must present this subject;
f. Casualty Extraction – As has been seen during this deployment, the number of IED strikes and vehicle accidents is at a rate never before experienced by the Canadian Forces. Training to ensure that a casualty is extracted from a disabled vehicle without exacerbating the injuries is essential. Although most personnel would believe that extracting a casualty from a disabled vehicle is a simple thing, variations of the injured soldiers mass as well as the final resting position of the vehicle, make this an important topic to be extensively practiced;
g. Vehicle Recovery – There will always exist situations when vehicle crews must be able to self-recover their own vehicles due either to battle damage or because they simply broke down. Ideally all convoys should have integral support with them, but that is logistically impossible. Convoys, at a minimum, should deploy with serviceable vehicles, with tow chains/cables. Best-case scenario would be to deploy with “A-Frames” to tow any disabled vehs. Proper recovery techniques will prevent injury and further damage to the disabled vehicle. This information must be presented by a Maintainer, and must also include recovery procedures for all types of SMP in use at the time; and
h. Pairs/Group/Section Fire & Movement – Although nobody expects that Signals personnel become as proficient at “the Art of War” as the Infantry, being a member of one of the Signals trade does not mean that they should not be proficient with their personal weapons either individually or as part of a small group. Fire & Movement training up to and including Group size manoeuvre elements should be a requirement for deploying soldiers. Fire & Movement up to Section level would be preferred in the long run. It must be considered that Signal’s soldiers can be employed with the Battle Groups, and as such must have the training that will, if required allow them to fight along side the Infantry, regardless of the situation, be it a Patrol, Advance to Contact or an Ambush.
6. Leadership – Although the proficiency of the leadership skills at the junior level is very good at this time, there must exist more training that is relevant to what the Army is facing today. Leadership courses must evolve away from the classroom-based instruction and focus more heavily on the practical “hands on” aspects of leadership. More challenging teaching scenarios that force the potential Jr. NCO to perform under greater levels of stress and duress can accomplish this. Simply completing a “Management” style course is insufficient given the situations that these junior leaders may find themselves in. An abundance of initiative must be stressed at all times during their training, ensuring that they can find the best solution for any problem they may encounter. The training progression with regards to the CF PLQ is currently under review, and has been previously identified as being insufficient for the training of Jr. leaders at this time.
7. TTPs and SOPs are subject to constant change, dependent on the user at the time. Signals units that are slated to deploy will be given a Task Matrix, consisting of identifiable BTSs that must be completed as part of the training. The matrix in itself should be used as a guide with regard to it being the MINIMUM standard that is required from soldiers and units prior their deployment. Every effort must be made to obtain the most up-to date information that is available, and use that as a training block. This will ensure that all soldiers are equipped and prepared for the deployment.
8. There appears, at this time to be a “disjoint” in the training that is received by the C&E Branch personnel. During the DP1, all soldiers are supposed to receive an introduction to Field craft, Platoon Weapons operation and deployment and basic field operations as is shown below:
a. PO 101 – Participate In Dismounted Offensive Operations;
b. PO 102 - Participate In Dismounted Defensive Operations;
c. PO 103 – Patrol;
d. PO 104 – Fire The C7 With The C79 Optical Sight Unit;
e. PO 105 –Fire the General Purpose Machine Gun, 7.62mm, C6;
f. PO 106 – Fire the Light Machine Gun, 5.56mm, C9;
g. PO 109 – Throw Grenades;
h. PO 110 – Perform Individual Field craft;
i. PO 111 – Operate Tactical Communication Equipment;
j. PO 114 – Perform Army Physical Training;
k. EdO 101 – Leadership in Peace and WAR; and
l. Edo 102 - Law of Armed Conflict.
9. It should be noted again that the DP1 course is approximately 33 days long, and some of the subject matter listed above is not covered, or not covered with any detail. From talking to several of the newer members to the unit, the majority of weapons training and field training took place once the members were in this unit, and not during their basic training. This leaves most of the C & E Branch soldiers without the basic skills necessary to perform as soldiers. However the majority of them are technically proficient at their MOC following their journeyman’s training.
10. At this time, the soldiers are expected to pick up this “Hard Field” knowledge by utilizing a form of osmosis at the units that they get posted to. Sometimes, depending on the unit, this is not a major problem. However, when these newer soldiers are posted to a front line field unit, employed for example as a Coy Signaller, they are expected to assimilate the information and skills as quickly as possible. This leaves them at a distinct disadvantage. As a possible remedy for this problem, I am suggesting that at a minimum, a course be implemented at the Signal Unit level. This course would address the shortcomings that we are seeing at this time, and will ultimately make for a more rounded soldier, able to conduct his/her job within Combat Arms units, with a more specific background with regards to training. This suggested course is as follows:
a. a Unit run, field intensive package of approximately 2-3 weeks in duration, that will encompass all of the above (para 9) subjects, including the weapons training, less the EdOs. This “package” could be compared to the Land Environmental Training or the Infantry annual Battle Schools that were run in the past, to ensure that the skills of all personnel within a unit were at a relatively high standard. Ideally this should be run after the soldier arrives at a field unit, and may be run as part of the annual training exercises. The opportunity exists also for “importing” SMEs to assist with the training; and
b. this training may also be conducted as a “Pre-Course” for the DP2, Primary Leadership Course (Land), enabling the soldiers to have a more solid knowledge base for the conduct of an important career course. This will ultimately lead to soldiers with a more rounded experience, able to perform leadership under stress roles not only in Canada, but also when deployed overseas.
11. In closing, it is to the benefit of all C & E soldiers to complete more in-depth training, including more “Theatre Specific” training. Training that will prepare them and also allow Jr. leaders the opportunity to take the initiative, and lead subordinates on the ground during times of greater stress. This added training has and will continue to save lives. In my opinion, all soldiers posted to Combat Arms units, or elsewhere should at a minimum, be mandated to achieve the same standards required of an Engineer, an Artilleryman, a Crewman or a Vehicle Technician (Veh Tech’s are now also mandated to attend PLQ (land)). Soldiers should never be placed in a situation destined to fail. They must have the confidence and the ability to react in all combat scenarios, and if they cannot, then we have failed to properly prepare them. Not only do our Signallers need to be proficient tradesmen/tradeswomen, they above all must be soldiers first to survive these adverse and volatile conditions.
RJ Richard
CWO
Task Force Mercury
)
