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Canadian Foreign Interference (General)

Good2Golf

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Since it seems that the international sport of interfering is expanding, here is a place to discuss general interference in Canadian federal and provincial politics, that isn’t otherwise always provided for with country/nation state-specific interference.

Same rules apply for this, as with other political threads.

Milner.ca Staff
 
To be fair the witch trials were successful; we're no longer plagued by black magic.



I think we're letting ourselves get dragged down into the weeds by all parties on this. They all have dirty hands and they'll play off one another to drag it out as long as possible. It's a mutual self-desteuction pact where are parties are shitting on each other but benefit by the names not reaching the light of day.
For sure, and the reindeer games being played by everyone does neither Canada nor our democratic processes any good.

If someone has does something criminal and they can turn the intelligence into probative evidence, then let the RCMP do their thing. If not, then I hope we are beyond ruining lives and careers on rumour. Maybe we can order them to wear a scarlet letter. Certainly not ideal, but if the names were released to the parties only, they could clean their own houses. The problem is, I don't trust them to do that.

Beyond better Charter-proof evidentiary and criminal procedure rules, I don't know what the answer is.
 
Announcing that someone is under investigation, or suspended from duties pending investigation, isn't rumour-mongering.
 
Announcing that someone is under investigation, or suspended from duties pending investigation, isn't rumour-mongering.
Generally true, but if someone was being investigated for sexual impropriety, for example, I'm sure the stigma would completely disappear if they're exonerated, right? I suspect the same would apply in these cases - "yeah, 'no evidence of wrong doing' =/= innocent" sort of thing.
 
If we hadn’t spent…checks latest claimed amount…$1B, on the ArriveCan app. We could have paid 100 MPs $10M for settlement each on releasing information about them prior to their being charged with (checks notes…..) nothing about colluding with foreign state-actors.
 
Generally true, but if someone was being investigated for sexual impropriety, for example, I'm sure the stigma would completely disappear if they're exonerated, right? I suspect the same would apply in these cases - "yeah, 'no evidence of wrong doing' =/= innocent" sort of thing.
Absolutely. It might motivate politicians to do something to fix that problem. Meanwhile, I see no reason they should enjoy immunity from the phenomenon.
 
OK, finally got a bit of time to bash out a (edit: LONG) post here on the criminal investigation/prosecution side of this, and the challenges. I'll try to go into better depth than just waving my hands and saying "I2E". I'll talk a bit about why our courts struggle with using the material that exists.

First, to situate the conversation: As a definition of 'foreign interference' I'm going to go with a portion of the definition of "threats to the security of Canada" as written in the CSIS act. That definition is important because it establishes authority for CSIS to collect, as well as informing the policy on National Security investigations by RCMP and prosecutions by the Public Service Prosecution of Canada. So it's a useful and coherent definition. That definition is:

"(b) Foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person,"

So:
  • Foreign influenced
  • In Canada OR outside but relating to Canada
  • Detrimental to our interests (this is very broad)
  • Clandestine or deceptive OR involve a threat to any person.

This captures the broad range of possibilities quite well.

Now, this is law empowering our security intelligence collection. It does NOT create crimes. In fact, until August 2024, most things that could constitute foreign interference were not crimes. The erstwhile Security of Information Act mostly concerned espionage- very relevant, but only overlapping this issue, not comprehensive. It did have one offense for "Foreign-influenced or Terrorist-influenced Threats or Violence", but it was restrictive and needed pretty clear threats or violence to be met. It has never been charged or prosecuted, and most of the things we see in the news fall short of that- although, potentially, some of the Khalistani-related oppression-via-threats alleged to have been committed by India could hit the elements, if proven. My wild guess is that the murder and extortion charges that have been prosecuted were much easier and cleaner to prosecute as straight murder or extortion, with no value added form testing an unproven offence that would involve, uh... 'complicated' evidence.

This just changed. Old SOIA is no more. In August it was amended to the 'Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act', FISOIA. It still has all the old familiar SOIA offences - STFU for life, don't talk about classified national security secrets, etc etc. But it added a number of new crimes for Intimidation, threats, or violence outside Canada; committing any other indictable offence for a foreign entity; engaging in 'surreptitious or deceptive conduct... for purposes prejudicial to the state...'' (there's that CSIS act definition sneaking in), and, written very broadly, 'political interference for a foreign entity' with a TON of ways to tick that box. All of these new offences have to be done at the direction of, in association with, or for the benefit of a "foreign entity". I've simplified and summarized a lot, but the new offences can be found in Ss. 20.1 to 20.4 of FISOIA. Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act

So the good news is a lot of stuff is now illegal that wasn't. Particularly, I actually find the 'commit indictable offence for a foreign entity' to be EXTREMELY broad. Basically if you do any other serious crime at the of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity, you've committed a separate and distinct offence. I let this bounce around my brain a bit. Extortion for a foreign power? New distinct offence on top of the extortion itself.

Oh, and these new crimes? All carry up to life in prison, and all specifically say that sentences are to be served consecutively to any other sentence. So if you eat a Foreign Interference charge and are convicted, that adds years on top of anything else you would be serving for the other stuff you did. In practice, and I mention this to keep @FJAG happy, probably in such cases we would see underlying offences treated as 'lesser included' and stayed per Kienapple, with the sentencing for the FISOIA charge bumped upwards accordingly. But anyway- get convicted for foreign interference offences, you're walking in the door knowing you face life.

These offences cannot apply retroactively. Anything done before August 19th, 2024 does not fall under the new offences. Going forward, now that the crimes exist, prosecuting them will be the challenge. This pulls us right back into questions of I2E.

I see some people say "Intelligence is not evidence". I don't like this sweeping generalization. I usually see it uttered by or attributed to people working in the intelligence world who are used to a blanket approach of 'this material shall not cross into criminal matters'. They take that to mean it can not cross into criminal matters. Or they'll say that the nature of how the information came in means it cannot be sufficiently probative to be regarded as evidence.

I don't agree. To the second point first: National security intelligence is pulling in information. So too is criminal evidence. Setting aside the question of admissibility for now, the quality of the information is more about how credible, compelling, and corroborated it is, not automatically determined by where it came from. CSIS works a lot of confidential informants who may be of dubious value and questionable integrity... But that equally describes police confidential informants. The people who can give actionable source info on drug gangs are often not the most upstanding or honest people. Similarly, and this is me going way out there now into hypotheticals, but if a domestic or foreign intelligence agency has communications intercepts... Well, police do that too. It's called a wiretap. What's different here is the legal framework and the methods.

Information is not valueless to law enforcement and prosecutions just because it is called 'intelligence'. Police also collect 'intelligence', albeit usually not with the degree of sensitivity and classification of, say, security intelligence human sources. Police intelligence can and does come with similar use caveats. I have written affidavits to get judicial orders where part of the process was requesting permission from a police organization to use their intelligence material, and to modify their caveat.

So- Security intelligence is not inherently not evidence in the sense that it's useless info. Au contraire, if it were authorized for use it could be quite compelling indeed. Intelligence info and witness testimony from the RCAF and CFINTCOM was used in a case int he early 2000s for some loser who took a Canadian Army officer hostage and used him as a human shield in Yugo. Approaches were found and actually a whole new structure developed to use that info.

So, if the security intelligence isn't 'not evidence' because of what it inherently is or how is it sourced, why is it 'not evidence'? Well, because the government of Canada says so- usually to protect how it was sourced. And that's not wrong.

When evidence is tendered in court, the accused is able to challenge it. If I write a wiretap warrant, and it results in us listening to criminals' conversatiosn and we get evidence, eventually we need to disclose the existence of that wiretap, AND we need to disclose my (likely very lengthy and detailed) affidavit asking the court for permission to do that. That affidavit will spell out a lot of the investigation. There are some things we can redact, but they're gonna get most of it. That's our 'sources and methods' at risk. Now, we can write confidential appendices to include, say, human source info- the courts will protect source info, so if we write well and are selective in what info we include, the accused shouldn't be able to piece together who the informant(s) is/are. But they do get to try. Further, if the defense counsel argues that there are significant weaknesses in my affidavit, I as the affiant may have to take the stand as a police witness, be questioned, and testify as to my grounds for belief. That can get sketchy, and can be used by skilled defense counsel to try to paint police into a box where if they go any farther, the identity of a source might get compromised. If any investigator states that they 'believe' something, and act on it in the investigation, they need to be ready to defend the basis for their belief. 'Well, CSIS told me..." counts for very little if CSIS is not next on the stand to defend it.

In criminal prosecutions in Canada, Crown has a duty to disclose all evidence that could possibly be relevant to the case. That's an extremely broad disclosure obligation. Contrast that with the U.S., where prosecutors have to disclose the evidence they rely on, as well as anything that 'exculpatory or impeaching', and material to guilt or innocence. It's still a lot, but it leaves out a ton of information that isn't relied on by prosecutors, and isn't material to the defense, or the degree of culpability or possible punishment. This means that a lot of material can be collected and considered, but ultimately not disclosed because it doesn't get used, and it doesn't let the guy off the hook. So, in Canada, were intelligence information to enter a criminal investigation and prosecution, it would by default be disclosable (hold on, I'll get to it), whereas in the US there are easier way around that.

Now, jsut because something is presume disclosable, doesn't mean the accused will definitely get it. The Canada Evidence Act allows for privilege to be asserted to protect certain public interests (S. 37 CEA, often sensitive investigative techniques or other ongoing investigations), for national security or international relations (S. 38), or Cabinet confidence (S. 39). I'll focus on S. 38 - national security and international relations. And I'll do this by contrasting Canada and the US.

Let's imagine a national security offense. Say, unauthorized disclosure of security intelligence, or one of the new Foreign Interference offences. And let's suppose that in this investigation, there is classified intelligence involved - maybe as the actual information that was leaked, or maybe coming form a domestic or international intelligence partner to say "Hey, Buttcrackistan is running a foreign interference network in Canada; this diplomat is running seven agents, and this foreign intelligence officer is in Canada under the radar to pressure the diaspora to vote for certain candidates in leadership elections and the general election". Let's say that's some rock solid security intelligence whose sources and methods MUST NOT be burned, and that some of it is foreign and not authorized to be disclosed in court.

In Canada, this would be investigated by RCMP and prosecuted by the Public Prosecution Service of Canada. In the US, by FBI and DOJ. Pretty analogous.

In Canada, though, the prosecution of crimes is always in Provincial courts. Serious offences will be in the Superior Court of Justice of a province. in the US, they have Federal criminal courts that can prosecute federal crimes - remember. Canada has a single system of criminal law, in the US they have at least 51. The feds, and each state.

Here's where this becomes a problem. In Canada, we do have a system for the government to assert that S. 38 CEA National Security privilege, and to suppress information from seeing the light of day in court. This was developed for the aforementioned Yugoslavia / hostage taking prosecution of a gent named Ribic, a Serbo-Canadian who went home to fight for Serbia and ended up back in Canadian custody after his hostage taking. The way this works is essentially thus:

1. The Attorney General or a delegate asserts, based on notice from someone in the criminal prosecution (usually Department of Justice non-prosecution counsel, but could conceivably be the prosecutor or even investigating police) that information could be disclosed which would be potentially injurious.

2. An application is made to Federal Court to have the matter considered in camera by a federal court judge, to determine if in fact the potential for injury exists. The federal court judge will consider the relevance of the material, the potential injury, and whether the public interest favours disclosure. The Department of Justice (as opposed to Prosecutors) will propose the actual redactions, based on consultation with the actual agencies that 'own' the material, or who are Canada's counterpart to the applicable foreign agency that does. So, say for example, CSIS would say 'here are the black boxes we want' and DOJ would say 'OK' and argue that to federal court. The defense does not get to see the material when fighting this, however they can have a security cleared lawyer appointed by the court as an Amicus who will hear the proposed arguments of both sides, will see the material, and will advise the judge to help decide. The federal court judge can order full or partial disclosure, or completely uphold the AG's proposed redactions. If the AG disagrees, the AG can by fiat overrule the court with regards to the admissibility of the info. A rare executive veto over the judiciary.

3. Once this is determined, the resulting final vetted version of the disclosure is given to defense. Maybe that's pages entirely covered in a big black box, maybe it's heavily or lightly redacted. But the defense never gets to see under the black. So too, the trial court judge never gets to see under the black. This is important: The judge presiding over the criminal trial will never get to know the actual contents that are redacted, and so is unable to make their own assessment of the impact in full knowledge of both the information content, and the larger impact on the trial.

4. The defense then will probably make an application saying that the lack of access to classified information renders the trial unfair. The trial court judge - again, not knowing what the material actually is - has to take their best stab at what's reasonable and fair. This can mean some charges completely dismissed, or it can mean certain crown evidence is excluded, or what have you. But, I think it's fair to say, the court will lean toward erring on the side of protecting the right to presumption of innocence.

The U.S., by contrast, will prosecute such matters in federal trial courts, and they will essentially import into the individual court and case a system to security clear court staff and counsel, brief, handle, safeguard, and argue classified materials. The judge does get to see the contents, while ultimately filling a similar role of deciding what will and what will not be disclosed. The judge can make similar determinations about trial fairness, can toss charges, order certain evidence suppresses, etc. But it's a decision that is made much more knowingly, and therefore, I would content, much more precisely and surgically. It's also happening within the same court as part of the pre-trial process, so it's not bouncing between (and causing delays in) various levels of court as it would here.

So- Canada has a more cumbersome process for taking such information into criminal proceedings. It's a process that leaves the trial judge ignorant about the actual precise content in question, and having to make a decision on trial fairness by making their best guess, with only the written decision of the federal court to rely upon (although this can include classified portions that the trial judge will see but the public won't).

Canada also uses this far less frequently. There have only ever been I think three prosecutions under SOIA, only one of which went to trial and ultimately to a jury verdict last year. I'm sure there was at least a bit of this as well in some terrorism cases, though those tend to be built on conventional non-classified police evidence, potentially after a national security agency says, with minimal to no detail, 'Uh- this guy's a problem, you better take a look'.

National security evidence considerations would inform every single stage of the investigation from early on all the way to the final trial. You need investigators and prosecutors who can wrap their heads around this and not crash into the problems that can arise. In Canada there are likely only a handful of prosecutors and police investigators who have worked most or all of the lifecycle of these sorts of files and who understand how to handle this stuff, because it's simply very rare. Why try to bring this evidence in if you can just run a clean murder or extortion trial? But this lack of experience will be a friction on future investigations; sort of the 'every roto is roto 0' that's familiar to anyone in CAF. If you don't rep something out enough you don't really build up institutional knowledge. And of course even after doing something once, doesn't mean someone's career keeps them in situ to be there running the file when the issue comes up again. Maybe they're on to higher management, or a different field office.

So, in the shell of a really huge nut, these are a lot of the practical considerations and, at times, barriers to bringing security intelligence into a prosecution. As a rule of thumb, investigators will seek clean, usable information... But in some crimes that simply may not exist. Police may not be able to replicate a signals intelligence intercept that tells us another government is screwing with our democracy. They may not be able to prove classified information was leaked without actually tendering the leaked information in court - Canada has never yet cracked that nut in the security intelligence space, though it's barely had any chances to.

I do not believe that our new FISOIA offences are impotent. I do believe they'll be challenging to investigate and prove without relying on information that comes form intelligence agencies and which they aren't cool with having disclosed in court. That pushes some of this back into the policy realm to decide if we will change how we view the sanctity of security intelligence... But that is best done super carefully, because those wells can and will dry up fast if we draw from them too liberally. And we have no authority at all to waive the privileges asserted by international partners. They can't stop us from doing it with material we already have, but fuck with it and watch how quickly Five eyes becomes Four Eyes- very much to Canada's detriment.

This long overdue post of dubious quality brought to you by my kid sleeping in and two cups of coffee.
 
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Seems to me that "intelligence" and "court case" are just both syntheses (analyses) of information/evidence with conclusions tacked on. Information is certainly evidence.
 
Seems to me that "intelligence" and "court case" are just both syntheses (analyses) of information/evidence with conclusions tacked on. Information is certainly evidence.
Information is information. It’s evidence if it’s probative of something to at least a small degree. But whether it can be used in court- therein lies the rub. The policy questions would be around how barriers to the use of classified security intelligence in criminal proceedings could possibly be reduced. That’s way above my pay grade but would involve a revamp of S. 38 of the Canada Evidence Act, and some adjustment of the respective roles of DOJ, PPSC, Federal Court, and Provincial Court. And it still wouldn’t achieve a magic fix. The U.S. still struggles with this too, just not to the same degree because the trial judge sees the material and plays a role in determining how evidence suppression and trial fairness remedy are balanced.
 
I read this to mean Canada really needs to up its counter intelligence game ALOT.
Outside my arcs, but I agree. Outside of the criminal realm I know no more than the rest of you. I do think a more aggressive campaign of unclassified public disclosure to candidates, institutions, and the public at large needs to be waged by CSIS. They’re better equipped to do this now under the same legislative reform this past spring. Improvements to criminal prosecution will be evolutionary, not revolutionary. Flip over some rotten logs and expose the bugs to sunlight. But like anything else, sources must be protected.
 
I read this to mean Canada really needs to up its counter intelligence game ALOT.
Agreed. How that’s done I don’t know.

I’ll investigate this and make a podcast out of it. Crayons be damned.

And what real hardship is once I find a copy of The Great Depression.
 
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OK, finally got a bit of time to bash out a (edit: LONG) post here on the criminal investigation/prosecution side of this, and the challenges. I'll try to go into better depth than just waving my hands and saying "I2E". I'll talk a bit about why our courts struggle with using the material that exists.

First, to situate the conversation: As a definition of 'foreign interference' I'm going to go with a portion of the definition of "threats to the security of Canada" as written in the CSIS act. That definition is important because it establishes authority for CSIS to collect, as well as informing the policy on National Security investigations by RCMP and prosecutions by the Public Service Prosecution of Canada. So it's a useful and coherent definition. That definition is:

"(b) Foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person,"

So:
  • Foreign influenced
  • In Canada OR outside but relating to Canada
  • Detrimental to our interests (this is very broad)
  • Clandestine or deceptive OR involve a threat to any person.

This captures the broad range of possibilities quite well.

Now, this is law empowering our security intelligence collection. It does NOT create crimes. In fact, until August 2024, most things that could constitute foreign interference were not crimes. The erstwhile Security of Information Act mostly concerned espionage- very relevant, but only overlapping this issue, not comprehensive. It did have one offense for "Foreign-influenced or Terrorist-influenced Threats or Violence", but it was restrictive and needed pretty clear threats or violence to be met. It has never been charged or prosecuted, and most of the things we see in the news fall short of that- although, potentially, some of the Khalistani-related oppression-via-threats alleged to have been committed by India could hit the elements, if proven. My wild guess is that the murder and extortion charges that have been prosecuted were much easier and cleaner to prosecute as straight murder or extortion, with no value added form testing an unproven offence that would involve, uh... 'complicated' evidence.

This just changed. Old SOIA is no more. In August it was amended to the 'Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act', FISOIA. It still has all the old familiar SOIA offences - STFU for life, don't talk about classified national security secrets, etc etc. But it added a number of new crimes for Intimidation, threats, or violence outside Canada; committing any other indictable offence for a foreign entity; engaging in 'surreptitious or deceptive conduct... for purposes prejudicial to the state...'' (there's that CSIS act definition sneaking in), and, written very broadly, 'political interference for a foreign entity' with a TON of ways to tick that box. All of these new offences have to be done at the direction of, in association with, or for the benefit of a "foreign entity". I've simplified and summarized a lot, but the new offences can be found in Ss. 20.1 to 20.4 of FISOIA. Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act

So the good news is a lot of stuff is now illegal that wasn't. Particularly, I actually find the 'commit indictable offence for a foreign entity' to be EXTREMELY broad. Basically if you do any other serious crime at the of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity, you've committed a separate and distinct offence. I let this bounce around my brain a bit. Extortion for a foreign power? New distinct offence on top of the extortion itself.

Oh, and these new crimes? All carry up to life in prison, and all specifically say that sentences are to be served consecutively to any other sentence. So if you eat a Foreign Interference charge and are convicted, that adds years on top of anything else you would be serving for the other stuff you did. In practice, and I mention this to keep @FJAG happy, probably in such cases we would see underlying offences treated as 'lesser included' and stayed per Kienapple, with the sentencing for the FISOIA charge bumped upwards accordingly. But anyway- get convicted for foreign interference offences, you're walking in the door knowing you face life.

These offences cannot apply retroactively. Anything done before August 19th, 2024 does not fall under the new offences. Going forward, now that the crimes exist, prosecuting them will be the challenge. This pulls us right back into questions of I2E.

I see some people say "Intelligence is not evidence". I don't like this sweeping generalization. I usually see it uttered by or attributed to people working in the intelligence world who are used to a blanket approach of 'this material shall not cross into criminal matters'. They take that to mean it can not cross into criminal matters. Or they'll say that the nature of how the information came in means it cannot be sufficiently probative to be regarded as evidence.

I don't agree. To the second point first: National security intelligence is pulling in information. So too is criminal evidence. Setting aside the question of admissibility for now, the quality of the information is more about how credible, compelling, and corroborated it is, not automatically determined by where it came from. CSIS works a lot of confidential informants who may be of dubious value and questionable integrity... But that equally describes police confidential informants. The people who can give actionable source info on drug gangs are often not the most upstanding or honest people. Similarly, and this is me going way out there now into hypotheticals, but if a domestic or foreign intelligence agency has communications intercepts... Well, police do that too. It's called a wiretap. What's different here is the legal framework and the methods.

Information is not valueless to law enforcement and prosecutions just because it is called 'intelligence'. Police also collect 'intelligence', albeit usually not with the degree of sensitivity and classification of, say, security intelligence human sources. Police intelligence can and does come with similar use caveats. I have written affidavits to get judicial orders where part of the process was requesting permission from a police organization to use their intelligence material, and to modify their caveat.

So- Security intelligence is not inherently not evidence in the sense that it's useless info. Au contraire, if it were authorized for use it could be quite compelling indeed. Intelligence info and witness testimony from the RCAF and CFINTCOM was used in a case int he early 2000s for some loser who took a Canadian Army officer hostage and used him as a human shield in Yugo. Approaches were found and actually a whole new structure developed to use that info.

So, if the security intelligence isn't 'not evidence' because of what it inherently is or how is it sourced, why is it 'not evidence'? Well, because the government of Canada says so- usually to protect how it was sourced. And that's not wrong.

When evidence is tendered in court, the accused is able to challenge it. If I write a wiretap warrant, and it results in us listening to criminals' conversatiosn and we get evidence, eventually we need to disclose the existence of that wiretap, AND we need to disclose my (likely very lengthy and detailed) affidavit asking the court for permission to do that. That affidavit will spell out a lot of the investigation. There are some things we can redact, but they're gonna get most of it. That's our 'sources and methods' at risk. Now, we can write confidential appendices to include, say, human source info- the courts will protect source info, so if we write well and are selective in what info we include, the accused shouldn't be able to piece together who the informant(s) is/are. But they do get to try. Further, if the defense counsel argues that there are significant weaknesses in my affidavit, I as the affiant may have to take the stand as a police witness, be questioned, and testify as to my grounds for belief. That can get sketchy, and can be used by skilled defense counsel to try to paint police into a box where if they go any farther, the identity of a source might get compromised. If any investigator states that they 'believe' something, and act on it in the investigation, they need to be ready to defend the basis for their belief. 'Well, CSIS told me..." counts for very little if CSIS is not next on the stand to defend it.

In criminal prosecutions in Canada, Crown has a duty to disclose all evidence that could possibly be relevant to the case. That's an extremely broad disclosure obligation. Contrast that with the U.S., where prosecutors have to disclose the evidence they rely on, as well as anything that 'exculpatory or impeaching', and material to guilt or innocence. It's still a lot, but it leaves out a ton of information that isn't relied on by prosecutors, and isn't material to the defense, or the degree of culpability or possible punishment. This means that a lot of material can be collected and considered, but ultimately not disclosed because it doesn't get used, and it doesn't let the guy off the hook. So, in Canada, were intelligence information to enter a criminal investigation and prosecution, it would by default be disclosable (hold on, I'll get to it), whereas in the US there are easier way around that.

Now, jsut because something is presume disclosable, doesn't mean the accused will definitely get it. The Canada Evidence Act allows for privilege to be asserted to protect certain public interests (S. 37 CEA, often sensitive investigative techniques or other ongoing investigations), for national security or international relations (S. 38), or Cabinet confidence (S. 39). I'll focus on S. 38 - national security and international relations. And I'll do this by contrasting Canada and the US.

Let's imagine a national security offense. Say, unauthorized disclosure of security intelligence, or one of the new Foreign Interference offences. And let's suppose that in this investigation, there is classified intelligence involved - maybe as the actual information that was leaked, or maybe coming form a domestic or international intelligence partner to say "Hey, Buttcrackistan is running a foreign interference network in Canada; this diplomat is running seven agents, and this foreign intelligence officer is in Canada under the radar to pressure the diaspora to vote for certain candidates in leadership elections and the general election". Let's say that's some rock solid security intelligence whose sources and methods MUST NOT be burned, and that some of it is foreign and not authorized to be disclosed in court.

In Canada, this would be investigated by RCMP and prosecuted by the Public Prosecution Service of Canada. In the US, by FBI and DOJ. Pretty analogous.

In Canada, though, the prosecution of crimes is always in Provincial courts. Serious offences will be in the Superior Court of Justice of a province. in the US, they have Federal criminal courts that can prosecute federal crimes - remember. Canada has a single system of criminal law, in the US they have at least 51. The feds, and each state.

Here's where this becomes a problem. In Canada, we do have a system for the government to assert that S. 38 CEA National Security privilege, and to suppress information from seeing the light of day in court. This was developed for the aforementioned Yugoslavia / hostage taking prosecution of a gent named Ribic, a Serbo-Canadian who went home to fight for Serbia and ended up back in Canadian custody after his hostage taking. The way this works is essentially thus:

1. The Attorney General or a delegate asserts, based on notice from someone in the criminal prosecution (usually Department of Justice non-prosecution counsel, but could conceivably be the prosecutor or even investigating police) that information could be disclosed which would be potentially injurious.

2. An application is made to Federal Court to have the matter considered in camera by a federal court judge, to determine if in fact the potential for injury exists. The federal court judge will consider the relevance of the material, the potential injury, and whether the public interest favours disclosure. The Department of Justice (as opposed to Prosecutors) will propose the actual redactions, based on consultation with the actual agencies that 'own' the material, or who are Canada's counterpart to the applicable foreign agency that does. So, say for example, CSIS would say 'here are the black boxes we want' and DOJ would say 'OK' and argue that to federal court. The defense does not get to see the material when fighting this, however they can have a security cleared lawyer appointed by the court as an Amicus who will hear the proposed arguments of both sides, will see the material, and will advise the judge to help decide. The federal court judge can order full or partial disclosure, or completely uphold the AG's proposed redactions. If the AG disagrees, the AG can by fiat overrule the court with regards to the admissibility of the info. A rare executive veto over the judiciary.

3. Once this is determined, the resulting final vetted version of the disclosure is given to defense. Maybe that's pages entirely covered in a big black box, maybe it's heavily or lightly redacted. But the defense never gets to see under the black. So too, the trial court judge never gets to see under the black. This is important: The judge presiding over the criminal trial will never get to know the actual contents that are redacted, and so is unable to make their own assessment of the impact in full knowledge of both the information content, and the larger impact on the trial.

4. The defense then will probably make an application saying that the lack of access to classified information renders the trial unfair. The trial court judge - again, not knowing what the material actually is - has to take their best stab at what's reasonable and fair. This can mean some charges completely dismissed, or it can mean certain crown evidence is excluded, or what have you. But, I think it's fair to say, the court will lean toward erring on the side of protecting the right to presumption of innocence.

The U.S., by contrast, will prosecute such matters in federal trial courts, and they will essentially import into the individual court and case a system to security clear court staff and counsel, brief, handle, safeguard, and argue classified materials. The judge does get to see the contents, while ultimately filling a similar role of deciding what will and what will not be disclosed. The judge can make similar determinations about trial fairness, can toss charges, order certain evidence suppresses, etc. But it's a decision that is made much more knowingly, and therefore, I would content, much more precisely and surgically. It's also happening within the same court as part of the pre-trial process, so it's not bouncing between (and causing delays in) various levels of court as it would here.

So- Canada has a more cumbersome process for taking such information into criminal proceedings. It's a process that leaves the trial judge ignorant about the actual precise content in question, and having to make a decision on trial fairness by making their best guess, with only the written decision of the federal court to rely upon (although this can include classified portions that the trial judge will see but the public won't).

Canada also uses this far less frequently. There have only ever been I think three prosecutions under SOIA, only one of which went to trial and ultimately to a jury verdict last year. I'm sure there was at least a bit of this as well in some terrorism cases, though those tend to be built on conventional non-classified police evidence, potentially after a national security agency says, with minimal to no detail, 'Uh- this guy's a problem, you better take a look'.

National security evidence considerations would inform every single stage of the investigation from early on all the way to the final trial. You need investigators and prosecutors who can wrap their heads around this and not crash into the problems that can arise. In Canada there are likely only a handful of prosecutors and police investigators who have worked most or all of the lifecycle of these sorts of files and who understand how to handle this stuff, because it's simply very rare. Why try to bring this evidence in if you can just run a clean murder or extortion trial? But this lack of experience will be a friction on future investigations; sort of the 'every roto is roto 0' that's familiar to anyone in CAF. If you don't rep something out enough you don't really build up institutional knowledge. And of course even after doing something once, doesn't mean someone's career keeps them in situ to be there running the file when the issue comes up again. Maybe they're on to higher management, or a different field office.

So, in the shell of a really huge nut, these are a lot of the practical considerations and, at times, barriers to bringing security intelligence into a prosecution. As a rule of thumb, investigators will seek clean, usable information... But in some crimes that simply may not exist. Police may not be able to replicate a signals intelligence intercept that tells us another government is screwing with our democracy. They may not be able to prove classified information was leaked without actually tendering the leaked information in court - Canada has never yet cracked that nut in the security intelligence space, though it's barely had any chances to.

I do not believe that our new FISOIA offences are impotent. I do believe they'll be challenging to investigate and prove without relying on information that comes form intelligence agencies and which they aren't cool with having disclosed in court. That pushes some of this back into the policy realm to decide if we will change how we view the sanctity of security intelligence... But that is best done super carefully, because those wells can and will dry up fast if we draw from them too liberally. And we have no authority at all to waive the privileges asserted by international partners. They can't stop us from doing it with material we already have, but fuck with it and watch how quickly Five eyes becomes Four Eyes- very much to Canada's detriment.

This long overdue post of dubious quality brought to you by my kid sleeping in and two cups of coffee.

How much of this situation is influenced by the 1984 origins of CSIS in the RCMP Security Service?

Prior to 1984, security intelligence in Canada was the purview of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). However, during the 1970s, there were allegations that the RCMP Security Service – the predecessor to CSIS – had been involved in numerous illegal activities. As a result of these allegations, Justice David McDonald was appointed in 1977 to investigate the activities of the RCMP Security Service. The resulting investigation, known as the McDonald Commission, published its final report in 1981, with its main recommendation being that security intelligence work should be separated from policing, and that a civilian intelligence agency be created to take over from the RCMP Security Service

On June 21, 1984, CSIS was created by an Act of Parliament. At the time, it was also decided that the activities of this new agency, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, should be subject to both judicial approval for warrants and to general review by a new body, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, as well as the office of the Inspector General (which was disbanded in 2012). Its de facto existence began on July 16 under the direction of Thomas D'Arcy Finn.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS, /ˈsiːsɪs/; French: Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité, SCRS) is a foreign intelligence service and security agency of the federal government of Canada. It is responsible for gathering, processing, and analyzing national security information from around the world and conducting covert action within Canada and abroad.


The CSIS has no law enforcement function and mainly focuses on intelligence gathering overseas.

Way back in the day, when we were in the Trudeau I era of the Cold War, the Charter was being created, Levesque was Premier and Reagan was President there were an awful lot of messy demands on police and security services. Much like today in fact.

People were gathering information on other people, some of whom were actively engaged in bombings in Canada, some of whom were members of legal political parties whose charters were inimical to the Canadian state. And some people moved in both worlds.
The RCMP, having inherited the role of the Dominion Police in 1922 (?) also inherited their security function. The Dominion Police were formed in the wake of the assassination of Thomas D'Arcy McGee in 1868. The RCMP then found itself tracking criminals, politicians and foreigners, conducting surveillance, sometimes requesting authority and sometimes not, and preparing books of information.

The RCMP found themselves monitoring Igor Gouzenko, Gerda Munsinger, the Litton bombers, the FLQ, members of the Communist Party of Canada, members of various left and right wing factions of legitimate parties.

Not everyone was thrilled to be on file. Some sitting politicians had youthful indiscretions on file that they preferred to keep to themselves.

Which brought up the need for separation of gathering information for intelligence purposes and gathering information for criminal prosecutions. And the need for reviews and approvals.
.....

Where in this mess does the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency fit? Doesn't it have a quasi-judicial role?

....

When did CSIS become focused on the foreign threat? When a serving buddy of mine joined CSIS in 1984 it was pretty clear that CSIS was not MI6 (SIS) but more like MI5 (Security Service).

....

Finally - the role of Parliament and Parliamentarians vice the role of the Party and the PMO.

In my view, NSICOP, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, in a properly functioning Parliament, should be independent of the PM and the PMO. Parliament is Sovereign. It gets to decide who sits in the chamber and who needs to be replaced.

We have similar problems with a lot of other Standing Committees. Our Canadian government is used to managing committees that are supposed to be cross-party and independent.
 
Ooooof. TS//TK//NOFORN, with further reference to NSA info within the product? This one might rise to the level of burning sources and almost definitely burns methods. It definitely identifies some observable activity indicators.

Someone needs to rot in jail for a number of years.

The Ukrainians don't trust the US with advance notice of their intentions.
The Israelis are likely to be less trusting of the US than they have been.

We have been citing concerns about trust between foreign governments as a concern when releasing information to the Canadian public.

How high up the priority list should that consideration be?

The Interwebs leak like a sieve everywhere.
 
In response to Kirkhill post two above: That's because the political parties (both of them) have worked diligently in the last 50 years to emasculate Parliament and relegate it to a role of rubber stamping the government-of-the-day's wishes.

Anybody remembers that, until the early 1960's, the basic concept of Westminster Parliamentarism, where Parliament is supreme and has the role of controlling the government on behalf of the people, was sufficiently well understood that if a MP was ask to become a Minister of the Crown, he/she had to stand for a by-election in his/her own riding so as to give a chance to the residents thereof to decide if they wanted representation to control government or were OK with their MP being in government.

The whole thing arose from a law then in force called the Independence of Parliament Act.

A good demonstration of how far from proper Westminster Parliamentarism we have strayed: The Reform Act of 2015.

We are probably the only "alleged" Westminster style Parliament where an Act on how party caucuses can act to remove their leader from his/her position as leader exists. In Westminster style Parliaments, the caucus of a party always has the power to remove their leader and appoint a new one (for examples, see the UK re: the Conservative party of late, or Australia re: Labour party, etc. In Canada, the political parties have sought to emulate the Americans after WWII, starting with conventions where the party leaders were chosen by representatives of each riding - at first with predominant votes of the elected MP of the party - later on with just the delegates/voting members (which included the party's senators and MP) having a single vote., finally ending with elections of the leader by all party members (including the 90% of them who just bought a member card once the vote is called to vote in the leader then disappear), leading to Head of Parties telling the MP to basically "stuff-it, I've been elected by the membership - Who are you to go against democracy".

Into this, appears a MP who remembers who is supposed to be in charge and presents a private member bill, that will get watered down to become the Reform Act, 2015. The Act provides, amongst other things, for caucuses to be able to hold a vote to replace/remove their leader if such vote is called for by a written request to that effect bearing the signature of 20% of current caucus members, with a caveat: to be able to avail yourself of that provision of the Act, the caucus of a party must have voted to avail itself of that provision of the Act at the beginning of the siting of a any new Parliament (meaning after an election). Guess what, only the Conservatives have availed themselves of the powers of the Act. Hence why Trudeau is facing a caucus revolt but cannot be removed by them under the law.

The sad part is that, before the Reform Act, there was no rule/law one way or the other on how caucuses could or couldn't remove their leader. While the Party leaders were holding the Damocles Sword of their power to sign the MP authorization to represent the Party in an election over the head of their MP and were using the suasion argument of being "democratically" elected leader to keep caucuses from voting them out, the MP's because no law existed, had all the unfettered powers and privileges of Westminster Parliamentarians including the power to remove/replace their leader at any time.

Now, because a well intended MP thought he was reintroducing a privilege that had been removed from them, all parties are bound by the Reform Act and can only remove/replace their leaders in accordance with the Act which is binding on Parliament. The law of unintended consequences in action.
 
The Ukrainians don't trust the US with advance notice of their intentions.
The Israelis are likely to be less trusting of the US than they have been.

We have been citing concerns about trust between foreign governments as a concern when releasing information to the Canadian public.

How high up the priority list should that consideration be?

The Interwebs leak like a sieve everywhere.
If you ever want to get their material again? High. If we want to go it alone on national security and not have foreign allies feed us info on the plot du jour of the latest ISIS convert or foreign interference network, then by all means stomp on said allies’ dicks.

Leaks and compromises will inevitably happen. Dealing with them and investigating and prosecuting where possible is how trust is retained and rebuilt after they do. Respecting foreign use caveats is utterly implicit in sharing and exchanging intelligence, whether at the highest levels of national security, or the lowest level police to police sharing. Being on our own in the national security space would be… Pretty lonely.
 
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