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Forces refused U.S. Request out of Iraq fears
Illustrates politicized military, defence analyst says
Chris Wattie
National Post
September 10, 2004
Canada rejected a U.S. request to send a squadron of CF-18 fighter-bombers to Afghanistan last year because of concerns that it might free more American forces for the invasion of Iraq, according to internal Defence Department documents.
In documents obtained under the Access to Information Act, the two top generals in the Canadian Forces agreed that a six-month deployment of as many as 18 aircraft to the air base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, was "deemed feasible" but recommended against the proposal because of concerns over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.
"With the political way ahead yet to be finalized for any CF participation in Iraq or the ISAF, it is recommended that CA [Canada] not deploy CF-18 aircraft," Vice-Admiral Greg Maddison, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, wrote in a memo dated Sept. 24, 2002.
Although the documents do not name the nation requesting the CF-18s or the country in which they would be based, the United States was the lead nation in the coalition fighting in Afghanistan and the squadron the Canadians were asked to replace was based in the former Soviet republic, just north of Afghanistan.
The Americans had made an "informal request" for Canadian jets to fly bombing and air cover mission against Taliban and al-Qaeda holdouts beginning in April, 2003.
However, Vice-Adm. Maddison said that the deployment "would in essence be backfilling U.S. forces to allow them to force generate for other contingencies."
At the time, the U.S. was beginning preparations to invade Iraq, an invasion that Canada ultimately did not support politically.
The documents also questioned whether the hard-pressed Canadian air force could have kept its front-line jets in the field for more than a few weeks. Vice-Adm. Maddison raised a number of concerns with the proposed mission, including an estimated cost of $41.6-million, a possible shortage of precision-guided bombs and severe limits to the Canadian Forces' logistics and support elements.
General Ray Henault, the Chief of Defence Staff, agreed with his deputy's recommendation that Canada not provide the fighter jets to the Afghan campaign and signed off on the decision to reject the U.S. request on Sept. 30.
Bill Graham, the Defence Minister, was not available for comment.
However defence critics called the decision questionable and decried it as an example of the politicization of the Canadian military.
Gordon O'Connor, the Conservative defence critic, said the Canadian fighters would have been a valuable addition to the campaign to root out the last holdouts of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
"Our guys are very good fighter pilots," he said. "They have an excellent reputation.... The U.S. wanted the Canadians there because they knew they'd do a good job."
Mr. O'Connor said that both the Liberal government and the Canadian Forces appear to put political considerations ahead of military ones. "It would seem they're more concerned about appearances than fighting the war on terrorism."
Lieutenant-General Lew Cuppens, a former air force general now working as an analyst for the Conference of Defence Associations, said the generals who recommended against the proposal were likely taking their marching orders from the federal Cabinet.
This is what you end up with when you have a defence headquarters that is representing the interests of a political party as well as the military," he said. "They obviously had guidance from the [Defence] Minister or the Department of Foreign Affairs that this [mission] wouldn't fly politically."
Major Mike Audette, a spokesman for the Canadian Forces, said the main reason that the request was turned down was for technical reasons. "It was technically feasible, but I'd emphasize the word 'technically,' " he said.
"It could have been done, but at significant cost to other areas of our operations.... It wasn't any one factor, [but] when they were all combined it made it non-viable."
Maj. Audette said the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was only one factor in the decision, but acknowledged that Vice-Adm. Maddison "was certainly aware of the political issues ... as a factor."
The documents, marked Secret -- Canadian Eyes Only and heavily edited before their release, indicate that military planners were asked to consider options for sending either six or 12 of the Canadian fighters on the mission, most likely from 3 Wing, based in Bagotville, Que.
Air force officers determined that the mission would be "feasible for a one-time deployment of six months duration," but said that sending the fighters, pilots and all the necessary maintenance and support troops "may stretch specialist resources and negatively impact on any future CF international deployments."
A possible shortage of laser- or GPS-guided bombs was another potential problem, but staff officers concluded that if Canada's supply of the high-tech precision weapons ran short, more could be acquired from the Americans or other allies.
The mission would have required at least one of the Canadian Forces' CC-150 Polaris transport jets to support it.
The Canadian fighters would likely have replaced a three-nation squadron of Dutch, Danish and Norwegian F-16s based in Kyrgyzstan, and Canadian planners noted the allied air base had its own air traffic control and firefighting equipment, as well as hangar, housing and dining facilities.
Lt.-Gen. Cuppens, who retired from the air force in 1998, said that the Canadian Forces is becoming so thin that it is falling behind even its much smaller NATO allies.
"It's an embarrassment," he said. "Even countries like the Netherlands or Denmark can field fighter aircraft ... and here we are, a G-8 country, and we can't even send six fighters anywhere."
An air force report earlier this year stated that even with 80 modernized CF-18 fighters available, Canada could only send a "six pack" of the jets on overseas operations.
Just five years ago, Canada contributed 18 CF-18s to the air campaign against Yugoslavia and then-president Slobodan Milosevic.
The Canadian aircraft, based in Aviano, Italy, flew 682 combat sorties over Yugoslavia in a 78-day air campaign and dropped a total of 530 bombs, of which 361 where laser-guided "smart" bombs.
In 1991, Canada sent a total of 26 CF-18s to join the Gulf War against Iraq.
The U.S. appeared eager to get Canadian fighters to provide air cover for coalition ground forces, which were at the time still conducting search-and-destroy missions in the mountains of eastern and southeastern Afghanistan.
The documents say that the Americans "indicated that there are limited options available to them for this mission and would appreciate that serious consideration be given to this request."
The U.S. military requested an "urgent preliminary assessment into the feasibility of deploying CF-18s" by early August, but the Canadian Forces was not able to answer until late September.
The U.S. also approached a second nation to contribute to the mission, but the name of that country was deleted in the documents released by the Defence Department.
The American request came on July 22, at the same time a battlegroup based on the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, was finishing a six-month tour in Kandahar with U.S. and coalition forces.
Forces refused U.S. Request out of Iraq fears
Illustrates politicized military, defence analyst says
Chris Wattie
National Post
September 10, 2004
Canada rejected a U.S. request to send a squadron of CF-18 fighter-bombers to Afghanistan last year because of concerns that it might free more American forces for the invasion of Iraq, according to internal Defence Department documents.
In documents obtained under the Access to Information Act, the two top generals in the Canadian Forces agreed that a six-month deployment of as many as 18 aircraft to the air base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, was "deemed feasible" but recommended against the proposal because of concerns over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.
"With the political way ahead yet to be finalized for any CF participation in Iraq or the ISAF, it is recommended that CA [Canada] not deploy CF-18 aircraft," Vice-Admiral Greg Maddison, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, wrote in a memo dated Sept. 24, 2002.
Although the documents do not name the nation requesting the CF-18s or the country in which they would be based, the United States was the lead nation in the coalition fighting in Afghanistan and the squadron the Canadians were asked to replace was based in the former Soviet republic, just north of Afghanistan.
The Americans had made an "informal request" for Canadian jets to fly bombing and air cover mission against Taliban and al-Qaeda holdouts beginning in April, 2003.
However, Vice-Adm. Maddison said that the deployment "would in essence be backfilling U.S. forces to allow them to force generate for other contingencies."
At the time, the U.S. was beginning preparations to invade Iraq, an invasion that Canada ultimately did not support politically.
The documents also questioned whether the hard-pressed Canadian air force could have kept its front-line jets in the field for more than a few weeks. Vice-Adm. Maddison raised a number of concerns with the proposed mission, including an estimated cost of $41.6-million, a possible shortage of precision-guided bombs and severe limits to the Canadian Forces' logistics and support elements.
General Ray Henault, the Chief of Defence Staff, agreed with his deputy's recommendation that Canada not provide the fighter jets to the Afghan campaign and signed off on the decision to reject the U.S. request on Sept. 30.
Bill Graham, the Defence Minister, was not available for comment.
However defence critics called the decision questionable and decried it as an example of the politicization of the Canadian military.
Gordon O'Connor, the Conservative defence critic, said the Canadian fighters would have been a valuable addition to the campaign to root out the last holdouts of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
"Our guys are very good fighter pilots," he said. "They have an excellent reputation.... The U.S. wanted the Canadians there because they knew they'd do a good job."
Mr. O'Connor said that both the Liberal government and the Canadian Forces appear to put political considerations ahead of military ones. "It would seem they're more concerned about appearances than fighting the war on terrorism."
Lieutenant-General Lew Cuppens, a former air force general now working as an analyst for the Conference of Defence Associations, said the generals who recommended against the proposal were likely taking their marching orders from the federal Cabinet.
This is what you end up with when you have a defence headquarters that is representing the interests of a political party as well as the military," he said. "They obviously had guidance from the [Defence] Minister or the Department of Foreign Affairs that this [mission] wouldn't fly politically."
Major Mike Audette, a spokesman for the Canadian Forces, said the main reason that the request was turned down was for technical reasons. "It was technically feasible, but I'd emphasize the word 'technically,' " he said.
"It could have been done, but at significant cost to other areas of our operations.... It wasn't any one factor, [but] when they were all combined it made it non-viable."
Maj. Audette said the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was only one factor in the decision, but acknowledged that Vice-Adm. Maddison "was certainly aware of the political issues ... as a factor."
The documents, marked Secret -- Canadian Eyes Only and heavily edited before their release, indicate that military planners were asked to consider options for sending either six or 12 of the Canadian fighters on the mission, most likely from 3 Wing, based in Bagotville, Que.
Air force officers determined that the mission would be "feasible for a one-time deployment of six months duration," but said that sending the fighters, pilots and all the necessary maintenance and support troops "may stretch specialist resources and negatively impact on any future CF international deployments."
A possible shortage of laser- or GPS-guided bombs was another potential problem, but staff officers concluded that if Canada's supply of the high-tech precision weapons ran short, more could be acquired from the Americans or other allies.
The mission would have required at least one of the Canadian Forces' CC-150 Polaris transport jets to support it.
The Canadian fighters would likely have replaced a three-nation squadron of Dutch, Danish and Norwegian F-16s based in Kyrgyzstan, and Canadian planners noted the allied air base had its own air traffic control and firefighting equipment, as well as hangar, housing and dining facilities.
Lt.-Gen. Cuppens, who retired from the air force in 1998, said that the Canadian Forces is becoming so thin that it is falling behind even its much smaller NATO allies.
"It's an embarrassment," he said. "Even countries like the Netherlands or Denmark can field fighter aircraft ... and here we are, a G-8 country, and we can't even send six fighters anywhere."
An air force report earlier this year stated that even with 80 modernized CF-18 fighters available, Canada could only send a "six pack" of the jets on overseas operations.
Just five years ago, Canada contributed 18 CF-18s to the air campaign against Yugoslavia and then-president Slobodan Milosevic.
The Canadian aircraft, based in Aviano, Italy, flew 682 combat sorties over Yugoslavia in a 78-day air campaign and dropped a total of 530 bombs, of which 361 where laser-guided "smart" bombs.
In 1991, Canada sent a total of 26 CF-18s to join the Gulf War against Iraq.
The U.S. appeared eager to get Canadian fighters to provide air cover for coalition ground forces, which were at the time still conducting search-and-destroy missions in the mountains of eastern and southeastern Afghanistan.
The documents say that the Americans "indicated that there are limited options available to them for this mission and would appreciate that serious consideration be given to this request."
The U.S. military requested an "urgent preliminary assessment into the feasibility of deploying CF-18s" by early August, but the Canadian Forces was not able to answer until late September.
The U.S. also approached a second nation to contribute to the mission, but the name of that country was deleted in the documents released by the Defence Department.
The American request came on July 22, at the same time a battlegroup based on the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, was finishing a six-month tour in Kandahar with U.S. and coalition forces.