Canada's purchase of the Leopard 2 MBT

[bison33]

Just saw this on web.........thoughts?

http://news.sympatico.msn.ctv.ca/TopStories/ContentPosting.aspx?newsitemid=CTVNews%2f20061031%2fcanada_tanks_061031&feedname=CTV-TOPSTORIES_V2&showbyline=True

 

[George Wallace]

I may direct you first to this post:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/52667/post-472819.html#msg472819


And then you may want to look at this post:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/52660/post-472786.html#msg472786

 

[GAP]

Whether new or old, tanks just not for this war
April 07, 2007 James Travers
Article Link

Hard to win the hearts of Afghans with battle tanks

If crew comfort and safety are the biggest problems with deploying battle tanks in Afghanistan, then the federal government has a compelling solution. Air-conditioned and more heavily armoured, the new generation of German Leopards are far superior to the ones the Canadian Forces declared obsolete before hurriedly deploying them against the Taliban last year.

But as important as those considerations are, they are not the ones that should concern Canadians most. The rush to lease nearly two dozen Leopard 2 A6M tanks is the most compelling evidence yet that neither the Afghan mission nor the master plan for the new military is unfolding as predicted.

No matter how sophisticated, tanks are inconsistent with this country's objectives of rescuing a failed state and creating a light, fast and flexible armed forces capable of responding to a new century's chaotic threats.

Designed for set-piece, Cold War confrontations, the 55-tonne behemoths are hardly the weapons of choice in the close and often urban encounters of today's hearts-and-minds wars. Too often they cause the collateral damage that turns locals against foreigners and isolates soldiers from the civilians they were sent to help.

Worse still, even the world's best battle tanks – and the new Leopards are among them – are vulnerable to fast-evolving insurgent tactics and improvised weapons. During last summer's failed Israeli incursion into Lebanon, a minimum of 18 of its tanks, all various generations of the highly regarded Merkava series, were seriously damaged and at least two destroyed.

For complex political reasons, the deadliest anti-tank arms used by Hezbollah have not yet surfaced in Afghanistan. But it's far from certain that even the newest Leopards would fare as well against mines and rocket-propelled grenades as the specially modified Merkavas.

What is known is that the commander of Canada's army, the parade-ground crisp and refreshingly cerebral Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie, studied the Israeli experience and drew vital conclusions. Among the most important is that even though the Merkavas had weaknesses, the survival rate of crews was high.

It's no coincidence that Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor stressed this week that Canadian casualties have dropped since September when the nearly 30-year old Leopards were pressed into service. While the reasons for that happy decline have more to do with changed enemy tactics and limited winter fighting, any equipment that saves soldiers' lives is both welcome and a persuasive part of the continuing military campaign for more procurement.

Not surprisingly, Stephen Harper's government is susceptible to that persuasion. Having planted the Conservative flag alongside Canada's in Afghanistan, the Prime Minister now has little choice but to write monster cheques when the military argues publicly that its fighting machinery isn't up to the job.

That raises interesting questions. Did the military not know that its aging Leopards would be unusable in Afghanistan's summer heat? Or was it an exercise in planned failure, one that would put irresistible political pressure on the government to acquire the tanks that, in more cost-conscious times, Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier deleted from his already-long shopping list?
More on link

 

[George Wallace]

:

Although many of his points are valid, he does show a lack of situation awareness in what is going on.  I have the opinion from his piece that he wants us to just give up on the Afghan people and come home.  The points he has put forward on the escalation of weaponry are valid and the natural trend in any warfare.  This is nothing new, and actually a common sense move on the part of anyone fighting belligerents. 

His "Winning the Hearts and Minds" argument is very biased and faulty.  It is here that he shows his true colours.  Since its inception, Canada's mission to Afghanistan has included the winning of the hearts and minds of the Afghan people.  In doing so, only a few Canadian soldiers have actually been doing that.  They are the guys who have been travelling 'outside the wire'.  A vast number of Canadians have been inside the wire and have had nothing to do with winning hearts and minds of Afghans.  They have been concentrating on the safety of Canadians and ensuring that they get the protection and supplies that they need.  Twenty tanks, does not take away from the work that the guys outside the wire have been doing and will continue to do.  They just give them more protection when they need it. 

James Travers has put forward some good points about weapons systems.  They are common sense points.  As a conflict progresses, each side will escalate their use of force.  They will get larger, better weapons to fight for their cause.  We have seen the Taliban increase the size of their IEDs.  We have responded by getting the G-Wagen to replace the Iltis, and the RG-31 to replace the G-Wagen, and now the Leo to add to the firepower of the LAV.  It is a logical and natural progression.  It is 'LIFE' Mr. Travers.  Don't be such a "Defeatist".

 

[FSTO]

The two posts above have effectively eviscerated Mr Traver's column.  You should send these comments directly to the Toronto Star.
Mr Travers should stick with what he knows and limit his comments to the battle between the press corps and the PMO in Ottawa.

 

[Cloud Cover]

The two posts above have effectively eviscerated Mr Traver's column. 

Sounds painful, if only it were more than literal. Maybe we should develop an Evisceration round for the Leo, stuffed full of [sour] grapeshot. 

 

[GAP]

Good Article for Ruxted to comment on. Seems to be a lot of Asshats out there that need direction...

 

[Infanteer]

The same tired arguments against the MBT.  Lt Col (Ret) Kilcullen has wrote a very good counterargument to those who see tanks as inappropriate in a modern Army.  Although it is written from the Australian perspective, the arguments easily cross over to the Canadian standpoint:

Bombers and Tanks: Understanding the Myths

 

[geo]

Infanteer... good read - thanks.....

"The ideal situation is to fight with both ASLAVs and tanks, along with infantry and air power as part of a balanced combined-arms team."

However... WTF... ASLAV as a six wheeled light armoured vehicle (pg 94) ???

AND
"Moreover, if Australia were to match the new ‘lighter’ tanks sought by our allies, this would actually mean increasing the weight of our tanks."

... given that Australia has taken delivery of US M1 Abrams MBTs, I guess this statement sorta sound a little silly.

 

[geo]

I figure that with the MBT in close support, the infantry's need for Artillery in indirect support is lessened - allowing our forces to close with and destroy the ennemy with a much reduced risk of collateral damage.

 

[Command-Sense-Act 105]

x

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

April to September of 2006 saw very conventional fighting in southern Afghanistan.  The Taliban staged a major offensive, openly taking District Centres in Helmand and standing and fighting in parts of Kandahar Province.  I was there until late August 2006, and I remarked at the time that the fighting evoked passages I read from fighting in Italy and Normandy (not the same intensity, of course).  While the world's attention was on Lebanon, Canadian soldiers liberated a town in Helmand by crossing a bridge over a river in their LAVs under fire, supported by artillery and aircraft.  Canadian troops have had to advance to contact in the face of dug-in where the civilian populations have fled before contact is made.  This is the kind of fighting for which tanks were made.

No tank is invulnerable, but they can still make a vital contribution.  LAVs are not invulnerable, yet we still employed them to great effect.  The arrival of Leopards brought together the "combat team" of infantry, armour and artillery backed by engineers and other vital arms.  Tanks can be remarkably precise with their devastating firepower.  Their use in counter-insurgency may seem counter-intuitive, but perhaps this is an insurgency of a different character than others.

 

[3rd Herd]

For those looking for more information on the value of tanks in this type of conflict, suggest either some of the plethora of open sources about Iraq or Israel.  For Afghanistan in the Soviet era, two of the most reputable authors are Lester Grau and Michael Gress.  Their "The Soviet-Afghan War - How a superpower fought and lost" offers some good insight.  Publisher information and page reference are in my signature line or here:http://www.kansaspress.ku.edu/grasov.html.

"The average Soviet soldier who entered Afghanistan in the invasion of 1979 appeared to be very much like his counterpart from the Great Patriotic War of 1941–45. He was a conscript. There were only a small number of specialized scout units and commando or Spetsnaz troops. Equipment was basic, with little protective gear except for the standard Soviet steel helmet. Ten years later, the Soviet soldiers that withdrew from Afghanistan were markedly different. They were still mostly recruits, but there was a far greater proportion of elite units as such. In addition, their uniforms, equipment and training had changed. They wore body armor, and muted insignia. Essentially, the army that went into Afghanistan looked like the army of Stalin, but the one that left looked like a modern army."(Shaw, 183)

There are a remarkable amount of similarities between the Soviets and our forces in the aforementioned quote. But have the learned lessons been learned ? Example in Grau's many treatise is the use of self propelled artillery in a direct fire role rather than tanks. Tanks stood off in an over watch while the artillery used it's heavier tubes to reduce strong points. Where self propelled was not available then towed was used.

source:

Shaw, Geoff and Spencer, David. "Fighting in Afghanistan: Lessons from the Soviet Intervention, 1979–89" Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 177–188, 2003 http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/content/jxmr4ngvmufqaxej/fulltext.pdf

 

[observor 69]

Comment on use of shape charge against armour:

What the Army must learn from Iraq
By Allan Mallinson

'It is with artillery that war is made," said Napoleon. But it is with the improvised explosive device that insurgents make war.

Fenian bombs shook London in the 19th century, and Zionist terrorists grabbed the world headlines in 1946, when they blew up the British HQ in Jerusalem, the King David Hotel. In South Armagh, in the 1980s, troops could move only by helicopter, such was the IRA's mastery of the roads by their culvert mines.

Appalling though yesterday's deaths in Basra are, they come as no surprise, therefore: a counter-insurgency force must dominate its tactical area of responsibility, and it can do so only by getting among the people. Troops take every measure to protect themselves, consistent with achieving the mission, but the insurgent often has both the tactical and technological initiative.

In Iraq, the "bomb" is no longer simply a quantity of explosives and a detonator: the insurgents have progressed to an "explosively formed projectile". The effect is of an anti-tank gun firing. The Army will be putting counter-measures in hand, but this is a business of challenge, response and counter-challenge: a deadly game of cat and mouse.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2007/04/06/do0602.xml

 

[3rd Herd]

Found in the September/ October 2006 Issue of Armour:

"The Russians entered the Chechen City of Grozny on 31 December 1994. The first unit to penetrate the city center was the 131st  “Maikop” Brigade. Russian forces initially met no resistance when they entered the city at noon. They drove their vehicles straight to the city center, dismounted, and moved into the train station. Other elements of the brigade remained parked along a side street as a reserve force. Then the Chechens attacked with RPGs. They first destroyed the Russian lead and rear vehicles on the side streets, trapping the unit. The tanks could not lower their gun tubes far enough to shoot into basements or high enough to reach the tops of buildings. Infantry fighting vehicles and personnel carriers were unable to support their tanks. Chechens systematically destroyed the column from above and below with RPGs and grenades................................"

W. Grau, Lester, "Preserving Shock Action: A New Approach to Armored Maneuver Warfare" http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/Preserving%20Shock%20action.pdf

 

[Flip]

The underlying premise seems to be;

Because the military have no idea what they are doing,
we have to send in the diplomats and
limit what the military have on hand,
so that things don't get out of hand.

I wrote a terse note to the author, because some of his presumptions were FALSE.

And worse, he suggests depriving our people in theatre is somehow a good thing.

I'm paraphrasing wildly,  I know, but his point of view should be challenged.

 

[3rd Herd]

Leopard Tanks and the Deadly Dilemmas of the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan
By Michael Wallace

Summary
At the end of September 2006, the Department of National Defence (DND) began to deploy a contingent of 15 of Canada’s 28-year-old Leopard 1 C2 tanks to the battlefield in Afghanistan.1 Three years previously, DND claimed that the Leopards were “obsolete” and would soon be replaced by 66 U.S.-designed Stryker armoured vehicles at a cost of US$460 million.2 The rationale for this abrupt reversal was the vulnerability of Canadian light armoured vehicles to attack, most notably by the now-infamous “improvised explosive devices” (IEDs), more simply named booby traps and anti-tank mines. The Leopards, it was argued, provided more protection for Canadian soldiers, while their 105- mm main armament provided superior striking power in battle. On closer analysis, this deployment was wrong-headed for two fundamental reasons. First, these tanks are themselves vulnerable to a variety of weapons easily obtained or manufactured by insurgent forces. Second, their deployment is part of a growing trend toward a blitzkrieg form of combat in Afghanistan that resembles the all-out warfare of the U.S.-led “Operation Enduring Freedom.” Thus, it is incompatible with the spirit of the civilian reconstruction mission envisaged by NATO in authorizing the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

The Vulnerability of the Leopard Tank It is a truism that even the most modern armoured vehicles, including main battle tanks (MBTs), are
almost totally helpless when deployed alone against advanced anti-tank missile systems, and even rocketpropelled grenades (RPGs). During the Israeli incursion into Lebanon in the summer of 2006, Israel’s Merkava tanks — perhaps the most powerful and safest in the
world3 — proved vulnerable to the advanced Soviet anti-tank missiles used by Hezbollah forces,4 such as the Russian-made AT-13 (METIS-M).5 The Merkavas were also vulnerable to advanced Soviet RPG-29 rocketpropelled grenades (VAMPIR).6 Leopard 1 C2’s Vulnerability to RPGs Older-model tanks such as the Leopard 1 are even more vulnerable. An RPG-29 uses a tandem shapedcharge warhead7 capable of penetrating as much as a metre of modern reactive armour,8 and can be fired from concealment at a range of up to 1.5 km. (It can also be aimed upward to attack helicopters, as the Americans have found to their cost in Iraq). In other words,  concealed insurgents so equipped could destroy a Canadian Leopard 1 C2 with a single shot, quite literally before its crew knew what hit it. Since the RPG- 29, like the older RPG-7, is infantry-portable, the light and mobile insurgent forces operating in Afghanistan should have no trouble deploying it in battle. It may be questioned whether such a relatively modern weapon would be available to the Afghan insurgents. It was developed by the Soviet Union in the 1980s to defeat the reactive armour developed for the upgraded American Abrams M1A1 and M1A2,9 and the end of the Cold War delayed its deployment until 1992. Yet Russian officials, speaking anonymously, admit that the RPG-29, along with many other former Soviet advanced weapons systems, have found their way onto the global black market.10 And if the unconfirmed but persistent reports that the Afghan insurgents are being aided by elements of the Pakistan Secret Service (ISI) are correct,11 it is possible that these insurgents have acquired RPG-29s. Military planners, who traditionally make their preparations based on worst-case scenarios, surely must assume that they have....................................................................http://policyalternatives.ca/documents/National_Office_Pubs/2007/Leopard_Tanks.pdf

 

[Bob Terwilliger]

Hardly surprising, Mr. Travers is no friend of the CF or the Conservative party, and the Star is as Liberal as the sponsorship scandal. I too have sent him (and the editor in chief) a scathing dissection of his column. The scary thing is that while most of here recognise the myraid of faults in his article, the average citizen does not, and he does have a knack for dressing up BS as something that looks credible.

 

[George Wallace]

Ah!  Michael Wallace, close compatriot of Steven Staples, has reared his ugly little head.  (I wonder if I can sue him for defamation of character and the "Wallace" name.)  It is, as was stated in an earlier post, a shame that these characters can twist facts to their bidding to present a picture that seems plausible, yet is completely out to lunch.  If we took his piece and did some changes, we could just as easily be comparing Street Gangs in Toronto, with their Glocks, AKs, PPKs, etc., going against the Metro Police.  These guys are the Fifth Column.  They are distorting facts to fit their agenda.  Unfortunately, other than people on this site, who is to disprove them?  Steven Staples even frequents this site, as I am sure, do many of the others we have commented on, just to test the waters and get more facts to bend.  They lies to the Canadian public are a slap in the face to "Responsible Journalism".

 

[George Wallace]

Found in the September/ October 2006 Issue of Armour:

"The Russians entered the Chechen City of Grozny on 31 December 1994. The first unit to penetrate the city center was the 131st  “Maikop” Brigade. Russian forces initially met no resistance when they entered the city at noon. They drove their vehicles straight to the city center, dismounted, and moved into the train station. Other elements of the brigade remained parked along a side street as a reserve force. Then the Chechens attacked with RPGs. They first destroyed the Russian lead and rear vehicles on the side streets, trapping the unit. The tanks could not lower their gun tubes far enough to shoot into basements or high enough to reach the tops of buildings. Infantry fighting vehicles and personnel carriers were unable to support their tanks. Chechens systematically destroyed the column from above and below with RPGs and grenades................................"

W. Grau, Lester, "Preserving Shock Action: A New Approach to Armored Maneuver Warfare" http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/Preserving%20Shock%20action.pdf

Interesting that you have brought this up.

Would you also be so kind as to post the solutions that they came up with to counter this initial 'mistake'?