Assessing the Enemy

[Kirkhill]

https://www.usni.org/magazines/ca/2022/december/assessing-military-capability-more-just-counting-guns

U.S. threat assessments in the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 got the intent right. The Russians invaded as predicted. But on the capability side, analysts focused on the quantity of troops and firepower being massed on the border. Surely, the outgunned Ukrainians could not withstand the pending Russian onslaught. Kyiv was expected to fall within days.

Threat assessment, as we are regularly reminded, is a function of both capability and intent. Usually the assumption is that capability is easy to discern while intent is difficult. Intent is all about what is in peoples' minds and you can't trust their words.

Capability is usually assessed by counting up the number of weapons in the arsenal and then assuming (THAT word) that bad things could happen IF the enemy can use their version of our equipment as well as we hope we will be able to use our version of our equipment.

But what if all our assessments are coloured by the sum of all our fears?

IF.
ASSUME.
HOPE.
FEAR.

How do you plan realistically? Should more weight be given to the amorphous, the unknowns?

 

[daftandbarmy]

https://www.usni.org/magazines/ca/2022/december/assessing-military-capability-more-just-counting-guns

Threat assessment, as we are regularly reminded, is a function of both capability and intent. Usually the assumption is that capability is easy to discern while intent is difficult. Intent is all about what is in peoples' minds and you can't trust their words.

Capability is usually assessed by counting up the number of weapons in the arsenal and then assuming (THAT word) that bad things could happen IF the enemy can use their version of our equipment as well as we hope we will be able to use our version of our equipment.

But what if all our assessments are coloured by the sum of all our fears?

IF.
ASSUME.
HOPE.
FEAR.

How do you plan realistically? Should more weight be given to the amorphous, the unknowns?

"Never take counsel of your fears." - Stonewall Jackson

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

https://www.usni.org/magazines/ca/2022/december/assessing-military-capability-more-just-counting-guns

Threat assessment, as we are regularly reminded, is a function of both capability and intent. Usually the assumption is that capability is easy to discern while intent is difficult. Intent is all about what is in peoples' minds and you can't trust their words.

Capability is usually assessed by counting up the number of weapons in the arsenal and then assuming (THAT word) that bad things could happen IF the enemy can use their version of our equipment as well as we hope we will be able to use our version of our equipment.

But what if all our assessments are coloured by the sum of all our fears?

IF.
ASSUME.
HOPE.
FEAR.

How do you plan realistically? Should more weight be given to the amorphous, the unknowns?

In political science there is the theory that estimated or assessed threat is assessed capability times (x) assessed intentions. So even if another country has incredible capability to harm you, if you assess their intentions to do as being zero then there is no assessed threat. Various neighbouring countries could do great harm to each other, but they do not realistically assess any intention of their neighbours doing so. As a result, they don't have war plans against each other or devote scarce resources to counter a threat assessed as zero.

Looking at the article in question, the author is saying that we overestimated the capability of the Soviet Army in the Cold War and then the modern Russian Army. He suggests that we have perhaps done the same thing with the Chinese military. I am searching for the "so what?" The benefit of overestimating a potential adversary's capabilities is that you avoid being complacent. The downside is that you might get bluffed on the international stage into acceding to something that you might not otherwise do.

I think that overestimating a potential adversary is a survivable mistake. Underestimating them can be fatal, as can overestimating one's own capabilities. It's especially dangerous when those last two combine. France in 1870 is an example. Having said that, perhaps France and Great Britain overestimated Germany in 1938 and underestimated their own power which led to a policy of appeasement? Or they really just didn't want another world war and were desperate to avoid one while they thought they had some manouevre room. Which is not an unreasonable position. Anyhoo.

Such assessments will have a level of confidence along with biases that influence them. I think our nature is to "err on the side of caution" but every now and then a gambler comes along who is willing to roll the dice (gamble vs risk) without first having taken the full measure of the foe. Sometimes they get lucky.

 

[Kirkhill]

In political science there is the theory that estimated or assessed threat is assessed capability times (x) assessed intentions. So even if another country has incredible capability to harm you, if you assess their intentions to do as being zero then there is no assessed threat. Various neighbouring countries could do great harm to each other, but they do not realistically assess any intention of their neighbours doing so. As a result, they don't have war plans against each other or devote scarce resources to counter a threat assessed as zero.

Looking at the article in question, the author is saying that we overestimated the capability of the Soviet Army in the Cold War and then the modern Russian Army. He suggests that we have perhaps done the same thing with the Chinese military. I am searching for the "so what?" The benefit of overestimating a potential adversary's capabilities is that you avoid being complacent. The downside is that you might get bluffed on the international stage into acceding to something that you might not otherwise do.

I think that overestimating a potential adversary is a survivable mistake. Underestimating them can be fatal, as can overestimating one's own capabilities. It's especially dangerous when those last two combine. France in 1870 is an example. Having said that, perhaps France and Great Britain overestimated Germany in 1938 and underestimated their own power which led to a policy of appeasement? Or they really just didn't want another world war and were desperate to avoid one while they thought they had some manouevre room. Which is not an unreasonable position. Anyhoo.

Such assessments will have a level of confidence along with biases that influence them. I think our nature is to "err on the side of caution" but every now and then a gambler comes along who is willing to roll the dice (gamble vs risk) without first having taken the full measure of the foe. Sometimes they get lucky.

But ....

Overestimating an enemy may end up being at odds with economy of effort. If you bump your defence budget to 5% of GDP what is the opportunity cost of that money? Could that money be better used to buy internal peace instead of being employed to counter a questionable external threat?

The Russians, arguably, went bankrupt trying to counter the "threat" from NATO. Curiously that threat was more of a draw than a push. The main concern was not that NATO would advance to Moscow but that the Muscovites would leave for Europe due to too much being spent on defence.

 

[Furniture]

But ....

Overestimating an enemy may end up being at odds with economy of effort. If you bump your defence budget to 5% of GDP what is the opportunity cost of that money? Could that money be better used to buy internal peace instead of being employed to counter a questionable external threat?

The Russians, arguably, went bankrupt trying to counter the "threat" from NATO. Curiously that threat was more of a draw than a push. The main concern was not that NATO would advance to Moscow but that the Muscovites would leave for Europe due to too much being spent on defence.

I'd argue that NATO and the West in general have overestimated the capabilities of rivals, but not grossly overestimated them. That overestimation ensures military dominance over any rivals, which helps to keep them in line.

Imagine Russia or China without the US and its partners to keep them from being more aggressive.