Deep thoughts about "Transformation"

[a_majoor]

One of the problems in talking about this subject is it is very difficult to find or generate examples, or to carry the ideas through to their "logical" conclusions, since they are running far ahead of our experience. By the time we have retrained ourselves to play "Warriors of Zelda", several generations of games and probably a new game console are already on the market.

For better or worse, here are a few ideas to give a bit more flavor to the idea:

1: Promotions generated from below. Who knows a leader or supervisor better than the people who work for him? We have all experienced leaders who are perfect model soldiers when their superiors are around, but total *******s when they have you alone. Other types are the ones who might excel in staff or field settings, but are hopeless otherwise. By getting input from the subordinates, the leadership will have a better idea who really can do the job.

2. DIY Logistics. When I first did IT purchases for 31 CBG; I canvassed the units to find what they needed, then started calling vendors. The G-4 staff stopped me before I went to jail, but when I redid the process through "the system", I paid far more than I had origionally been quoted, had far less selection (NMSO Vendors only seemed to carry Compaq or HP) and the entire process stretched out for several months. Under some circumstances, decentralized buying or sourcing by the RQ could be faster and cheaper. Imagine a clever RQ strapped for spare parts getting on line and "FedEx"ing a piece of kit to a line house in theater.

3."Groups of purpose" meets on line games. Imagine soldiers who may be deployed on OPs, but who are in constant IM contact with their fellow soldiers all over the world. Fellow soldiers are always available to offer suggestions, critiques and help. If there is sufficient bandwidth, they might even be watching events via web-cam. Records can be recalled for critique (if just screwed up), forensic analysis (if gone horribly wrong), or used to support awards and promotions as well.

These ideas are quite primitive and probably flawed, but are in line with the sort of experience and mindsets the "Generation Y" soldiers will have grown up with. To their minds, why should they work with a dick****; wait forever for the "system" to supply them or not be able to talk to their friends and peers whenever they want or need to?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Kirkhill,

Basically Port Arthur was a foreshadow of WW I in 1904/05 that occured during the Russo-Japanese war.  The Japanese were attacking a defended port (Russia's only all-year anchorage on the Pacific).  Extensive use was made of trenches, fortifications, artillery, modern rifles, hand-grenades and machine guns.    The Japanese won the battle and the war (combined with a crushing naval victory at Tushima) but only at great cost in lives.  The Japanese lost 60,000 men in frontal attacks while the Russians lost 30,000.  At least one Japanese attack lost 10,000 men in fifteen hours.  The matter was finally decided when the Japanese were able to bring 11 inch siege howizters into range (using medival style "saps").  In some ways it resembled Verdun, although at least there was a strategic outcome.  The Russians were basically cut-off and worn down in a battle of attrition.  Had the Russians been able to feed more men into the battle the toll would have been much higer.

I have read that some correspondents and military observers reported the effects of barded wire, machineguns and artillery to the Western armies but the reports were not taken very seriously.  The futility of frontal infantry attacks in the time-honoured way was there to be seen but not fully grasped. 

My own thoughts here are that MGs, barbed wire and accurate artillery had "first-order" effects on the battlefield.  I perceive that IT has a second or even third order effect. 

Looking at the Western Desert in 40-42 we see a little bit of everything.  The Germans had the combined arms thing down pat while the British seemed to be a step behind.  Cavalrymen turned into tankers tended to rush forward and cooperation between the arms seems to have been lacking.  Flexibility and combined arms groupings seem to have been the key factors, although logistics may have had the final say (as Infanteer aludes to).  How does this apply to our current situation?  I would say that the methods that achieved success in 1942 would work quite well today.  Missiles have replaced the 88 (with less effect) but otherwise it looks like the same type of fight (except with GPS  ).

A Majoor,

Promotions from below can make promotion a popularity contest.  I think that subordinates do have an impact on the promotion prospects of their superiors, but I'd hate to see it in a direct way.

Having networked soldiers sharing detailed info and imagery regarding ongoing operations would not be possible in my opinion due to the operatioal security implications. 

DIY logistics looks attractive until you realize that the only way to get delivery to the war-zone is through your own logistics channel.

Networked soldiers or groups of soldiers may be feasible, but I'd rather see small units that can work independently of a network.  I guess that I hope that future generations will be able to accept the frustrations that crop up in army service.

Cheers and good thread,

2B

 

[tomahawk6]

Promotions generated from below ? Subordinates approving their bosses ? I don't think so. Leaders have to lead and manage without regard to the feelings of their subordinates. Everything we do is mission oriented. The leaders that consistently  complete the mission/task
on time and successfully get ahead. Those that don't perform well dont get ahead. A leader is like a coach. You train your unit to a high standard. When assigned the mission/task you brief your subordinates on the game plan and they go out an execute. If you have done your job as a leader your team accomplishes the mission as tasked. In the old days of the US Army a leader when assigned to a command
would ask for certain subordinates by name- men he had worked with before to fill key staff positions. If you were one of those fortunate
souls as your mentor rose through the ranks you did too. This practice was ended in the post Vietnam era to afford more officers opportunities at key jobs.

Transformation in the US Army has been a continuous process for years. Technology was used to replace manpower. For example, in 1994 a brigade combat team had 67 M1's, 149 M2/M3, 72 infantry squads, 20 120mm mortars and 24 155mm howitzers. In 2004 that same mech brigade looked like this: 56 M1's,76 M2/3, 36 Infantry squads, 16 120mm mortars and 16 155mm howitzers. Prior to the invasion of Iraq the 3ID had to be dramatically reinforced with mech infantry. The new organization goes in the opposite direction from where we need to go. Iraq is very infantry intensive. There are not enough so we have artillerymen, tankers, engineers and air defense arty soldiers performing infantry missions. Any new organization should have alot of infantry. We need larger infantry squads- 10 man squads at least. We need another rifle company in every battalion be it a heavy or light formation. We need to find technologies that will enable us to the mission better to give us an edge on our enemies. But technology shouldnt replace the man - just allow him to do his task better.

 

[Kirkhill]

Promotions generated from below ? Subordinates approving their bosses ?

Wasn't that one of the problems with many of the Militia units that served the US so poorly in the early stages of the War of 1812?  Likewise I seem to remember reading of similar problems with Civil War units as well as Napoleonic era Volunteer Regiments in Britain and even as late as World War 2.  Both British Yeomanry and US National Guards had problems with too much familiarity.

The problem always seems to boil down to there having to be a degree of detachment between those issuing the orders and those carrying them out.  It seems to be difficult to order a friend to put his life at risk.  In that regard the class system has demonstrated some advantages over the years.  That obviously is not a sustainable system in the West currently so we have to find a suitable work-around.

As to a_majoors point about FedExing supplies to the front, I can't speak to the Americans but I do remember reading in various British publications that enterprising British Soldiers confronted with kit shortages, including NATO stock items like radio parts, were sourcing them on-line and having them delivered through the Army Post Office as personal mail.  It seemed to move faster than going through the system.  This caught the attention of the British committee that reviews the Services and got MPs asking why MOD couldn't do what a switched on Corporal could.

Like 2Bravo, I can't see indiscriminate comms being allowed regardless of how much spare bandwidth is available, on security grounds alone. But a_majoor's thought does raise another interesting thought if our stock of recruits is trained to work in a consensual consultative environment in which nobody is to blame where are we to find leaders willing to make decisions and accept responsibility?  If the intake's attitudes are truly learned attitudes, what will it take to unteach the old attitudes and instill new attitudes?

tomahawk6's comments about more infanteers seems to be coming a more and more common refrain.  Six, when 3ID and 101 Air Aslt came back from Iraq at roughly the same time and it was announced that they were both going to be transformed to the 5 UA structure.  Schoomaker had already said that he wanted a more infantry-centric organization.  I wondered at the time if the US commanders weren't going to look at mixing the two divisions ( I believe that together they had 10 - 11 Battalions worth of rifles, 9 in the 101 and 1-2 in the 3ID) and creating two divs with 5 Rifle Battalions each which would form the core's of the UAs along with the one of the 10 Armd/Cav/Bradley Units in the 3ID.  Do you know if there was any consideration along those lines?

Cheers.

 

[pbi]

Promotions generated from below ? Subordinates approving their bosses ? I don't think so. Leaders have to lead and manage without regard to the feelings of their subordinates. Everything we do is mission oriented. The leaders that consistently  complete the mission/task
on time and successfully get ahead. Those that don't perform well dont get ahead

tomahawk: this sounds great and it certainly is what the book says (in all armies...) but it's not really what happens. Not (I suggest) in your army, and most definitely not in ours. You must consider the soldier. Leaders who treat their subordinates like sh*t will never get the full performance out of them. I seem to recall that a few of your soldiers in Vietnam had a way of resolving that sort of problem in summary fashion. I am not suggesting that we need to be "buddy-buddy" and all hold hands--quite the contrary--but I believe that you treat men like men until you have a reason to treat them otherwise. Our soldiers (and yours) are intelligent, generally well educated by world standards and quite independent-minded. They are no longer Wellington's "scum of the earth".

As for the promotion of the undeserving, I echo my earlier assessment: we certainly experience it, and I am reasonably sure that your system, being composed of human beings, does too.

I must say, however, that apart from that I tend to side with 2B and Kirkhill with regards to AMajoor's ideas. Remember-the enemy has a vote, and at some point a dirty, tired NCO will lead equally dirty and tired (and scared) soldiers to kill some very nasty, determined enemy who will sell their lives dearly. No amount of on-line shopping, net buddies or promotion by popularity will change or even materially improve their chances. Discipline, training, cohesion and raw human courage will be required, just as they were at Thermopylae, Waterloo, Port Arthur or in Fallujah. Cheers.

 

[tomahawk6]

I wondered at the time if the US commanders weren't going to look at mixing the two divisions ( I believe that together they had 10 - 11 Battalions worth of rifles, 9 in the 101 and 1-2 in the 3ID) and creating two divs with 5 Rifle Battalions each which would form the core's of the UAs along with the one of the 10 Armd/Cav/Bradley Units in the 3ID.  Do you know if there was any consideration along those lines?

Not to my knowledge. But I do think a brigade of the 101st should be a heavy UA. This would add another dimension to the capability of the division.

 

[MdB]

I'm not a CF member yet, but I think, since I've a BA and have some basic understanding of sociology and psychology, that I just throw my opinion in it.

I think that RMA is mostly tech, but that it'll influence, by the type of infos coming to soldiers and leaders, the approach of the battlefield. BUT, the battlefield will remain what it has been since beginning of wars, weapons and humans fighting. The bayonnet will always exist or will stop when we'll decide to throw all these I-don't-know-many-THOUSANDS of nuclears bombs/warheads/missiles, and it'll all stop. I don't believe it'll happen, but who knows. RMA won't stop it, just change the way of it like it's been said.

My approach is a sociological one, since I just finished reading Understanding Militay Culture(McGill-Queen's University Press - http://www.mqup.mcgill.ca/book.php?bookid=1693 ), which is a book on both Canadian and American militay culture, their similarities and differences. It discussing how a society's culture can affect the military culture of his armed forces. Since all recruits and cadets come from the society, it's not too hard to think one's society influences the military culture. The other way around is also true, because an armed forces is an institution, represent the government, and plays a political and economic role, even though it shouldn't. But that's the reality of it.

Now, what I see, from this reading, is that the way of thinking and the culture of younger generations will alterate sooner or later the military culture in a deeper and a long last way than RMA could. The promotion will be different, the leaders will lead in other ways, they'll all learn different ways (to learn too?), they'll interact in different ways. Let's just think about the developping of individuality today, how it poses solutions and problems to a combat unit, to command and control, to leadership. I think that the true transformation is to learn to adapt and transform as the situations, period, era evolves. That's the real challenge in my opinion.

The thing is to be flexible and to try to adapt to any form of threat. The only thing is that we do have money and time constraints. And money is, like always, the bottom line of it, it's political. How can we train, justify, and maintain large groups of military personnel when the threat(s) isn't/aren't clear and direct? Maintaining broad capabalities and skills when objectives (i.e. assessing threats and solutions) aren't clear is very difficult. That comes down to the society and how it asesses his armed forces, which is through his culture. In Western societies, people are less involved socially, because they are more individualistic. They put more time and focus on themselves, and tend to depolitize themselves from their social roles (voting, educating, helping, establishing one or more larger group other than the family or job). So is it for very important issues (other than what's repeated endlessly on TV) and leadership among the governement (the quality of our reps). So it is in approaching the military service. Instead of being a responsability, it becomes an obligation, or a burden, because individual rights is above all else, but for security. But again, how can the Governement, society, scholars appraise the threat when it's hidden and just be aware of it?

Another point: I see a lot of comments here that say the way future recruits perceive the CF jobs: as occupations, like any other job (instead you have a gun, which kicks the adrenaline, and not just a keyboard), and not as vocations, which means you have a responsability and a duty, that you offer, in the worse or better case, your life for the rest of your society. We can't blame them, but confirming it in CF policies is another thing. On the other side, I think the Government/DND wants it like that because it easier to manage that way (easier to go along than defend an opinion). It just won't put their pants on and say the CF reflects Canadian values, but it IS the military and ISN'T just another job. It's not a job when you come thinking that the end effect is trying to help, but finishes sometimes in killing someone. Death isn't a product.

I may sound hard on some points, but I just want to point out that military profession is different than other institutions. I just want to put the discussion here above the facts and numbers, above just the technology used, because, like we said, it changes the way soldiers make war, but not the nature of war.

I would like to discuss more deeply on the western culture effects on changes to come in our military cultures. My comment is incomplete but I'll fill it along the discussion.

 

[Kirkhill]

Interesting comments MdB.

and plays a political and economic role, even though it shouldn't

This is a relatively minor quibble so I'll get it out of the way first.  "Even though it shouldn't".  Everything that exists in society is part of the economy, a consumer and supplier, and because it is made up of people it is part of the polity.  Its members will have individual opinions and the institution will have opinions.  The military like any other entity, is aware of itself as an entity and wishes to be represented in the decision making process.  A society has to recognize that desire and figure out how to meet that desire, as it meets the desire of doctors, aboriginals and Scots-Presbyterians to participate in the process, while at the same time not allowing any particular entity to dominate.

However that is a quibble that is off this thread and doesn't affect your argument.

Your notion that the institution will transform as society transforms the institutions stock of recruits caused me to rethink a question that I asked, Can we transform modern kids into soldiers?  Maybe the answer is your answer, maybe we can't. Maybe we have to wait for some of the modern generation, who thinks in the same terms as the recruit pool, who perceives a need to apply force and who perceives new ways to apply the tools at hand, the new recruit pool and the skills that they have, to generating that force.

Their is an ancient science fiction book that I read back in the 70's by Gordon Dickson.  It was called Dorsai and it formed the basis of a Universe that was explored in a number of subsequent novels.  Dorsai was originally published as The Genetic General.

The central assumption of the book was that "Birds of a feather flock together".  That at some point in the future all the intellectuals would take themselves off to one planet, religious fundamentalists another, business people another, soldiers another etc and would breed amongst themselves, each to perfect their own vision of the ideal human.  They discovered however that as societies they each had need of each others services and qualities and so traded with each other for those services thus maintaining an economy.  However people being people some inter-breeding occured.  The intellectuals discovered that these mongrels may have qualities that inbreeding couldn't achieve.  So they set out to find or create the ideal mongrel. When they find one they at first don't recognize him,  he was nothing like what they were looking for and had skills that they failed to predict and couldn't comprehend once presented with the evidence of them.

I don't propose that our children are developing magical skills but I do wonder if the way that they look at life, the skills that they are developing, using exactly the same grey matter that we have but nurtured in a different environment, makes it impossible for us to figure out how best to employ them to defend themselves and to defend our society.

Thinking back to the North African Desert in 1942, the SAS, which is now ONE model for how to exert force in SOME situations, it has become part of establishment thinking, that force didn't come out of the General Staff calling for such a Force to be raised.  It came from a Subby who was convinced he had a better way to put the bits and pieces available together and use them to good effect.  He convinced the Staff to give it a try basically because it was relatively cheap to organize and didn't detract greatly from their conventional force requirements.

 

[a_majoor]

Your notion that the institution will transform as society transforms the institutions stock of recruits caused me to rethink a question that I asked, Can we transform modern kids into soldiers? Maybe the answer is your answer, maybe we can't. Maybe we have to wait for some of the modern generation, who thinks in the same terms as the recruit pool, who perceives a need to apply force and who perceives new ways to apply the tools at hand, the new recruit pool and the skills that they have, to generating that force.

This is exactly the sort of argument I am trying to make. We have difficulty visualizing what the future will be like because it is discontinuous. If history was linear, we would be fighting wars the way H.G. Wells predicted near the end of WW I, with 10,000 tonne tanks slowly grinding their way forward and exchanging salvos of 18" gunfire over the devastated landscape...

These ideas are quite primitive and probably flawed, but are in line with the sort of experience and mindsets the "Generation Y" soldiers will have grown up with. To their minds, why should they work with a dick****; wait forever for the "system" to supply them or not be able to talk to their friends and peers whenever they want or need to?

Given the attitudes that these soldiers have been conditioned to believe by the wider culture for the first 18 years of their lives, it is hard to imagine anything less than a "Full Metal Jacket" type total restructuring of the recruits mind and body will create a fundamentally different mind set. As Kirkhill alluded to, we might actually want some of those mind sets and attitudes (the good ones); but since there is no surgical procedure in place to excise the rest, a new sort of institutional organization and culture will have to evolve. I certainly knew the ideas I tossed out were only marginally workable (if at all), but were deliberately provocative in order to point out the areas I believe are more important to the future than "should we have x brigades in the field force?, or must we co-locate LAVs and TUAs in the same battalions?".

While we see these questions as being very important, some future historian might be comparing our actions to sawing the rams off a galley in order to get a greater field of fire for the two bronze cannons, while being totally oblivious to the rapid development of sailing ships....

 

[jrhume]

Just a quick thought:

Western armies have one structural component that other armies have lacked, usually due to distrust of a professional military or for idealogical reasons.  That is a professional NCO group.

The Soviets never allowed such a group -- instead they used junior officers to do many of the things a good sergeant does in Western forces.  They took the better recruits in any given set of conscripts and sent them for extra training to make them into sergeants.  This gave units below company-level some sort of NCO, but without the experience such people have in the West.

Jim

 

[pbi]

And the difference is huge and usually quite noticeable. A strong, capable NCO corps, that has high standards and sees itself as a class apart, with a reputation to uphold, is definitely a vital key to success. From what I have seen of the world's armies, it exists in its strongest form in the English-speaking Commonwealth countries and in the US. In some places (including some European countries) it is quite weak. Cheers.

 

[Kirkhill]

Interesting,  the NCOs as the middle class.  The key to making an Army work in a middle class society.  The middle class as the key to a democratic society.  The middle class as the basis for both the Army and Society to outperform two-tiered societies and armies.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I agree completely that our NCO corps gives us our advantage over other armies who are not similarily blessed.

MdB,

I believe that you are correct to emphasize that service with the CF should be seen as a calling as opposed to a job.  People who enlist because they want to serve their country as a soldier will tend to accept the odd inconvenience of military life.  Army culture does change over time due to the makeup of its soldiers but army culture also has an influence on its soldiers.  I, personnaly, am a bit skeptical of attempts to make the CF an "employer of choice."

Looking at our culture I would say that our indvidiualism is a strength militarily but that it must be managed and shaped by the existing military culture.  Basic training is more than just a list of skills regarding weapons, drill and dress.  It is also a period of "socialization" that transforms the civilian into a soldier.  This is something that I think the CF has forgotten somewhat but that the Army still believes in.  If our entry level training is done right it will retain the positive aspects of individualism (initiative, creative thinking) but also impart the necessary discipline onto the recruits.

Going back to RMAs, I would argue that military culture and techniques have indeed changed with the RMAs.  From the perspective of looking at the battlefield from a wide angle view the methods of Western military forces changed little from the classical times up until the days before WW I (and unfortunately for a couple of years after in some respects).  Blocks of infantry manouevring in ranks along with varying ratios of cavalry was the staple.  Cannons were introduced and had an impact (especially if a cannonball hit you) but from a tactical perspective one battle pretty much resembled the next.  The military culture was geared towards producing soldiers and units that could succeed.  Close order drill, strict discipline and snappy uniforms were crucial for success.  The infantry may have acquired muskets along the way but in practical terms they were pretty much the same as the pikemen of classical times (hence the bayonet).

I would argue that these elements actually worked against armies in the age of the machinegun, barbed wire and modern artillery.  WW I and WW II saw armies come to grips with the new battlefield (called by some "The Empty Battlefield."  Our dress uniforms, penchant for drill and bayonets  >are are, in my opinion, hold-overs from those times.  We have adapted in the field but still retain these organizational elements.

There is the one universal that people must be led in order to successfully wage war.  Risking one's life and taking the life of another are not things that mose sane people would like to do.  In classical times this was achieved through fighting in ranks and the fact that the individual soldiers had "bought-in" to the society they were fighting for.  Later wars still had the close ranks (and supervision) but with varying degrees of of "buy-in."  The empty battlefield of today is more tricky and places more reliance on junior leaders and the ability (and willingess) of the individual soldier to carry out his task (the works of Marshall and Grossman are good reading on this).  Western armies have the advantage of possessing a professional NCO corps who can make this happen.  Something that the next generation of Western armies may have to content with is facing formerly Third World forces that have a "middle class."

Cheers,

2B

 

[Infanteer]

Since the NCO Corps was the "backbone" of the Industrial Age armies, does anyone see Transformation having any profound affect on the way NCO's do their job, the way they are prepared, the general composition of the Corps, etc, etc?

 

[jrhume]

I'm sure there will be differences in the way NCOs are trained and prepared for their duties.  However, I would argue that the basic functions of a good NCO do not change much over time.  Small unit leadership, technical skills, communications -- all those are simply extensions of the soldier's art.  The real task of NCOs is to maintain the traditions, the esprit de corps of their military units.

I suspect that a Roman Centurion, who is not a direct comparison to a modern NCO, I know, but close enough considering the practical skill set involved, would instantly recognize his modern counterpart.  Senior NCOs are the physical embodiment of military tradition most respected by young soldiers.  Officers come and go, but your sergeant major is likely to be around for a long time.

Of course, it doesn't hurt that they sit at the right hand of God himself.    Just ask one.

Jim

 

[Infanteer]

I suspect that a Roman Centurion, who is not a direct comparison to a modern NCO, I know, but close enough considering the practical skill set involved, would instantly recognize his modern counterpart.

I think you're right on that mark; that is probably one of the enduring factors in war and history....

 

[ArmyRick]

NCO look after training, disciplining and developing their soldiers...
They ensure proper execute of the mission...
They train new officers...
They look after the welfare of their soldiers...

Yes in a post transformation Army, NCOs will still be the back bone of the army..

Also refer to the 10 principles of leadership and you will see as long as their soldiers, their will be NCOs...

I also like the comparison of the ABCA (and new zealand) armies having a very professional NCO structure..

 

[pbi]

Basic training is more than just a list of skills regarding weapons, drill and dress.  It is also a period of "socialization" that transforms the civilian into a soldier.  This is something that I think the CF has forgotten somewhat but that the Army still believes in.

Very well said 2B. If I could see you right now, I would buy you a beer. No, wait...I would buy you a case. You have zeroed in on, in one concise paragraph, an underlying malaise that we have identified and discussed at length on other threads. I would rather have a smaller force of well trained, proud individuals who really want to be there and to "do the business" than a semi-motivated crew of paycheque collectors who regard military discipline, culture and the demands of operational readiness as impositions on their lifestyles. If you recruit for a "job" you get "workers". If you recruit for a career/callling/service, you get "soldiers". The USMC has understood this for years. Cheers.

 

[a_majoor]

Interesting development. The role of the NCO and even the idea of a "middle class" are uniquely Western concepts, and do go a long way to explaining the dominence of Westrern militaries through the millenia (The Ancient Greeks started the fine Western tradition of conquering their neighbours and overmatching the armies of their enemies).

Thinking farther into the transformation, the NCO "class" (for want of a better word) are the holders of the technical knowledge. This might be best exploited through the use of short command and information "loops" (sensor to shooter, consumables to end user etc.) while the officer "class" is plugged into longer "loops" for the wide angle view of things, mid to long range planning and so on. Obviously, there will need to be interfaces, but the Org diagram might more resemble the Olympic rings rather than a pyramid.

Tipping my hat to Infanteer, the biggest change is in the issues of span of command rather than dominating the physical space of the battlefield. US Marines in Fallujiah were connected to the entire world, with commanders able to get advice from HQs in the US, hospitals in Germany prepared to recieve their wounded and the GD Land Systems plant here in London probably prepared to supply LAV 25 parts if required. The Jihadis network is not anywhere nearly as broad or deep.

Once again, these are fairly primitive ideas, and I am adjusting the "interceptor" plates to recieve your responses.

 

[Pikache]

Looking at our culture I would say that our indvidiualism is a strength militarily but that it must be managed and shaped by the existing military culture. Basic training is more than just a list of skills regarding weapons, drill and dress. It is also a period of "socialization" that transforms the civilian into a soldier. This is something that I think the CF has forgotten somewhat but that the Army still believes in. If our entry level training is done right it will retain the positive aspects of individualism (initiative, creative thinking) but also impart the necessary discipline onto the recruits.

Agreed.
Reason why I think BMQ is the most important course in a soldier's career. It's a shame that most junior PLQ qualified NCOs tend to get stuck teaching on BMQ, in my observation. By no means I'm slamming the junior leaders, I'm just saying experience counts a lot when dealing with troops and one slip up dealing with a troop can have the biggest impact on that troop's career.