TangoTwoBravo
Army.ca Veteran
- Reaction score
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- Points
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I just came across an interesting article in the Sep-Oct 2005 edition of Military Review regarding the long-term modernization of the Chinese Army. It is written by LCol (retd) Dennis Blasko, a US Army intelligence officer with attache experience in China. He overviews the modernization undertaken since 1985 and several key thrust lines emerge:
(1) Reduction in forces from over 2.2 million to 1.6 million
(2) changes in force structure
(3) new equipment (including high technology items)
(4) doctrincal revisions to focus on "Local Wars"
(5) improvements to the logistics system
(6) various improvements to soldier's "quality of life" and changes to officer/NCO professsional development
Looking at force structure and equipment, heavy and mechanized divisions now make up 40 percent of the force as compared to 20 percent a decade ago (due in part, no doubt, to the reduction in normal infantry divisions). Interestingly, since the late 90s the army has added two amphibious mechanized divisions. These are in addition to the two "marine brigades" owned by the navy.
Regarding training, since 1996 the PLA's focus has been on amphibious operations. It is noted that over the past five years, one quarter of the PLA's field forces have trained by amphibious operations. The PLA conducts both live fire and force on force training. In addition, units are designated to test new concepts and focus on specific areas to garner lessons learned.
There are other interesting changes made to make the PLA a more "modern" force. While all of this takes time, the Chinese leadership seems to be somewhat patient and takes a long view. The image many Westerners have of the PLA from 1950 may well have to change.
The navy and airforce are touched on, but only in so far as to discuss their marines and airborne forces. I guess I'm going to go and dig up some articles on those areas now as well. I recommend the article as a quick and enlightening read on the PLA.
Cheers,
2B
(1) Reduction in forces from over 2.2 million to 1.6 million
(2) changes in force structure
(3) new equipment (including high technology items)
(4) doctrincal revisions to focus on "Local Wars"
(5) improvements to the logistics system
(6) various improvements to soldier's "quality of life" and changes to officer/NCO professsional development
Looking at force structure and equipment, heavy and mechanized divisions now make up 40 percent of the force as compared to 20 percent a decade ago (due in part, no doubt, to the reduction in normal infantry divisions). Interestingly, since the late 90s the army has added two amphibious mechanized divisions. These are in addition to the two "marine brigades" owned by the navy.
Regarding training, since 1996 the PLA's focus has been on amphibious operations. It is noted that over the past five years, one quarter of the PLA's field forces have trained by amphibious operations. The PLA conducts both live fire and force on force training. In addition, units are designated to test new concepts and focus on specific areas to garner lessons learned.
There are other interesting changes made to make the PLA a more "modern" force. While all of this takes time, the Chinese leadership seems to be somewhat patient and takes a long view. The image many Westerners have of the PLA from 1950 may well have to change.
The navy and airforce are touched on, but only in so far as to discuss their marines and airborne forces. I guess I'm going to go and dig up some articles on those areas now as well. I recommend the article as a quick and enlightening read on the PLA.
Cheers,
2B