Forsaken Warriors by Aaron Gunn

[ArmyRick]

I suggest you watch this movie by Aaron Gunn and lets hear your thoughts!

 

[OldSolduer]

Trudeau Sr started it. Canada has a history of being unprepared for war.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Trudeau Sr started it. Canada has a history of being unprepared for war.

Technically John A. McDonald starred it. Although you could probably make the argument that it was the Family Compact.

 

[Edward Campbell]

There are two big issues in Aaron Gunn's film and I'm going to ignore the clusterf__k that is DVA:

The key moment for Canada is circa 1968. The Liberal Party had polled carefully and they had decided that appearance mattered more than policy and so they pushed aside the fiery Québec labour leader Jean Marchand and selected 'public intellectual' Pierre Trudeau, a silk stocking socialist, to lead the party.

I was told by a source I consider 100% reliable, someone who was in the next room when the meeting ended, that one of PET's early acts was to brief a subset of his cabinet, his P&P (planning and priorities) committee, which included some of his closest allies and some who were worried about his leadership, on his personal aim for Canada: he wanted to disarm the country - to, essentially, withdraw from the US-led West and focus on our internal, domestic concerns, including the environment. His cabinet colleagues, even his closest. allies, were horrified and they told him that he would quickly lose the party's leadership and his high office if he tried.

Trudeau. explained his goal in terms of the 1960s: The , he said, which was then embroiled in the Vietnam War, was a least as great a threat to global peace and security as was the USSR. NATO, he said, had served its purpose. Stalin's expansionism had been contained, and NATO was now more problem than solution. , he said, was safe, the had an overarching strategic vital interest in securing our sovereignty for us; we didn't need a military except for an internal security force, perhaps something like the French CRS (les Compagnies républicaines de sécurité) based in the RCMP.

Under intense political pressure from his own cabinet, PET backed away from disarmament but he quickly pushed through his plan to cut Canada's NATO commitment in half and then he published his infamous 'Foreign Policy for Canadians.' Mitchell Sharp signed it but it was written, mainly, by PET's foreign policy guru Ivan Head and it reflected Trudeau's views about the , about the (it almost ignored it) and .

Canadians liked it.​

Most Canadians were 'progressives' and, circa 1970, that meant they were anti-American and anti-war and they heartily approved of cutting the defence budget, bringing the troops home, and spending on social programmes instead.

Not much changed in the 1980s and '90s. We all remember 9/11 and we all remember that Prime Minster Chrétien, quite reluctantly, agreed that Canada had to do something to support the USA - the something grew, under both Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin to be a full-blown operation in Kandahar province - but it was never popular with either the Liberal government or the country.

Even Stephen Harper, who wanted to repair relations with the and with other allies, understood that he did not have broad public support to increase the defence budget and to rebuild the Canadian Armed Forces. Canadians were, grudgingly, willing to give the military what it needed to fight in Afghanistan but no more. They still believed the PET was right and George W Bush was a war monger.

 

[OldSolduer]

" a silk stocking socialist"

I never heard that term - until now. I reckon "champagne socialist" or "limousine liberal" are apt descriptions as well.

How about "Rolex and silk suit socialist"?

 

[CBH99]

I watched this film last night in the wee hours, and was definitely worth the watch.

Aaron puts a lot of effort into his documentaries and makes an effort to interview a lot of people relevant to whatever the subject matter is, good on him

 

[Eagle_Eye_View]

I watched it too, and I got trigger after watching the part where she’s been trying to get an elevator for her wheelchair for the past 6 years. Instead she was offered MAID.

 

[daftandbarmy]

There are two big issues in Aaron Gunn's film and I'm going to ignore the clusterf__k that is DVA:

The key moment for Canada is circa 1968. The Liberal Party had polled carefully and they had decided that appearance mattered more than policy and so they pushed aside the fiery Québec labour leader Jean Marchand and selected 'public intellectual' Pierre Trudeau, a silk stocking socialist, to lead the party.

I was told by a source I consider 100% reliable, someone who was in the next room when the meeting ended, that one of PET's early acts was to brief a subset of his cabinet, his P&P (planning and priorities) committee, which included some of his closest allies and some who were worried about his leadership, on his personal aim for Canada: he wanted to disarm the country - to, essentially, withdraw from the US-led West and focus on our internal, domestic concerns, including the environment. His cabinet colleagues, even his closest. allies, were horrified and they told him that he would quickly lose the party's leadership and his high office if he tried.

Trudeau. explained his goal in terms of the 1960s: The , he said, which was then embroiled in the Vietnam War, was a least as great a threat to global peace and security as was the USSR. NATO, he said, had served its purpose. Stalin's expansionism had been contained, and NATO was now more problem than solution. , he said, was safe, the had an overarching strategic vital interest in securing our sovereignty for us; we didn't need a military except for an internal security force, perhaps something like the French CRS (les Compagnies républicaines de sécurité) based in the RCMP.

Under intense political pressure from his own cabinet, PET backed away from disarmament but he quickly pushed through his plan to cut Canada's NATO commitment in half and then he published his infamous 'Foreign Policy for Canadians.' Mitchell Sharp signed it but it was written, mainly, by PET's foreign policy guru Ivan Head and it reflected Trudeau's views about the , about the (it almost ignored it) and .

Canadians liked it.​

Most Canadians were 'progressives' and, circa 1970, that meant they were anti-American and anti-war and they heartily approved of cutting the defence budget, bringing the troops home, and spending on social programmes instead.

Not much changed in the 1980s and '90s. We all remember 9/11 and we all remember that Prime Minster Chrétien, quite reluctantly, agreed that Canada had to do something to support the USA - the something grew, under both Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin to be a full-blown operation in Kandahar province - but it was never popular with either the Liberal government or the country.

Even Stephen Harper, who wanted to repair relations with the and with other allies, understood that he did not have broad public support to increase the defence budget and to rebuild the Canadian Armed Forces. Canadians were, grudgingly, willing to give the military what it needed to fight in Afghanistan but no more. They still believed the PET was right and George W Bush was a war monger.

And then there was the Peacekeeping Panacea

 

[Rifleman62]

"Soft Power" which meant No Power. Lloyd Axworthy, an academic, university professor who became Chrétien's Minister of Foreign Affairs.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Oddest thing about Axworthy is in spite of being a Soft Power proponent . It seems clear that he didn't understand or was willing to ignore that In order for it to work it has to work in conjunction with Hard Power.

 

[OldSolduer]

And then there was the Peacekeeping Panacea

I’ll dig up an essay I wrote - I think it was for an OPME

 

[FJAG]

I remember Axworthy from my decades living in Manitoba. Liberal penetration of Western Canada has always been weak but particularly then. As one of Western Canada's few elected Liberal politicians he carried much more influence in the party than he would have otherwise merited. He wasn't known as the Liberal Godfather of Manitoba for nothing.

I've always liked this quote about him.

One of the amusing elements of the summer was the re-emergence of former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy via a self-inflated trial balloon touting his possible return to federal politics. A master of petulant arrogance, Axworthy made himself memorable at DFAIT by hectoring homilies instructing Washington how to manage its foreign policy. Never fazed by his errors, e.g., that the Russians would never accept an end to the 1972 ABM Treaty, Axworthy simply lost his Washington audience. He exercised his right to pontificate; we exercised our right to ignore him. Thus while he presumably could find a riding in Manitoba where he spent his career as a largess-distributing godfather, that would not translate into a Martin cabinet post.

Canada and Quebec in 2003: A Time of Transition | American Diplomacy Est 1996

americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu

 

[OldSolduer]

I’ll dig up an essay I wrote - I think it was for an OPME

Well I found it. Be prepared to be mightily bored.

The purpose of this essay is to examine the role of peacekeeping within the CF and its contribution to Canadian military professionalism. Was the Canadian Forces (CF) fatally distracted from the primary mission of a military due to peacekeeping commitments? Or was peacekeeping another military mission that the CF was extraordinarily proficient with, that in fact did enhance military professionalism in the CF? It the contention of this paper that peacekeeping was not a fatal distraction but did enhance military professionalism in the CF but that in a sense it did also degrade military thought in some circles. As a by-product of Canadian success in peacekeeping, a “peacekeeping myth” was created that basically said all Canadian soldiers ever did was peacekeeping. [1] This thinking totally ignores the fact that Canadian soldiers were involved in both World Wars, and the Korean War.

This essay will be divided into four sections. Peacekeeping and how it fits in with the current roles and missions as designated by the Government of Canada is the first section. Secondly, the Medak Pocket operation is analyzed to demonstrate that peacekeeping did not affect professionalism at the individual or unit level. Third, the fatal distraction will be discussed. Lastly, the role of public opinion on the missions of the CF is discussed.

PEACEKEEPING

The definition of peacekeeping is “the maintenance of international peace and security by the deployment of military forces in a particular area”[2] or “the maintenance of peace, especially the prevention of further fighting between hostile forces in an area”[3]. This makes the assumption that both sides are willing to sit down and negotiate a ceasefire agreement, and then actually have their troops abide by it.

The purpose of peacekeeping, as envisioned by Lester B. Pearson, was to separate warring factions while the conflicts were small, before the conflict became larger and unmanageable. Mr. Pearson’s ideas came to fruition in 1956 during the Suez Canal crisis. Mr. Pearson was able to persuade the United Nations (UN) to form an international peacekeeping force to supervise the withdrawal of the combatants from the Suez Canal area. [4] This force was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). This was the first large-scale deployment of peacekeepers in United Nations history, and was the model for many after it.

How has CF participation impacted professionalism in the CF? First, it is necessary to examine the Canada First Defence Strategy to ascertain what priorities the Government of Canada has set out for the CF and Department of National Defence (DND). There are three roles - defending Canada, defending North America and contributing to international peace and security.[5] It is clear that of these three roles, peacekeeping contributes to international peace and security. It is also the third on the list of priorities.

Underlying these three roles are six core missions – one of these is “Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period”. [6] Certainly, peacekeeping would be seen as conducting a major international operation, such as Operation Harmony. Operation Harmony was the large scale deployment of peacekeepers to the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1992 after the breakup of the FRY. This peacekeeping operation was conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Operation Harmony, as we shall see, contained elements of peacekeeping and war fighting.

OPERATION HARMONY AND THE MEDAK POCKET

“On December 1, 2002, nine long years after the battle, recognition came in the form of a Commander in-Chief Commendation for the Battle of Medak Pocket”.[7]

On 9 September 1993 the Croatian Forces launched an attack on little known Serbian held area near the town of Medak, Croatia. The loss of life is grievous – old people and animals seem to be the victims of this attack. Into the maelstrom steps the Second Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI).

What happened at Medak is a testament to the professionalism of the Canadian Forces during the times of the decade of darkness. While on a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission, it was necessary for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to use armed force to separate the combatants and prevent further atrocities. This has not been the norm for many years and many UN missions.

It is the contention of this portion that peacekeeping was not a fatal distraction on the unit, subunit or individual level in this particular case. As the example will show, professionalism at the individual level, be it Regular Force or Reserve, was maintained.

“It was the grimmest possible ending to what had been a very successful tour. Everywhere they were sent, the Patricias bore the standard of Canada, showing discipline and resolve, and bolstered a failing UN mission” [8]

In 1992, the United Nations deployed a peacekeeping force, including Canadian soldiers, into the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The initial deployment of Canadian Forces came from the brigade posted in Germany, from The Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) and The Royal 22e Regiment, the “Van Doos”.[9] The next deployment came from Canada, consisting of the Third Battalion, PPCLI and a company from 2 PPCLI.

In March 1993, 2PPCLI deployed to the FRY, initially in the Sector West. This was done only after extensive training in Canada, Fort Ord and Fort Hunter Liggett in California. Due to time constraints, 2PPCLI was not able to exercise as a battalion and even the rifle companies were not properly exercised.[10]

An interesting dynamic of this deployment was the fact that of the total number of troops deployed, only 375 were members posted on strength of 2PPCLI. Of the remainder, 165 were attached from other Regular Force units, and 385 were Reserve soldiers.[11] Despite this, after a few months of training, it was virtually impossible to tell the difference between the Regular Force and Reserve Force soldiers, other than their headdress.

On 9 September 1993, the Croatian Army launched an attack into the Medak Pocket. Of particular note, 9 Platoon was commanded by a Reserve Officer, Lieutenant Tyrone Green. While under fire, and during lulls in shelling, the platoon fortified their positions, reported cease fire violations and gathered information on the developing battle. [12]

After the Croatian forces withdrew, soldiers from 2 PPCLI swept the area. “Their job was now, along with civilian police officers and UN medical officers, to sweep the area for signs of ethnic cleansing. The task was enormous”.[13] It was not within the detailed terms of reference for the infantryman of 1993 or a peacekeeping mission to engage in crime scene investigation. The fact that the unit undertook this task is a testament to the professionalism of 2 PPCLI as a unit and as individuals within that unit.

Despite the fact that 2 PPCLI was comprised of a mix of Regular and Reserve Force and that there was insufficient time to complete training as a unit, it is very apparent that the “peacekeeping” mission initially assigned clearly did nothing to lessen the professionalism of the individual soldier or the unit as a whole.

FATAL DISTRACTION

The fatal distraction lays not with the CF. The fatal distraction lies with the Government of Canada, the media and in some part, the Canadian public. Peacekeeping and some of the effects it had on the Government of Canada and the Canadian public have contributed to a “fatal distraction” on the strategic, operational levels and to some extent unit levels.

As far back as 1961 the Canadian Army had the view that UN operations were not high on the priority list, as UN operations detracted from the Army’s ability to fulfill wartime tasks. The view of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was that “Canadian participation in UN operations was secondary to NATO and continental defense”.[14] The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) had at least one senior officer who thought the three services should be integrated into one as a “kind of combat police force”; however, the Chief of the Air Staff at that time disagreed.[15]

Successive governments since the inception of peacekeeping in 1956 have seen this particular military mission (peacekeeping) as a method of keeping the cost of maintaining a military to minimum and deploying troops on missions to maximize political gain with allies and the Canadian public. This is evident when Prime Minister Chretien stated, “We’re always there, like Boy Scouts, somewhat. We’re happy and Canadians love it. They think it’s a nice way for Canadians to be present around the world.”[16] The general civilian view is that “peacekeepers” are lightly armed (with small arms) and do not require expensive weapons systems such as tanks, artillery pieces, or for that matter helicopters and jet fighters.

To be fair, it was not only the Liberal governments who wanted to curry favour with allies or the public. Conservative governments have done the same. Under Prime Minister Mulroney, the government offered troops for the ill-fated mission in Somalia. Although this was viewed in government circles as another peacekeeping mission, it in fact turned out to be a Chapter VII mission, with a different mandate and different Rules of Engagement. It was decided that the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) would be deployed to Somalia, with dire consequences. The CAR was viewed as an elite unit, who were stricken at that time with disciplinary problems and poor leadership.[17]

A focus on peacekeeping was a fatal distraction when it came to the matter of equipping the CF. The cancellation of the EH-101, with the resulting penalties (costing a half billion dollars) limited the operational ability of the helicopter squadrons tasked with Search and Rescue (SAR) operations, anti submarine warfare and transport duties. Despite the government White Paper of 1994 that stated Sea Kings were rapidly approaching the end of their operational life, they are just starting to be replaced.[18] CF-18s, which were purchased in early 80’s, are not due to be replaced until around 2020. [19] The CF 18s were deployed in Operation Desert Storm, however were tasked with flying escort missions, combat air patrols and reconnaissance missions.[20] In 1999, the CF 18s were deployed once again to Kosovo there was a problem with finding precision guided munitions to properly equip them.

The lack of up to date, modern equipment puts the CF at a disadvantage when tasked on operations whether it is a domestic operation or an internationally led one. Without the proper equipment, soldiers, sailors and airpersons cannot perform to their optimal capability as individuals. On a strategic level, without the proper equipment, the CF has interoperability issues when working with our allies such as the USA or the UK forces.

A result of the loss of certain types of equipment is the loss of the skill set of that particular piece of kit. The sale of our Chinook medium lift helicopters in the early 90’s is evidence of this. While the Chinooks were relatively easy to replace, the time that was invested in training personnel to operate the Chinooks was priceless. Once a skill set is lost, it is very difficult to regain.

Due to the focus on peacekeeping, one of the losses suffered by the CF during this time was the loss of skill in operational and strategic planning. In 1996, the government sent General Baril to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. According to Mr. Granatstein, the Prime Minister thought that a mission to a French speaking African country would sell well in Quebec. The proposed operation was poorly planned and cancelled. The CF itself criticized the methodology used by NDHQ to plan and mount missions.[21]

PUBLIC OPINION

There is no doubt that public opinion exerts influence over government actions or inaction. The Canadian public in general envisions peacekeepers in the traditional sense – lightly armed soldiers or unarmed observers who interpose themselves between two factions who have agreed to cease hostilities. This has translated, in some segments of the population to question the need for a multi purpose combat capable military, as Canadians are just peacekeepers – not soldiers, warriors or war fighters.[22]

This perception of lightly armed peacekeepers can translate into lower government expenditures on military equipment, such as new armoured vehicles (including tanks), artillery pieces, helicopters, strategic airlift, and jet fighters. After all, who needs these when all the CF does is peace keep?

As a result of less or no equipment, such as modern jet fighters, ships or tanks, it is difficult for the CF to maintain professionalism as an entity. It is also difficult to maintain credibility when dealing with our allies in NATO or NORAD.

CONCLUSION

The discussion whether or not peacekeeping was a fatal distraction for the CF and its professional ability will be debated for some time. In as much as peacekeeping in the traditional sense was seen as a break from garrison routine, or field exercises, peacekeeping was never seen within the CF as the primary mission, but one that contributed to international peace and security. The role of peacekeeper did not detract from the professionalism displayed by the troops of 2 PPCLI at the Medak Pocket, nor have any other peacekeeping missions, as Canadian troops and the CF as a whole have been internationally recognized as being professionals.

Where the fatal distraction lies is not with the men and women of the CF, it is with the successive Governments of Canada, who have used the military to balance budgets and curry favor with international alliances and the Canadian people. This distraction has led to an underfunded, poorly equipped military. The military has lost skill sets and people which are difficult to regain when you need them the most. The CF is also inexperienced in strategic and operational planning, and may have interoperability problems with allies.

The role of peacekeeping within the CF is but one component of military operations that has served to enhance military professionalism within the CF but not without associated issues caused by successive governments who allowed their focus on peacekeeping to distract them from providing the CF with the requisite direction and equipment to meet all operational requirements.

---

[1] “Soldiers Made Me Look Good” – Lewis MacKenzie
[2] Dictionary.com | Meanings & Definitions of English Words
[3] Ibid
[4] Peacekeeping: The Mid-East and Indo-China
[5] http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/roles-eng.asp
[6] http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/missions-eng.asp
[7] http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/2PPCLI/RH-United_Nations.asp
[8] http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/2ppcli/RH-United_Nations.asp
[9] Who Killed the Canadian Military? JL Granatstein Page 166
[10] Professionalism Under Fire: Canadian Implementation of the Medak Pocket Agreement, Croatia 1993
[11] Ibid
[12] Professionalism Under Fire: Canadian Implementation of the Medak Pocket Agreement, Croatia 1993
[13] Ibid
[14] Global Mobile” Flexible Response, Peacekeeping and the Origins of Forces Mobile Command, 1958-1964 – Sean M Maloney, PhD
[15] Ibid
[16] Who Killed the Canadian Military? JL Granatstein Pg 178
[17] Who Killed the Canadian Military? JL Granatstein Pg 152-155
[18] Ibid Pg 163-165
[19] http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1611146620100716
[20] http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=history/canadianforces/factsheets/persiangulf
[21] Who Killed the Canadian Military? JL Granatstein Pg 168-169
[22] Peacekeeping and Public Opinion - Peacekeeping and Public Opinion - Canadian Military Journal

 

[GK .Dundas]

I remember Axworthy from my decades living in Manitoba. Liberal penetration of Western Canada has always been weak but particularly then. As one of Western Canada's few elected Liberal politicians he carried much more influence in the party than he would have otherwise merited. He wasn't known as the Liberal Godfather of Manitoba for nothing.

I've always liked this quote about him.


The Axworthy boys, Tom and Lloyd. Of which it was said, Lloyd got the looks and Tom got the Brains.

 

[FJAG]

In 1996, the government sent General Baril to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. According to Mr. Granatstein, the Prime Minister thought that a mission to a French speaking African country would sell well in Quebec. The proposed operation was poorly planned and cancelled. The CF itself criticized the methodology used by NDHQ to plan and mount missions.[21]

Good paper overall and particulalry with this excellent reference to a little known event.

The "Great Lakes Fiasco" or "Bumble in the Jungle" as it was known intended to have Canada's 1 Cdn Div (during one of its periods of existence) provide the lead element for a multinational UN force. There were a number of reasons why the mission didn't come off - lack of major power support being at the top of the list - but Baril was also very critical of Canada's inability to provide the requisite command and control and logistics capability to lead a mission of that scale.

His after action report had two basic responses: within the army there was a recognition of a capability gap that should be addressed (requiring additional resources but also some basic structural changes); conversely, within the DCDS's office there was a general feeling that Canada can't do this type of leadership mission and therefore should not take one on. Ultimately it came down to a question of risk the government was willing to take. It wasn't until Kabul and Hillier's experiences with the Ottawa leadership, that the issues were seriously addressed by his subsequent formation of the operational commands.