Deep thoughts about "Transformation"

[TangoTwoBravo]

PBI,

I'd gladly drink the beer and return the favour (although going through a case might take a few days if you are where I think you are)  !  I did an exchange with the USMC and was very impressed with their ethos.  I mightily respect their "crucible" approach to basic training.

Royal Highland Fusilier,


Good point.  We always have to cut corners somewhere but I agree that BMQ is probably not the best place to do it.

AMajoor,

I agree that span of control will probably widen and we will get even more dispersed.  I also think, however, that we will continue to need relatively large armies to undertake the missions of today and the near future.  This will mean that there will still be a hierarchy, although it will probably be quite broad as you suggest.  I read an article sometime ago about "swarms" and while a bit scientific for me it did raise some interesting ideas.  You may well be on to something but I remain a skeptic.

That being said, do those higher level "loops" to the factory in North America and the hospital in Germany really help in fighting the bad guy across the street?  These things certainly help at the strategic and operational level but perhaps not so much at street level.  I would feel better having a good tactical link to a QRF that can get me out of trouble, a robust field hospital and a squared away RQMS than the ability to talk to somebody outside of the theatre that can give me advice or send something that will take days to reach me.

Cheers,

2B

 

[a_majoor]

AMajoor,

I agree that span of control will probably widen and we will get even more dispersed. I also think, however, that we will continue to need relatively large armies to undertake the missions of today and the near future. This will mean that there will still be a hierarchy, although it will probably be quite broad as you suggest. I read an article sometime ago about "swarms" and while a bit scientific for me it did raise some interesting ideas. You may well be on to something but I remain a skeptic.

That being said, do those higher level "loops" to the factory in North America and the hospital in Germany really help in fighting the bad guy across the street? These things certainly help at the strategic and operational level but perhaps not so much at street level. I would feel better having a good tactical link to a QRF that can get me out of trouble, a robust field hospital and a squared away RQMS than the ability to talk to somebody outside of the theatre that can give me advice or send something that will take days to reach me.

Still feeling my way around this idea, but if the "outside loop" is any good, the operators in that side will have anticipated a need and prepositioned something nearby. This is not in a "magical" sense, but rather the outside loop saying "if these units are patrolling here, here and here; then we need a reaction force there which can support them if they run into a problem. The "inside loop" takes over when it is triggered by a specific need, i.e. send reaction force to GR 123456 right now...

Characterizing the operators in these loops as "officers" and "NCOs" is not really correct, but a way to get the flavor of the idea.

 

[Kirkhill]

Currently taking a course just now talking about personalities and leadership styles.  It struck me that while I have usually conflated "leadership" with "The Man on the White Horse" addressing the Millions, 2Bravo's empty battlefield  has actually prompted a change towards small group dynamics and small group leadership.  4 man dets, 2 dets commanders per Section Commander, 3-4 SC/PL, 3-4 PL/OC, 3-5 OC/CO..........  Span of control is defined how exactly?

Also, further to a_majoor's comments about the technical skills of the NCO middle class, that actually could be the key to understanding the Western middle class.  This group of servants, merchants, accountants, engineers, masons, developed expertise and sold that expertise to the benefit of the ruling classes and thus secured their position.  The society and the army can't run without them.

Contrarily, does decision making require technical expertise or is the ability to understand, analyze and decide a separate skill set?

Cheers.

 

[a_majoor]

Contrarily, does decision making require technical expertise or is the ability to understand, analyze and decide a separate skill set?

It is difficult to make a decision without some sort of grounding. "Inside loop" operators are dealing with the here and now, so need to be closer to the technical expertise model, while "Outside loop" operators use their analytical skills to frame the actions of the inside loops and anticipate future needs. These analytical skills may be developed through higher education (although in my experience, University educated officers and soldiers can be just as limited as the rest of us), as well as being developed through experience, such as the CFR model.

 

[Kirkhill]

In my experience education is no indicator or either ability to think logically nor to decide in a timely fashion.  I plead guilty in particular to the last.

No, I think what I was getting at is that somethings require detailed technical knowledge "How" to do things and thus people with this knowledge are best placed to present "What" is possible.  Given that there are so many things to know these days (and this may have always been true) it is unlikely that any one person will have full and adequate knowledge of all practicable options available to overcome any particular obstacle. 

What I am suggesting is that there are essentially three components in an organization.  Those that "Do, those that know "How" and those that can decide "What".  Sometimes all capabilities are present in one person.  Some people are capable of some, all or none, depending on circumstances.  Not all ORs are just Doers - many have specialized technical knowledge.  Not all those that have specialized knowledge are NCOs, Engineer and Arty officers amongst many others in the modern force come to mind and not all of those that can decide "What" are in the Officer Corps.  Conversely some Officers likely have difficulty deciding "What" to do.

However, in the Grand Scheme of Things, I would argue, that traditionally ORs have been assumed to be the Doers, the Officers were the Deciders and the NCOs were the ones with the Knowledge of "How".

Officers generally were upper class types with wide ranging educations that covered a lot of ground but, especially since the enlightenment, focused on the ability to think - and decide - rationally. Other ranks were not required to have any education.  The Army would teach them what they had to know.  They teaching, directing and technical knowledge was the province of the NCOs. Jumped up NCOs filled the ranks of such "ungentlemanly" positions as Quartermaster in Wellington's army. 

As Armies became more technologically dependent on cannons, explosives and fortifications then schools were created for gunners and engineers. In Britain at least, I won't speak to the continent, but it is my sense that these schools were largely populated by "Middle Class" offspring that brought with them a high degree of education and could apply the industrial revolution to the battlefield.  Engineer and Arty officers were not in the same social league as the Cavalry, Guards and Infantry officers.  At the same time their men were a cut above the ordinary line soldiery because they needed to be able to do sums and write.  Thus in the Technical Corps there would be a tendency for there to be less social distinction between the ranks - officers and men were both essentially recruited from the same educated middle class pool, selection would be based on merit, to the extent that the better educated were inducted as officers but advancement was base on merit.  Knowledge. Both technical knowledge and knowledge of how to direct people and events and get things done.

This broadening middle class would tend to find commonality with the NCO corps of the Cavalry and Infantry.

As more technical capabilities were grafted onto Units, especially guns (leather guns, galloper guns, gatling guns, maxim guns, stokes mortars, anti-tank guns, snipers), then the proportion of "middle class" knowledge workers increases in the unit.  Concurrently there occurred a class levelling with NCOs and Tradesmen and Craftsmen being respected for what they know and what they can accomplish.

The hallmark of the best of the Officer Corps however is still an ability to win battles by receiving and understanding information, understanding its importance, analyzing the situation and making a decision in a timely fashion (did someone say OODA).  Like any other situation the key to success is an ability to listen to advice, select the best, and act based on that advice.  Success is based on being surrounded by good advisors.  Traditionally that was the purview of the NCOs at the Unit level but it also includes CRE and CRA at the formation level - commissioned officers supplying technical advice to the force commander.

Typing that out loud - OK - typing that out loud makes me think that therein lies the real problem with the Cavalry.  They have derived from a force that operated independently on battlefield. Their officer corps is used to being "Deciders" and leading the Army.  Since WWI there have been fewer, at least in British service and definitely in Canadian service, Cavalry officers in supreme command positions.  The British and Canadian armies are essentially infantry armies with Cavalry being a supplementary force, increasingly technically oriented.  Increasingly the senior cavalry commander has become the senior advisor on the manoeuvre and possibly the recce battles.

Interestingly I think it might be fair to say that the American Army, with its Airland concept and its emphasis on maneouvre and shock, rather than holding and dominating ground,  is adhering to a Cavalry ethos.  Cavalry officers still tend to hold many of the senior positions and even when Cavalry officers don't then Mech Infantry officers, or even Air Asslt Infantry officers, (7 out of 10 reg divisions) are imbued with the same spirit.

Does that have implications for a difference in "cultures" between Canadian, American and British forces? How do they compare to Continental forces?

 

[a_majoor]

As usual, the deep historical roots of the institution are directing the future growth. The US military's true roots are in various "small wars", both during the colonial period and the "Indian Wars" throughout the 19th century. We "see" the big wars because they are more visible and encompass more of a societiy's resources, but even so, most of the commanders were trained in the previous "small wars". Even "Black Jack" Pershing first gained his spurs in the "Punitive" expidition in Mexico against Pancho Villa, and Douglas McArthur was already famous for fighting against Phillipino guerillas. Patton, another "old style" Cavalry commander, managed to combine the best features of industreal age weapons and logistics with the "Cavalry" ethos; unhinging German positions through speed and movement rather than frontal collisions.

The "American Way of War" using economic power to provide lots of material and sophisticated logistics support go get it into action only works as well as it does because of the "Cavalry" ethos where the rubber meets the road. If the US Army was an Infantry Army, the history would read more like that of the Red Army, hurling masses of men and material headlong against the enemy....

This is an interesting aside for our question. Our "deep roots" seem to be Artillery (at least since WW I), and our military culture is prevaded by the need for detailed and carefully laid plans. This does not seem to be a culture attuned to fluid environments and "three block wars".

 

[Kirkhill]

Our "deep roots" seem to be Artillery (at least since WW I),

Weren't the first two Canadian reg force units formed after Confederation A and B Batteries at Kingston and Quebec?  Are those your Arty roots?

Also I agree with you about the Americans and their history of small wars.  Mounted forces covering large territories at home.  Marine forces deployed internationally by sea.

As to the Brits.  A long period of static garrisons (centuries all over the world including Britain) where the Cavalry was a patrolling force and Infantry dominated urban control, with interspersed wars where Cavalry came into its own as a shock force.  Gunners also were primarily War Branch, while Engineers,  their parent organization, were more generally useful in establishing secure bases and lines of communication to enhance "stability ops".

Those are roots, and we are all prisoners (to an extent) of tradition and what worked in the past.  But is transformation just about transforming from a Canadian Artillery Army to a British Infantry Army or an American Cavalry Army?

 

[a_majoor]

Knowing the roots of the institution is a guide more than anything else. If we are not careful, we will take the tools of the 21rst century and use them according to slow, careful and methodical formulas (the key to victory in WW I), while our allies and enemies run rings around us.

Meanwhile, I am hijacking a thread from News and Current Affairs: The war in Iraq and unofficial internet sites. http://army.ca/forums/threads/25213.0.html

The two part article speaks to some of the ideas posted earlier, mostly about transformation being driven by junior leaders with different attitudes and skill sets.

 

[Kirkhill]

Great post by Michael O'Leary and thanks for the link Art.

As you suggest roots can be limiting. They might tend to bind and prevent progress.  However knowledge of what an organizations roots are might be a guide to both what has succeeded in the past and MAY be useful in the future as well as what specifically are the institutional impediments to change and thus should be considered carefully as to whether change in those areas might be worth the risk in order to achieve different/better results.

At the same time, especially given the scope for change these days due to technology and the competence of individuals in the general population, both inside the army and potential recruits,  some flexibility,  some room for experimentation at very junior levels has to be built into the structure.  Without losing either cohesiveness nor the ability to concentrate forces and operate in mass.

Is one answer, as Infanteer, 2Bravo and a_majoor, amongst others, have suggested to download systems to the lowest level at which they are likely to be used,  allowing lower level commanders to train and operate with them during periods of low stress, either when out of action or in low intensity conflicts?  At the same time regular training with other low-level units as amalgamated formations?

Eg, using the notorious plug'n'play model - The single capbadge Regiment, fielding multiple task force units, composed of companies, platoons, squadrons, troops and combat teams that will be operating with a great degree of autonomy in-theatre most of the time - having the Regiment form from all-arms MOCs organized primarily of those sub-units and sub-sub-units that are likely to be used as independent teams on the ground and then figure out how to conduct individual and task-force training in garrison under the auspices of a single Regiment. 

And I would argue in favour of multiple Regiments, each allowed SOME autonomy in operations and doctrine formation as a little, well-managed competition is a good thing.


Cheers.

 

[jrhume]

I have some thoughts on realism in training

Training scenarios and simulations need to approximate the real thing insofar as possible.  That's a given.  The US Army's use of simulators for tank training and the considerable time and effort expended in combined arms training at Fort Irwin are but two examples of efforts in that direction.

Iraq and Afghanistan offer new situations for which the Army will have to develop realistic training regimes.  I'm sure, based on what I've been reading, that many 'lessons learned' are already a part of unit training.

What might be less obvious, in my opinion, is that even the wrong kind of training has value -- if it is done in a genuinely realistic manner.  Let me explain.  US Army tank training has concentrated on the moving battle, combined arms, open country scenario, a derivation of the Western Europe armored combat model that was prevalent for so long.  This training turned out to be marginally useful for the forces in Iraq -- of more use in the initial invasion than since.  However, since the tankers involved had been trained in stressful situations, akin to actual combat, they were better able to adapt to the changed situation.

Thus, it is less important, I think, to get every simulated situation as close to observed reality as possible, than to make whatever training a unit receives as realistic as you can. 

When my unit was getting ready to deploy to Vietnam we participated in a mock ambush drill.  We put together a convoy and proceeded along a Georgia road somewhere on Fort Benning.  An opposing force ambushed us.  We had no blank ammo for our M-16s -- only for the M-60s.  The aggressors were using M-14s, for which there was a plentiful supply of blank ammo.  There were not enough umpires (this is pre-miles gear) to manage the action and the whole thing was a joke.

We received no other training.

In Vietnam, I was never involved in an ambush.  Mortar attacks by the dozen but no ambush.  However, I knew any number of people who were part of a convoy that got hit.  Like Iraq, the whole country was a combat zone.  Whether hit with a mortar attack, ambush or perimeter assault, non-combat soldiers in Vietnam received their training on the job.  Initial reactions in sudden combat situations can mean the difference between life and death.  Yet, we had no training to help us get past that initial shock and confusion that grabs you when those first rounds come in.

I believe a good introductory course, 'Survival in a Guerilla War' or something like that could have been developed and would have saved numerous lives during Vietnam.  Some units -- mostly combat outfits -- did run newbies through such courses.  Too bad we all didn't have the opportunity.

The same situation reoccurred in Iraq, although much has been done to remedy the lack of convoy training, mostly by people on the scene.  There's on big difference between the two wars.  In Vietnam innovation was frowned upon.  We still had a very top-down orientation.  Though that view still persists, it co-exists with a willingness on the part of higher command to let the people on the ground do their thing.

So I guess my thinking comes down to observed reality.  Well trained soldiers given the freedom to adapt can not only survive rapidly changing situations but find new ways to defeat the enemy. 

That's enough for now.  I want to discuss information flows -- but later.

Jim

 

[a_majoor]

Realistic training should have a much expanded "box" to operate in, presenting commanders with a thinking enemy, and giveing them freedom of action to deal with the unexpected.

I once did micro-armour wargaming, and learned the Soviet way of war. Examining the doctrine closely, I realized the Soviets were not as rigid and formulatic as we had been taught, and there was some flexibility built into their doctrine. At about the same time, some other regimental members heard about our gaming and asked to join. As the Soviet commander, I had the Regimental Leading March Parties out and the regiment in the normal formation to start, but once I had "bumped" and located the "Canadian" battlegroup, I spent a moment to decide what to do, based on my mission objectives. Rather than bring up progressively larger formations and do a series of sequential attacks (the accepted formula), I halted the advance guard, brought up the rest of the formation and proceeded to launch a regimental attack, with the independant tank battalion trailing to do the exploitation.

The "Canadians", expecting the formulaic attacks, were overwhelmed by the sheer weight of the assault, and were unable to prevent a breach in the lines, followed by a battalion of T-72's racing into the rear area.

In "real" wargames I have observed, this sort of thing never happens, the Red force/Gen force always attacks according to the template, and the Blue force wins after a tough struggle when the A-10s swoop down on the Regimental main body.

Unless commanders at all levels are exposed to unconventional situations, they will not be able to get the flexible mind set needed to work in the real world.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I've been observing and thinking on this one for a few days now.  First off, the article above does seem to indicate that at least one element of the transformation suggested by Art is coming to pass, namely that of soldiers having a network outside of their immediate unit and chain of command that can be used to communicate lessons and get advice.  Guess I'm looking like Haig today instead of Fuller...I have concerns about security and the ability to ensure that all leaders have access, but I am thinking that we will see more of this rather than less.   

I have been pondering the issue of historical roots and military culture.  Looking at our current situation I see several generations of military culture that exist right now that transcend capbadges.  We have a "cold war" culture that sees the Army in terms of CMBGs fighting a conventional enemy.  There is another generation that sees the world in terms of 90s peace support missions.  We are now in a "post 9-11" security environment that is creating a third generation of currently serving soldier that has an enemy but one that is different than the one prepared for in the Cold War.  All three sets of experience have an influence on our "culture", with many soldiers having served in all three periods.

I feel that the true differences between the "generations" or sets of experience are not so much in technology or a Gen Y culture but rather in the security context.  The Cold War saw potential scenarios of two combatants meeting in conventional stand-up battles.  The 90s saw Western forces interposed between belligerents but often with less than concrete objectives.  The war on terror has a defined opponent but he is diffuse and does not fight the conventional battle.  Three difference situations with three different threats and requiring three difference solutions.  Could this be the Three Block War that is so often mentioned today?  Do we need the ability to be able to switch between all three modes?  Can the same method or organization work for each threat model?

Comparing Canadian, US and UK cultures, I would say that we have more in common than not when compared with other militaries.  We are basically a British army that is strongly influenced by the US (common to virtually all things Canadian).  That being said, based on having been a Canadian military student on a US Army course I would say that US officers are more accustomed to taking criticism than we are.  I feel (and not excepting myself) that Canadian officers are a bit more defensive in After Action Reviews than our US counterparts but I may be way off here.  The senior officers that I met in the US Army had, for the most part, been in Vietnam and were personally aware of the human cost of war.  Once again this is my gut feel and not based on scientific study.  Please note that I am not saying that I thought that the US officers were better (or worse), just that this was one cultural difference that relates to the topic.  The US Army has been through twenty years of NTC, JRTC and CMTC rotations so they are pretty familiar with the AAR.  As we conduct more and more formal After Action Reviews in our Army it may become ingrained in our culture to accept "public" criticism with greater ease.

I have poster from the US Army that I carry from office to office that has a grainy picture of a soldier in battlegear and reads as follows "Battle Staff Officer, Remember...everything you plan and write must be executed by this man.  He and his buddies will be the first to pay for your mistakes.  Do your job well- futures depend on it."  Its a bit melodramatic but it does make a good point.

I think that Old Guy's comments are illustrative of the idea that as long as training presents challenges and practices units in situations involving stress and decision making then the training has value even if it is not necessarily "realistic."  That being said, we should make every effort to make our training events relevent to situations that our soldiers may actually face.

Looking at Iraq (and Afghanistan and other war on terror theatres) it should not be a suprise that it is for the most part a small unit campaign that relies on low level leaders.  The newer generations of soldiers and leaders should be able to do well in that environment, especially with regards to being comfortable working in ambiguous situations and environments. 

I'm afraid I've rambled too much today (I can visualize the "Sum-up" clipboard being flashed by the DS).

Cheers and have a good weekend,

2B

 

[a_majoor]

http://stumpinggrounds.com/2005/01/blink-examining-split-second-decisions.html

Sunday, January 16, 2005
'Blink' - Examining Split-Second Decisions

What do a marble statue, an apparently happy marriage, a tennis coach, an American President, Aeron chairs, Oreo Cookies, Amadou Diallo, and classical musicians have in common? In Malcolm Gladwell's new book Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking, they each serve as waypoints on the way to understanding how the adaptive unconscious works. As he did in his best selling book The Tipping Point, Gladwell manages to take a complex concept and break it down into easily understood terms.

Blink undertakes to accomplish three tasks; to convince the reader that "Decisions made very quickly can be every bit as good as decisions made cautiously and deliberately", to answer the question "When should we trust our instincts, and when should we be wary of them?", and to convince us that "Snap judgments and first impressions can be educated and controlled." That Gladwell succeeds in all three tasks is testament to his abilities both as a researcher and as a story teller.

Blink is intriguing in that it manages to quantify a concept that most people accept without understanding why it is so - the power of split-second decision making. Using examples such as a researcher who can analyze marriages based entirely on micro-expressions used in normal conversation, Gladwell introduces the concept of "thin-slicing" - finding patterns based on very narrow experiences. It is this thin-slicing that forms the basis of much of what we consider intuitive decision making. And, more significantly, he demonstrates that the ability to thin-slice can be learned and refined, resulting in better instantaneous decisions.

Gladwell also looks at those instances when our instincts fail us. Using the killing of Amadou Diallo as an example, he explores the factors that interfere with our ability to make correct split-second decisions. Most interesting is his premise that a form of "temporary autism" is at the root of the inability to make correct instant decisions. Gladwell supports his assertion by examining the psychological, physiological, and environmental factors that combine to cause otherwise normal individuals to exhibit autistic-like symptoms when faced with critical situations. He further demonstrates that by understanding these factors, and practicing techniques to overcome them, it is possible to improve one’s ability to make quick decisions under stressful conditions.

Gladwell uses a recent Pentagon war game to examine the potentially negative impact of having too much information. He demonstrates how one man, relying on many of the techniques discussed in this book, was able to achieve a stunning victory over an opposing force relying on what amounted to information overload in its decision-making process. Using this example, coupled with the experiences of Emergency Room physicians at Chicago's Cook County Hospital, Gladwell ably demonstrates that less is often more when it comes to having the information needed to make a decision.

That Malcolm Gladwell has managed to explain the essence of a concept that seems to be second nature to most people should come as no surprise. In fact, it would be safe to bet that many who have read his earlier works used exactly the techniques he describes in Blink to decide that this latest offering would be a worthwhile addition to their personal libraries.

They would be correct.

This sort of intuative decision making may be what we see as the "non-linear" and "non-contiguous" thought process of the Gen Y cadre. If what I am reading in the review is correct; it may be possible to learn this sort of mind set. There is still hope for us yet  ;D

 

[Kirkhill]

This sort of intuative decision making may be what we see as the "non-linear" and "non-contiguous" thought process of the Gen Y cadre. If what I am reading in the review is correct; it may be possible to learn this sort of mind set. There is still hope for us yet 

Have you ever watched Wheel of Fortune and guessed what the word or phrase is before Vanna turns all the tiles over? ;D

 

[a_majoor]

http://www.scienceblog.com/cms/node/6733

Research could help military leaders make better decisions under pressure

Research into how people make decisions while under pressure could help the U.S. military improve training for its leaders and lead to better decision-support systems. Studies have shown that when people process information, they develop unconscious strategies â “ or biases â “ that simplify their decisions. Now, research at the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI) is revealing how these biases affect people when they're dealing with lots of information â “ and little time to form conclusions.

"The immediate application for this research is to develop training programs to improve decision-making," said Dennis Folds, a principal research scientist in GTRI's Electronic Systems Laboratory. "Yet our findings could also help design new types of decision-support systems." The research indicated that nine different kinds of biases can lead to errors in judgment when people are dealing with a lot of information. Meanwhile, the error rate was not as high as researchers expected for individuals under time pressure. Also, the study revealed that subjects who were trained to spot conditions that lead to decision-making biases were better at detecting "false-alarm opportunities."

The Army Research Institute funded Folds to conduct a series of experiments that combined a high volume of data with time pressures. The experiments simulated the changing reality of military decision-makers. Commanders today communicate more directly with field personnel. The amount and variety of information at their disposal has escalated with sources ranging from real-time sensors and voice communications to archived data. The result can be ambiguous, disjointed information rather than integrated, organized reports.

"This puts far greater pressure on leaders, who must make faster decisions while sifting through more data," Folds noted. In his experiments, he considered previous research on seven specific biases that affect individuals who must wrestle with large amounts of data:

* Absence of evidence. Missing, relevant information is not properly considered.
* Availability. Recent events or well-known conjecture provide convenient explanations.
* Oversensitivity to consistency. People give more weight to multiple reports of information, even if the data came from the same source.
* Persistence of discredited information. Information once deemed relevant continues to influence even after it has been discredited.
* Randomness. People perceive a causal relationship when two or more events share some similarity, although the events aren't related.
* Sample size. Evidence from small samples is seen as having the same significance as larger samples.
* Vividness. When people perceive information directly, it has greater impact than information they receive secondhand -- even if the secondhand information has more substance.

To test the affects of these biases, Folds had experiment subjects view an inbox on a computer screen containing a variety of text messages, maps, photographs and video and audio recordings. Subjects (the majority being Georgia Tech ROTC students) were instructed to report certain military situations, such as incidents of sniper fire or acts of suspected sabotage. They were not to report other events, such as normal accidents in an urban area unrelated to enemy activity.

To decide whether or not an event should be reported, subjects reviewed a series of messages that contained both bona fide evidence as well as information created to trigger the biases that cause poor decisions. In each trial, subjects were allowed enough time to spend an average of 20 seconds per element data plus one additional minute for reporting; they were also asked to attach information that supported their decision.

In the first experiment, all seven biases appeared with the greatest number of errors caused by vividness and oversensitivity to consistency. In addition, Folds discovered two new biases that can hinder the quality of rapid decisions:

* Superficial similarity. Evidence is considered relevant because of some superficial attribute, such as a key word in a message title. For example, a hostage situation might have been reported earlier, and then another message shows up in the inbox with the word "hostage" in its header, although the message's actual content has nothing to do with hostages.
* Sensationalist appeal. Items containing exaggerated claims or threats influence a decision-maker even when there is no substance to the content.

Folds was surprised at how well subjects could perform the task while under pressure, he said. Although he expected an accuracy rate of about 50 percent, subjects correctly reported 70 percent of incidents.

In a second experiment, researchers divided subjects into two groups, using one as a control group while training the other group how to spot conditions that spark decision-making biases. Subjects who received training were able to detect about twice as many "false-alarm opportunities" as the control group.

The biggest difference between the two groups involved "persistence of discredited information" and "small sample" biases. Forty-eight percent of trained subjects were able to recognize when a "persistence" bias existed compared to 18 percent of the control group. Fifty percent of trained subjects caught the "sample-size" traps versus 11 percent of the control group. Although training helped participants recognize when traps existed, it didn't help them identify the specific bias. "When subjects were under pressure to make decisions rapidly, the distinctiveness of the categories fell apart," Folds explained. "That's significant, because it helps us tailor training efforts."

The experiments also revealed what kind of information is meaningful to decision-makers, Folds noted. Software designed especially for the trials tracks when subjects open a document for the first time and when they go back for a second time or third look. The amount of time that subjects spend reviewing data â “ along with the data they attach to reports showed a decided preference for text messages over other formats. Folds' team is conducting more research: Two new sets of trials are examining how decision-making errors occur in groups, while another experiment is trying to pinpoint how rapidly individuals can make good decisions.

From Georgia Tech Research Institute

 

[PPCLI Guy]

http://stumpinggrounds.com/2005/01/blink-examining-split-second-decisions.html
This sort of intuative decision making may be what we see as the "non-linear" and "non-contiguous" thought process of the Gen Y cadre. If what I am reading in the review is correct; it may be possible to learn this sort of mind set. There is still hope for us yet   ;D

This is, I believe, the key to the Command Support dilemma.  Having given Conds greater SA, we now need to unleash their intuitive decision making ability - to untie it from the linear process driven approach of OPP and tie in to the gestalt, the intuition of a Comd.  All of that begs the question as to how one trains for or creates intuition.

Dave

 

[Kirkhill]

Quote from: a_majoor on January 16, 2005, 22:18:50
http://stumpinggrounds.com/2005/01/blink-examining-split-second-decisions.html
This sort of intuative decision making may be what we see as the "non-linear" and "non-contiguous" thought process of the Gen Y cadre. If what I am reading in the review is correct; it may be possible to learn this sort of mind set. There is still hope for us yet  


This is, I believe, the key to the Command Support dilemma.   Having given Conds greater SA, we now need to unleash their intuitive decision making ability - to untie it from the linear process driven approach of OPP and tie in to the gestalt, the intuition of a Comd.   All of that begs the question as to how one trains for or creates intuition.

This may only be possible by giving people the opportunity to fail and supplying enough institutional depth that the institution can still accomplish assigned tasks despite the failure of one or more components.   Maybe that is the ultimate difference between wartime and peacetime advancement.   In peacetime men and machines are measured against arbitrary standards by men and women that have created those standards and have a vested interest in those standards.   In wartime, casualties demand promotions based on commanders intuitions or just plain necessity. Successful commanders survive, complete tasks and get promoted.   Unsuccessful commanders don't.

Which brings me to another point which should be addressed in another thread really:

http://army.ca/forums/threads/25758.0.html


Just reviewing LCol Eyre's post on 3PPCLI and the phrase "hollow army" stood out.  

This, from a snr serving offr, very much reinforces the dire situation of the CF.   Is it possible to look at your situation as analogous to the situation of a force after its first blooding at war and in need of reorg.

(FIXED YOUR LINK - INFANTEER)

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Just reviewing LCol Eyre's post on 3PPCLI and the phrase "hollow army" stood out.  

This, from a snr serving offr, very much reinforces the dire situation of the CF.

 

The exact phrase has been used by Gen Hillier in public - it is a phrase in relatively common usage...

Is it possible to look at your situation as analogous to the situation of a force after its first blooding at war and in need of reorg.

Not so sure about that - or that we have actually been bloodied.  Change is inevitable - and transformational (and one could argue that we actually going through metamorphic change, and are just coming out of the pupal stage) is inevitably painful. 

Dave

 

[Infanteer]

All of that begs the question as to how one trains for or creates intuition.

My personal feeling on this is that it is not something you can "create".  Intuition seems to belong to the realm of the "Art of War" in that it is a character trait of the person in command rather then a skill that can taught at CTC or Staff College.  Being part of the Art, not everyone is going to be able to master application of intuition to tactical and operational problems; this is what one German General alluded to when he said (roughly) that "in the world of Art, not everybody can be a Raphael".  Being that Intuition is an innate trait, you can probably put it on the bell curve of good (left) and poor (right) command ability.

That being said, just because not everyone can be a Raphael or a Michaelangelo doesn't mean that we can't do our best to ensure that a great proportion of leadership is made up of Bob Ross's (a happy little tree...).  The fact that not every leader will be an innate military genius does not mean we cannot devise a training system to unlock the abilities of the "center mass" of the Bell Curve.  How to do this best?  My understanding would be to train leaders to be thinkers rather then actors.  This is why I've advocated a "critical education/field exposure" combined approach for training Officers in the thread Up From the Ranks and the "free play" approach to section command in the thread  Thinking About the Section Attack; these are two methods of measuring abilities through intuition by challenging leaders to think and justify the though process that went into executing their command decisions rather then simply pulling out the aide-memoir and resorting to Left-Flanking, Right-Flanking, or Frontal.

Technology also gives us better capabilities of objectively measuring the capabilities of leaders (again, if used properly).  As many have commented before, WES such as MILES and Simunition (best of all, a combo of both) is ruthlessly efficient at separating winners and losers in realistic combat training.  When "free play" is added to the mix, you can really start to draw the best out of you thinkers while watching your actors consistently hemorrhage their commands for lack of any intuitive approach to unique tactical situations.  We can expand on Free-Play by doing things like inviting real reporters to take part in training (to prepare commanders for being watched by the world....), ensuring that active Holy and Cultural Sites are thrown into training scenarios, and giving the Enemy Force access to a kit and other things that allow them to present unique challenges to the Blue Team.

Rather then have enemy force be the usual "Dressed in CADPAT and using Canadian weapons...", OPFOR should be a "jammy-assignment".  The men and leaders in OPFOR are truly able to "Step Outside the Box" (limited of course, to the scope of the training).  OPFOR, acting withing a unconstrictive set of boundaries (to ensure a bit of realism), should be free to act as they wish.  This will force both the Blue Team and the Red Team to get their "Thinking Cycles" reving at a high-RPM in order to not be outfoxed by the other in an unscripted training scenario.   Our leaders will develop best when challenged not by scripted scenarios but by the abilities of another thinking human being (which ultimately, is what we will face in combat).

What is perhaps needed most is inculcating within the institution an allowance for error and a measure of autonomy within subordinates.  Your leaders will never become "thinkers" if the chain is looking over their shoulder and saying "You shouldn't do that" or "Your approach is wrong".  Derivations from the dogmatic approaches of PAM's (which are good for introducing concepts) should be seen as experiments rather then lack of ability - if they are successful good on the thinker and if they fail, well, that's why we have "training", right?  Training scenarios should never be the same, and those responsible for creating them should be as creative as those who will take part in them.

In building an institutional foundation based upon critical thought, you would probably move away from the comfort zone of many who rely on "The Way" as dictated from above in manuals, PAM's, and Staff College notes.  It will also seem harder and less concrete of an approach because it will demand of us to be less reliant on quantitative measures to training leaders (we can no longer rely on 7 steps of battle procedure, 10 principles of warfare, 17 steps to launch an attack, etc, etc).  However, as we seem to be acknowledging here, the "Transformation" of our Army seems to be leading to a soldier who is more responsive to this sort of approach.  By taking advantage of this we can build on the "non-linear" and "non-contiguous" thought process mentioned above, ensuring that a greater percentage of the leadership (both Officer and NCO) has a more rapid and unpredictable OODA loop, which instills the advantage of knowing what letter before Vanna turns it over....

 

[Kirkhill]

Quote from: Kirkhill on Today at 16:32:58

Just reviewing LCol Eyre's post on 3PPCLI and the phrase "hollow army" stood out. 

This, from a snr serving offr, very much reinforces the dire situation of the CF.
 

The exact phrase has been used by Gen Hillier in public - it is a phrase in relatively common usage...


Quote
Is it possible to look at your situation as analogous to the situation of a force after its first blooding at war and in need of reorg.

Not so sure about that - or that we have actually been bloodied.  Change is inevitable - and transformational (and one could argue that we actually going through metamorphic change, and are just coming out of the pupal stage) is inevitably painful. 

Dave

In hindsight my wording does verge on the apocalyptic.  Not actually the intent I had although that may have been the effect.

Where actually I was coming from was the "realization", late in coming no doubt, that we now seem to be down to two effective companies in the Battalions, meaning a force of only 18 infantry coys, meaning our government can only "defend" 18 locales at a time.  Or 4 on a sustained basis.  This is based on my recollection of 1980's  doctrine. 

In the 1980's that would have been the task for a single Battalion.  Now we expect to deploy two Battalion centred Battle Groups on a sustained basis which means that each Battalion can only defend two locales. In other words, half the companies means half the locales.  I accept we might be able to cover more area in each locale but we still have less flexibility than we had.

To re-establish the flexibility of response I wanted to know what it would take to "Quickly" stand up more Companies/Squadrons.  I was suggesting that in extremis the CF in the past has resorted to jumping people ranks and relying on OJT. 

Perhaps I should have said, regardless of the "direness" of the situation, do you have to wait to be in extremis or would the same thinking apply in your current situation?

At heart this goes back to Admiral Buck's 5 years to add 5000 bodies and a desire to take the Government up on its offer while it is still fresh in their and the public's mind and not give them an out.

If my manager ( I know you guys hate that word but anyway) promised me more resources to complete an existing or new task my FIRST priority would be to secure those assets ASAP.