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Float Like a Butterfly, Sting Like a Bee – The Future of a Canadian Forces Intent on Punching Above it’s Weight
The future of Canada’s defense forces must be one of a lean, mean, results oriented machine. For the CF to remain relevant in the current context of modern warfare and the operations in which the Canadian public wishes to participate, it will have to transform itself into an organization equipped with not only modern technology and transportation, but a mindset based more in offensive action than the tattered notion of “peacekeeping” that is now trotted out in conjunction with any mention of Canada’s military. Canada’s military must become one of power disproportionate to it’s diminutive size, in order to “punch above its’ weight” as envisaged by the Chief of Defense Staff, General Rick Hillier, and former ambassador to Canada, Paul Celluci, among others. The Canadian Forces will never reach the level of experience or battlefield prowess that our southern neighbors have, but this comparison is hardly an accurate measure of the worth of a nation’s defences. For the CF to be effective and relevant in the context of the post September eleventh era, it must be a force which exemplifies the high school football mantra of “agile, hostile and mobile”.
An agile force is one which may be large, but must be overly muscular in order to move quickly, or conversely, be small enough to move and react quickly. This is one area in which the CF is “ahead of the game” so to speak, as the CF now numbers less than sixty thousand members in all elements, regular and reserve. While this enables sweeping change to be implemented quickly, small size is not a commonly recognized benefit in the sense of warfighting. A “hostile” force is one geared towards offensive action, as opposed to defensive measures, or submission as a means of affecting desired results. This is not to advocate unbridled aggression, merely the presence of a force that, like a coiled spring, has destructive potential ever ready to be unleashed, should the circumstances warrant it. The mere presence of such a deterrent is often all that is required to achieve many positive outcomes. In real terms, this means the maintenance of a lavishly equipped, well trained and well paid cadre of career, professional soldiers; ready to do serious damage to an adversary on a moments notice, wherever that adversary may be located. “Mobile” is the key to the success of the other two pillars of the analogy. The best fighting force in the world is useless if it cannot be moved to where it is needed in a timely manner, regardless of conditions which would hamper this effort. As Canadians have demonstrated in the past that they are unwilling to tolerate large defence expenditures for any length of time, Canada’s military must concentrate on forces easily and quickly adaptable to different uses on short notice, and an ability to move them in a timely manner to where they are needed.
The force described above is required by the Canadian public for a number of reasons. The first of these is the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty. The Hans Island issue, the possible opening of the North West Passage, illegal fishing and smuggling operations between Canada and the United States are a few of the reasons to maintain a capable and well equipped defence capability, but other areas not so easily patrolled and controlled are also important. The activities of terrorists both in Canada and abroad demand a strong response by specially equipped troops with a far broader mandate than the traditional state vs. state context applied to military force. A capability to find and attack terrorists is fundamental to this, as is the requirement for this work to be unencumbered by the oversight of the public until such a time as the unit’s successes can be properly documented and released to the public, without compromising ongoing operations. While this temporary pliability of government transparency is distasteful, the secrecy required is the unpleasant side effect of our open society, especially as a method of combating those who would harm Canadians. The freedom and safety of Canadian citizens is best preserved by adopting the methods of those who would harm the public, as a method of defeating them. Canada’s military must not hesitate to use guile and deception in the manner of her adversaries as a method of defeating them.
Canada’s allies, alliances, and recipients of aid all require Canada’s defences to be powerful and capable of quick action. The two most powerful organizations that Canada maintains membership in are the United Nations (UN), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Both of these organizations have common ground in that they were conceived principally as methods of preserving the territorial integrity of participating nations. The notable difference between the two is that while the UN is devoted to the peaceful resolution of differences, NATO is a purely military alliance, despite the charter it was created under. A powerful and capable military is required for our UN commitments if Canada is to make an effective contribution to trouble spots around the world in a unilateral manner, or a sizeable contribution in a multilateral one. At present, Canadian Peacekeeping and Peace support missions are hampered by the fact that the Canadian Forces must rent, lease or hire civilian air and sea lift in order to move large quantities of equipment and troops to areas where they are needed. NATO requirements for a capable Canadian military are rather self –explanatory, but are rooted in the NATO charter, which clearly states in the fifth article, that the signatory nations are required to “treat an armed attack against one or more members as an attack against them all”. If Canada is not able to respond to a territorial violation of any and all NATO members, it is not fulfilling treaty obligations.
Agile
The Canadian Forces must become a lean, mean, results oriented machine in order to meet the challenges set before it today. While a total strength of just less than sixty thousand members gives a deceptively large impression of strength, the employment and uses of this force is the key to success. At present, the operational portion of the Canadian Forces is composed of Army, Navy and Air Force elements, which are further sub-divided; the Army is composed of three Brigades, numbering approximately five thousand members each, while the Navy is broken into two fleets, one stationed on each coast. The Air Force is comprised of one air division, with units or “wings” spread across Canada, as well as stationed aboard Canadian ships. All of the elements share common basic training facilities, and maintain their own higher training establishments for element specific training. There is also a Special Forces unit, the Joint Task Force Two (JTF-2) which operates independently or in conjunction with the other three branches, although has it’s own chain of command to national the national level. The CF maintains a Primary Reserve system as well, although the use of these units for anything other than individual augmentation of the Regular forces and aid to civil powers (floods, fires, ice storms etc.) has yet to proven.
While this is a small military by any standards, certain groups command a disproportionately large portion of this manpower and resources. National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, Ontario is staffed with approximately 3300 troops, in excess of five percent of the total strength of the forces. Canada also maintains a large cadre of General officers, with approximately one hundred. When all is said and done, only about one third of the total budget of the Department of National Defence is spent on the operational side of the military, with the remainder being absorbed into managerial and administrative functions. Canada maintains a General staff approximately one third of the size of the United States, to administer a military one twentieth of the size of the American’s, with a budget one fortieth of the size. There are obviously some efficiencies to be had!
For Canada’s military to fill the “agile” description, a flattening of the command structure will have to occur. This agility could be attained largely by removing the authority of unelected bureaucrats within the DND, who consume vast amounts of resources hindering military commanders with directives related to enforced diversity, integration of women, bilingualism etc. While these matters are not unimportant, they must be recognized as accessories to a successful military, not a mission unto themselves. The inefficiencies created in this system have many examples, but the requirement for all officers to speak two languages is arguably the most contentious, perhaps because the composition of these two languages is defined exclusively as English, and Quebecquois French. Considering that this particular dialect of French is spoken nowhere else on earth, the value in paying professional officers to learn it is somewhat dubious, given that only one third of the military members these officers would be expected to lead speak the same language. Promotion within the officer corps is also directly and officially linked to the bilingualism requirement, which has had the effect of placing francophones in a disproportionately high number of positions in the military, a marked similarity to the federal public service, which has similar requirements, and similar top - heavy leadership as well.
For the military to fulfill the “agile” requirement, the social engineering of the uniformed military must stop. The most qualified persons for the job must be given the opportunity to fill the position, regardless of sex or ethnicity. The language requirement is a non – issue, as fully one third of CF ships, wings and units use French as their language of operation. As long as a prospective member was proficient in one official language, they would have met the requirement for service and subsequent promotion. In regards to women and service in the CF, equality and opportunity could be attained with the simple application of one, universal standard for all applicants, regardless of sex. This is not currently the case, with female recruits held to less rigorous physical entrance standards than their male counterparts for the same pay, employment and benefits. If women are to be permitted access to the Canadian Forces in all positions as men, they must meet the same high standards. There cannot be two classes of soldiers, in which one is required to accomplish less based on antiquated notions of the fragility or inability of one sex. Those who would harm Canadian soldiers with suicide attacks, roadside bombs and gunfire will surely not differentiate between the two. The “agile” Canadian Forces will employ the best individual for the job, regardless of their gender, which official language they speak, or the color of their skin through the use of a universal physical and intellectual standard.
Hostile
A “hostile” force is one geared towards offensive action, as opposed to defensive measures, or submission as a means of affecting desired results. The proverb “The best defence is a good offence” is an appropriate representation of this pillar of success.
This is not to advocate unbridled aggression, merely the presence of a force that, like a coiled spring, has destructive potential ever ready to be unleashed, should the circumstances warrant it. The mere presence of such a deterrent is often all that is required to achieve many positive outcomes. In real terms, this means the maintenance of a lavishly equipped, well trained and well paid cadre of career, professional soldiers; ready to do serious and permanent damage to an adversary on a moments notice, wherever that adversary may be located. Canada’s current Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) proclaimed; “We are not the public service of Canada, we’re not just another department, we are the Canadian Forces, and our job is to be able to kill people” The Canadian Forces is in the advanced stages of de-militarization right now, with relevant and useful tools of war such as heavy transport and reconnaissance helicopters, and tanks and self – propelled artillery (among many others items) being sold or scrapped as cost saving measures, or by a civilian directorate who does not believe that such expensive items are required for the wars Canada may have to fight. The deficiencies of equipment are only now being addressed by the abovementioned CDS, who has re-oriented the Canadian Forces for the short term, but time will tell if his policies are perpetuated or are discontinued by his successor(s).
The Canadian Forces requires certain pieces of equipment to fit the description of “hostile” as envisaged here. The first, and most obvious, is the need for individual soldiers to have the most lethal weapons for use on the enemy, and the very best protection to preserve their lives. This has not been the case in the past, as Canadian soldiers have died due to the use of obsolete and poorly designed equipment, such as the Iltis Jeep, in which three troops were killed in two separate incidents in Afghanistan in 2003 and 2004, due to suicide bombers and mine strikes. The Iltis’ armored replacement was rushed into service soon after, but the fact that soldiers must die to demonstrate the need for adequate equipment is inexcusable in a nation as wealthy as Canada, especially considering that the federal surplus that year (2004) was in excess of four billion dollars, or enough to buy approximately thirty - five thousand of the Mercedes Military Division built armored SUV’s, which have saved troops in Afghanistan who have, once again, run afoul of insurgents armed with improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers and firearms. This time however, none have died, although they have sustained serious injuries, which would have been fatal in an Iltis.
For the “hostile” requirement to be fulfilled, the Canadian Forces must have equipment designed to make any attack against Canada, her allies or Canadian soldiers a futile and suicidal endeavor. Tanks are required for ground forces, along with helicopter gunships for the army, and a troopship and landing craft for the Navy, with maritime helicopters to replace the geriatric Sea King. The Canadian Air Force must have the ability to support these elements, with capable fighter jets, and a ground to air capability based on precision weapons platforms. Transport aircraft are required to supply these troops while abroad, and sufficient stores of ammunition and spare parts must be stockpiled in order to keep these pieces of equipment and their operators working in a wartime situation. Canada must form an expeditionary force based on the United States Marine Corps “Marine Expeditionary Unit” or MEU which is basically a Brigade of troops, all of their transport and fighting vehicles, and supplies for ninety days on a series of ships, with enough integral helicopter (both attack and transport) support to project military power up to twenty kilometers from any coastline, anywhere on earth. One of these Expeditionary units could be based on each coast, with the third one reconstituting, performing domestic operations or training, and rotating the brigades through the task. This would enable Canada to make a timely and significant contribution to the various missions asked of it, instead of the current practice of offering a politically charged General to lead other nations’ troops, perhaps in conjunction with a few logisticians and a headquarters element.These Expeditionary units could also be used to preserve Canadian sovereignty, as Canada has the longest coastline in the world.
The issue was brought to the forefront of the public consciousness in 2003, when the Danish Navy sailed to Hans Island, an uninhabitable island precisely half – way between Ellesmere Island and Greenland, and proceeded to erect a Danish flag, along with a claim of sovereignty over the city block sized atoll. At the time of the alleged annexation of Canadian territory, Canada had little means of dissuading the Danes, and a ferocious exchange of words and declarations ensued. While the trivial nature of such a small piece of territory may be considered, the precedent set by a weak response from Ottawa could be very important, especially with the opening of the pack ice through the North West passage, a trade route that could save shipping companies millions of dollars on a route 4000 km shorter, as compared to the Panama Canal route, in the booming trade between Europe and Asia. That this route traverses approximately 1200 km of Canadian waters and may be open year round in the near future as a side effect of global warming, is of great concern to Canadians, especially given the environmental sensitivity of the area, and the poor record of the international shipping industry in the area of environmental stewardship.
An aggressive response to the Danish violation of Canadian territory could have set the tone for nations wishing to use the North West passage, but this did not happen, implying that Canadians are not concerned with the traditional definition of “border” or that they are simply not willing to pay to defend them. Nevertheless, Canada must be able to defend her borders, even if the political leader du jour is not willing to. The “hostile” pillar is one of readiness for war, not seeking one. The traditional argument against a powerful military in Canada is that for the last fifty years, Canada has participated in a long line of peacekeeping missions, and vehicles designed for attack are not suitable for this role. The fact of the matter is, that there has never, by the United Nation’s own definition been a “successful” peacekeeping mission seems to be overlooked. Canada’s contribution to these missions has often been substantial, and while a noble pursuit, peacekeeping is not a mission of and to itself. Peacekeeping is an activity that militaries are often called upon in the western world to perform if they are not otherwise employed in the defence of their own nation or the pursuit of their national interests. Canadian politicians in Ottawa have lost sight of this, and have continually denied resources to the Department of National Defence (DND) in an effort to fund social programs. While this is undoubtedly popular with the electorate, it would seem to be a foolhardy strategy if the nation is left undefended, interests unpursued. As a result, a military can maintain a high state of readiness and capability, then perform a mission below which it is capable of, (which should be all – out warfare) but it cannot train half –way, then perform to the full potential. In other words, it would be better for the military to train and be equipped for the worst case scenario, and then be pleasantly surprised, when all of the skills and resources are not required, than to be caught unprepared, and suffer a potentially huge loss of life and materiel.
Mobile
Winston Churchill stated that “Victory is the beautiful, bright colored flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.” Those words are as true in the modern military context as they were during World War Two. The best trained and equipped forces are of no use if they cannot reach the area where they are required in a timely manner. Canada has an even greater need for transportation assets than most nations due to the large size of Canada, the inaccessibility of large portions of it, and, as mentioned, the longest coastline in the world. The routine deployment of units within Canada for training exercises is often over distances which would be considered to be strategic in other parts of the world. An example of this would be the move of a mechanized infantry unit between New Brunswick and Alberta. In the European context, one could traverse six nations with a move of the same distance, and over less demanding terrain! Transport is another area in which Canada’s greatest reason for having a small military becomes the bane of that force. The oceans that separate Canada from her potential adversaries are the same barriers that make it so difficult and expensive to move Canadian troops where they are needed, as this almost always requires a Trans oceanic trip. For the CF to be effective in the missions asked of it overseas, it must have the ability to move massive amounts of men and materiel across these oceans and through the air. This capability does not currently exist, with the Canadian Forces lacking any type of organic heavy sea or airlift capabilities. Air transport is limited to a fleet of 32 CC-130 Hercules fixed wing aircraft, all of which are between thirty and forty years of age. These aircraft are well maintained, but when faced with an ever – expanding operational tempo and job description, are simply not up to the task for a wealthy nation like Canada, especially not when alternatives like the C-17 Globemaster are available from our US allies, an aircraft that has a payload approximately five times of that of a Hercules, and far greater reliability and maintainability. The Hercules is also unable to transport the newest and best Canadian armored vehicles, such as the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) III in the configuration that it would be required in, and with a full load of ammunition.
Recent examples of the requirement for expanded Canadian air transportation assets were the delayed deployment of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to tsunami ravaged Asian locales in 2004, when the Canadian Government was not able to act immediately, as the public demanded, but instead had to wait until civilian transportation assets in the form of Russian and Ukrainian Antonov - 124 transport aircraft came available.
The requirement of the Canadian Navy to maintain a transport capability for the Army and Air Force is also apparent for several reasons. The first is that the Canadian military currently lacks the ability to transport ground vehicles or large numbers of troops by sea, despite access to shipbuilding facilities in Canada, Europe and the US. This has been remedied in the past with the use of civilian assets, but this is not without pitfalls, as the GTS Katie proved in 2000, when nearly a quarter of a billion dollars worth of Canadian military equipment returning from Kosovo was withheld by a civilian transportation company due to a dispute with a sub-contractor. The Canadian Navy was forced to board the vessel in order to compel the return of the equipment and soldiers aboard. Obviously, if Canadian troops and equipment are to be prevented from being used as bargaining chips in contractual disputes, Canada must be able to move her own military to where the Canadian Government sees fit. The transportation of military assets to and from Peacekeeping missions is one thing, but if the Canadian military is to truly be a multi-faceted and capable military, it must maintain the ability to engage in littoral warfare, which by definition include vessels able to operate in shallow coastal waters, and ground troops able to perform amphibious landings on suitable beachheads, as opposed to the requirement for a deepwater port, as is currently the case. At least one amphibious troopship is required in this respect, along with a full complement of maritime transport helicopters to support landed expeditionary forces.
There is no lack of enthusiasm in the Canadian Forces for the missions asked of soldiers overseas, in the areas of peace – enforcement and ridding countries of despotic regimes such as Afghanistan’s Taliban. The Canadian Forces are currently hampered in their role as the military embodiment of the will of the Canadian public because they lack the resources to reach the areas and people of interest in a timely manner. In addition to this, military transport is not solely used for military purposes, the aircraft can be made available to civilian transportation companies, generating profit for the owners (the taxpayer) which can help to offset the high cost of acquisition and operation. Also, heavy air transport capability would have been of great benefit during such natural disasters as the Quebec Ice Storm, the Manitoba Floods or the Fires in British Columbia. Massive amounts of supplies and manpower can be moved in military transport aircraft, and in periods of high demand, the cost of civilian transportation rises exponentially, so the military transportation system can be extremely efficient by comparison!
Note A conclusion is in the works for this paper, but due to an extremely short timeframe, any input on the existing content is much appreciated, don't hold back!
This paper is intended as an academic pursuit, and does not represent the opinions or desires of the DND or CF administratively or as a whole.
The future of Canada’s defense forces must be one of a lean, mean, results oriented machine. For the CF to remain relevant in the current context of modern warfare and the operations in which the Canadian public wishes to participate, it will have to transform itself into an organization equipped with not only modern technology and transportation, but a mindset based more in offensive action than the tattered notion of “peacekeeping” that is now trotted out in conjunction with any mention of Canada’s military. Canada’s military must become one of power disproportionate to it’s diminutive size, in order to “punch above its’ weight” as envisaged by the Chief of Defense Staff, General Rick Hillier, and former ambassador to Canada, Paul Celluci, among others. The Canadian Forces will never reach the level of experience or battlefield prowess that our southern neighbors have, but this comparison is hardly an accurate measure of the worth of a nation’s defences. For the CF to be effective and relevant in the context of the post September eleventh era, it must be a force which exemplifies the high school football mantra of “agile, hostile and mobile”.
An agile force is one which may be large, but must be overly muscular in order to move quickly, or conversely, be small enough to move and react quickly. This is one area in which the CF is “ahead of the game” so to speak, as the CF now numbers less than sixty thousand members in all elements, regular and reserve. While this enables sweeping change to be implemented quickly, small size is not a commonly recognized benefit in the sense of warfighting. A “hostile” force is one geared towards offensive action, as opposed to defensive measures, or submission as a means of affecting desired results. This is not to advocate unbridled aggression, merely the presence of a force that, like a coiled spring, has destructive potential ever ready to be unleashed, should the circumstances warrant it. The mere presence of such a deterrent is often all that is required to achieve many positive outcomes. In real terms, this means the maintenance of a lavishly equipped, well trained and well paid cadre of career, professional soldiers; ready to do serious damage to an adversary on a moments notice, wherever that adversary may be located. “Mobile” is the key to the success of the other two pillars of the analogy. The best fighting force in the world is useless if it cannot be moved to where it is needed in a timely manner, regardless of conditions which would hamper this effort. As Canadians have demonstrated in the past that they are unwilling to tolerate large defence expenditures for any length of time, Canada’s military must concentrate on forces easily and quickly adaptable to different uses on short notice, and an ability to move them in a timely manner to where they are needed.
The force described above is required by the Canadian public for a number of reasons. The first of these is the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty. The Hans Island issue, the possible opening of the North West Passage, illegal fishing and smuggling operations between Canada and the United States are a few of the reasons to maintain a capable and well equipped defence capability, but other areas not so easily patrolled and controlled are also important. The activities of terrorists both in Canada and abroad demand a strong response by specially equipped troops with a far broader mandate than the traditional state vs. state context applied to military force. A capability to find and attack terrorists is fundamental to this, as is the requirement for this work to be unencumbered by the oversight of the public until such a time as the unit’s successes can be properly documented and released to the public, without compromising ongoing operations. While this temporary pliability of government transparency is distasteful, the secrecy required is the unpleasant side effect of our open society, especially as a method of combating those who would harm Canadians. The freedom and safety of Canadian citizens is best preserved by adopting the methods of those who would harm the public, as a method of defeating them. Canada’s military must not hesitate to use guile and deception in the manner of her adversaries as a method of defeating them.
Canada’s allies, alliances, and recipients of aid all require Canada’s defences to be powerful and capable of quick action. The two most powerful organizations that Canada maintains membership in are the United Nations (UN), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Both of these organizations have common ground in that they were conceived principally as methods of preserving the territorial integrity of participating nations. The notable difference between the two is that while the UN is devoted to the peaceful resolution of differences, NATO is a purely military alliance, despite the charter it was created under. A powerful and capable military is required for our UN commitments if Canada is to make an effective contribution to trouble spots around the world in a unilateral manner, or a sizeable contribution in a multilateral one. At present, Canadian Peacekeeping and Peace support missions are hampered by the fact that the Canadian Forces must rent, lease or hire civilian air and sea lift in order to move large quantities of equipment and troops to areas where they are needed. NATO requirements for a capable Canadian military are rather self –explanatory, but are rooted in the NATO charter, which clearly states in the fifth article, that the signatory nations are required to “treat an armed attack against one or more members as an attack against them all”. If Canada is not able to respond to a territorial violation of any and all NATO members, it is not fulfilling treaty obligations.
Agile
The Canadian Forces must become a lean, mean, results oriented machine in order to meet the challenges set before it today. While a total strength of just less than sixty thousand members gives a deceptively large impression of strength, the employment and uses of this force is the key to success. At present, the operational portion of the Canadian Forces is composed of Army, Navy and Air Force elements, which are further sub-divided; the Army is composed of three Brigades, numbering approximately five thousand members each, while the Navy is broken into two fleets, one stationed on each coast. The Air Force is comprised of one air division, with units or “wings” spread across Canada, as well as stationed aboard Canadian ships. All of the elements share common basic training facilities, and maintain their own higher training establishments for element specific training. There is also a Special Forces unit, the Joint Task Force Two (JTF-2) which operates independently or in conjunction with the other three branches, although has it’s own chain of command to national the national level. The CF maintains a Primary Reserve system as well, although the use of these units for anything other than individual augmentation of the Regular forces and aid to civil powers (floods, fires, ice storms etc.) has yet to proven.
While this is a small military by any standards, certain groups command a disproportionately large portion of this manpower and resources. National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, Ontario is staffed with approximately 3300 troops, in excess of five percent of the total strength of the forces. Canada also maintains a large cadre of General officers, with approximately one hundred. When all is said and done, only about one third of the total budget of the Department of National Defence is spent on the operational side of the military, with the remainder being absorbed into managerial and administrative functions. Canada maintains a General staff approximately one third of the size of the United States, to administer a military one twentieth of the size of the American’s, with a budget one fortieth of the size. There are obviously some efficiencies to be had!
For Canada’s military to fill the “agile” description, a flattening of the command structure will have to occur. This agility could be attained largely by removing the authority of unelected bureaucrats within the DND, who consume vast amounts of resources hindering military commanders with directives related to enforced diversity, integration of women, bilingualism etc. While these matters are not unimportant, they must be recognized as accessories to a successful military, not a mission unto themselves. The inefficiencies created in this system have many examples, but the requirement for all officers to speak two languages is arguably the most contentious, perhaps because the composition of these two languages is defined exclusively as English, and Quebecquois French. Considering that this particular dialect of French is spoken nowhere else on earth, the value in paying professional officers to learn it is somewhat dubious, given that only one third of the military members these officers would be expected to lead speak the same language. Promotion within the officer corps is also directly and officially linked to the bilingualism requirement, which has had the effect of placing francophones in a disproportionately high number of positions in the military, a marked similarity to the federal public service, which has similar requirements, and similar top - heavy leadership as well.
For the military to fulfill the “agile” requirement, the social engineering of the uniformed military must stop. The most qualified persons for the job must be given the opportunity to fill the position, regardless of sex or ethnicity. The language requirement is a non – issue, as fully one third of CF ships, wings and units use French as their language of operation. As long as a prospective member was proficient in one official language, they would have met the requirement for service and subsequent promotion. In regards to women and service in the CF, equality and opportunity could be attained with the simple application of one, universal standard for all applicants, regardless of sex. This is not currently the case, with female recruits held to less rigorous physical entrance standards than their male counterparts for the same pay, employment and benefits. If women are to be permitted access to the Canadian Forces in all positions as men, they must meet the same high standards. There cannot be two classes of soldiers, in which one is required to accomplish less based on antiquated notions of the fragility or inability of one sex. Those who would harm Canadian soldiers with suicide attacks, roadside bombs and gunfire will surely not differentiate between the two. The “agile” Canadian Forces will employ the best individual for the job, regardless of their gender, which official language they speak, or the color of their skin through the use of a universal physical and intellectual standard.
Hostile
A “hostile” force is one geared towards offensive action, as opposed to defensive measures, or submission as a means of affecting desired results. The proverb “The best defence is a good offence” is an appropriate representation of this pillar of success.
This is not to advocate unbridled aggression, merely the presence of a force that, like a coiled spring, has destructive potential ever ready to be unleashed, should the circumstances warrant it. The mere presence of such a deterrent is often all that is required to achieve many positive outcomes. In real terms, this means the maintenance of a lavishly equipped, well trained and well paid cadre of career, professional soldiers; ready to do serious and permanent damage to an adversary on a moments notice, wherever that adversary may be located. Canada’s current Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) proclaimed; “We are not the public service of Canada, we’re not just another department, we are the Canadian Forces, and our job is to be able to kill people” The Canadian Forces is in the advanced stages of de-militarization right now, with relevant and useful tools of war such as heavy transport and reconnaissance helicopters, and tanks and self – propelled artillery (among many others items) being sold or scrapped as cost saving measures, or by a civilian directorate who does not believe that such expensive items are required for the wars Canada may have to fight. The deficiencies of equipment are only now being addressed by the abovementioned CDS, who has re-oriented the Canadian Forces for the short term, but time will tell if his policies are perpetuated or are discontinued by his successor(s).
The Canadian Forces requires certain pieces of equipment to fit the description of “hostile” as envisaged here. The first, and most obvious, is the need for individual soldiers to have the most lethal weapons for use on the enemy, and the very best protection to preserve their lives. This has not been the case in the past, as Canadian soldiers have died due to the use of obsolete and poorly designed equipment, such as the Iltis Jeep, in which three troops were killed in two separate incidents in Afghanistan in 2003 and 2004, due to suicide bombers and mine strikes. The Iltis’ armored replacement was rushed into service soon after, but the fact that soldiers must die to demonstrate the need for adequate equipment is inexcusable in a nation as wealthy as Canada, especially considering that the federal surplus that year (2004) was in excess of four billion dollars, or enough to buy approximately thirty - five thousand of the Mercedes Military Division built armored SUV’s, which have saved troops in Afghanistan who have, once again, run afoul of insurgents armed with improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers and firearms. This time however, none have died, although they have sustained serious injuries, which would have been fatal in an Iltis.
For the “hostile” requirement to be fulfilled, the Canadian Forces must have equipment designed to make any attack against Canada, her allies or Canadian soldiers a futile and suicidal endeavor. Tanks are required for ground forces, along with helicopter gunships for the army, and a troopship and landing craft for the Navy, with maritime helicopters to replace the geriatric Sea King. The Canadian Air Force must have the ability to support these elements, with capable fighter jets, and a ground to air capability based on precision weapons platforms. Transport aircraft are required to supply these troops while abroad, and sufficient stores of ammunition and spare parts must be stockpiled in order to keep these pieces of equipment and their operators working in a wartime situation. Canada must form an expeditionary force based on the United States Marine Corps “Marine Expeditionary Unit” or MEU which is basically a Brigade of troops, all of their transport and fighting vehicles, and supplies for ninety days on a series of ships, with enough integral helicopter (both attack and transport) support to project military power up to twenty kilometers from any coastline, anywhere on earth. One of these Expeditionary units could be based on each coast, with the third one reconstituting, performing domestic operations or training, and rotating the brigades through the task. This would enable Canada to make a timely and significant contribution to the various missions asked of it, instead of the current practice of offering a politically charged General to lead other nations’ troops, perhaps in conjunction with a few logisticians and a headquarters element.These Expeditionary units could also be used to preserve Canadian sovereignty, as Canada has the longest coastline in the world.
The issue was brought to the forefront of the public consciousness in 2003, when the Danish Navy sailed to Hans Island, an uninhabitable island precisely half – way between Ellesmere Island and Greenland, and proceeded to erect a Danish flag, along with a claim of sovereignty over the city block sized atoll. At the time of the alleged annexation of Canadian territory, Canada had little means of dissuading the Danes, and a ferocious exchange of words and declarations ensued. While the trivial nature of such a small piece of territory may be considered, the precedent set by a weak response from Ottawa could be very important, especially with the opening of the pack ice through the North West passage, a trade route that could save shipping companies millions of dollars on a route 4000 km shorter, as compared to the Panama Canal route, in the booming trade between Europe and Asia. That this route traverses approximately 1200 km of Canadian waters and may be open year round in the near future as a side effect of global warming, is of great concern to Canadians, especially given the environmental sensitivity of the area, and the poor record of the international shipping industry in the area of environmental stewardship.
An aggressive response to the Danish violation of Canadian territory could have set the tone for nations wishing to use the North West passage, but this did not happen, implying that Canadians are not concerned with the traditional definition of “border” or that they are simply not willing to pay to defend them. Nevertheless, Canada must be able to defend her borders, even if the political leader du jour is not willing to. The “hostile” pillar is one of readiness for war, not seeking one. The traditional argument against a powerful military in Canada is that for the last fifty years, Canada has participated in a long line of peacekeeping missions, and vehicles designed for attack are not suitable for this role. The fact of the matter is, that there has never, by the United Nation’s own definition been a “successful” peacekeeping mission seems to be overlooked. Canada’s contribution to these missions has often been substantial, and while a noble pursuit, peacekeeping is not a mission of and to itself. Peacekeeping is an activity that militaries are often called upon in the western world to perform if they are not otherwise employed in the defence of their own nation or the pursuit of their national interests. Canadian politicians in Ottawa have lost sight of this, and have continually denied resources to the Department of National Defence (DND) in an effort to fund social programs. While this is undoubtedly popular with the electorate, it would seem to be a foolhardy strategy if the nation is left undefended, interests unpursued. As a result, a military can maintain a high state of readiness and capability, then perform a mission below which it is capable of, (which should be all – out warfare) but it cannot train half –way, then perform to the full potential. In other words, it would be better for the military to train and be equipped for the worst case scenario, and then be pleasantly surprised, when all of the skills and resources are not required, than to be caught unprepared, and suffer a potentially huge loss of life and materiel.
Mobile
Winston Churchill stated that “Victory is the beautiful, bright colored flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.” Those words are as true in the modern military context as they were during World War Two. The best trained and equipped forces are of no use if they cannot reach the area where they are required in a timely manner. Canada has an even greater need for transportation assets than most nations due to the large size of Canada, the inaccessibility of large portions of it, and, as mentioned, the longest coastline in the world. The routine deployment of units within Canada for training exercises is often over distances which would be considered to be strategic in other parts of the world. An example of this would be the move of a mechanized infantry unit between New Brunswick and Alberta. In the European context, one could traverse six nations with a move of the same distance, and over less demanding terrain! Transport is another area in which Canada’s greatest reason for having a small military becomes the bane of that force. The oceans that separate Canada from her potential adversaries are the same barriers that make it so difficult and expensive to move Canadian troops where they are needed, as this almost always requires a Trans oceanic trip. For the CF to be effective in the missions asked of it overseas, it must have the ability to move massive amounts of men and materiel across these oceans and through the air. This capability does not currently exist, with the Canadian Forces lacking any type of organic heavy sea or airlift capabilities. Air transport is limited to a fleet of 32 CC-130 Hercules fixed wing aircraft, all of which are between thirty and forty years of age. These aircraft are well maintained, but when faced with an ever – expanding operational tempo and job description, are simply not up to the task for a wealthy nation like Canada, especially not when alternatives like the C-17 Globemaster are available from our US allies, an aircraft that has a payload approximately five times of that of a Hercules, and far greater reliability and maintainability. The Hercules is also unable to transport the newest and best Canadian armored vehicles, such as the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) III in the configuration that it would be required in, and with a full load of ammunition.
Recent examples of the requirement for expanded Canadian air transportation assets were the delayed deployment of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to tsunami ravaged Asian locales in 2004, when the Canadian Government was not able to act immediately, as the public demanded, but instead had to wait until civilian transportation assets in the form of Russian and Ukrainian Antonov - 124 transport aircraft came available.
The requirement of the Canadian Navy to maintain a transport capability for the Army and Air Force is also apparent for several reasons. The first is that the Canadian military currently lacks the ability to transport ground vehicles or large numbers of troops by sea, despite access to shipbuilding facilities in Canada, Europe and the US. This has been remedied in the past with the use of civilian assets, but this is not without pitfalls, as the GTS Katie proved in 2000, when nearly a quarter of a billion dollars worth of Canadian military equipment returning from Kosovo was withheld by a civilian transportation company due to a dispute with a sub-contractor. The Canadian Navy was forced to board the vessel in order to compel the return of the equipment and soldiers aboard. Obviously, if Canadian troops and equipment are to be prevented from being used as bargaining chips in contractual disputes, Canada must be able to move her own military to where the Canadian Government sees fit. The transportation of military assets to and from Peacekeeping missions is one thing, but if the Canadian military is to truly be a multi-faceted and capable military, it must maintain the ability to engage in littoral warfare, which by definition include vessels able to operate in shallow coastal waters, and ground troops able to perform amphibious landings on suitable beachheads, as opposed to the requirement for a deepwater port, as is currently the case. At least one amphibious troopship is required in this respect, along with a full complement of maritime transport helicopters to support landed expeditionary forces.
There is no lack of enthusiasm in the Canadian Forces for the missions asked of soldiers overseas, in the areas of peace – enforcement and ridding countries of despotic regimes such as Afghanistan’s Taliban. The Canadian Forces are currently hampered in their role as the military embodiment of the will of the Canadian public because they lack the resources to reach the areas and people of interest in a timely manner. In addition to this, military transport is not solely used for military purposes, the aircraft can be made available to civilian transportation companies, generating profit for the owners (the taxpayer) which can help to offset the high cost of acquisition and operation. Also, heavy air transport capability would have been of great benefit during such natural disasters as the Quebec Ice Storm, the Manitoba Floods or the Fires in British Columbia. Massive amounts of supplies and manpower can be moved in military transport aircraft, and in periods of high demand, the cost of civilian transportation rises exponentially, so the military transportation system can be extremely efficient by comparison!
Note A conclusion is in the works for this paper, but due to an extremely short timeframe, any input on the existing content is much appreciated, don't hold back!
This paper is intended as an academic pursuit, and does not represent the opinions or desires of the DND or CF administratively or as a whole.
