TangoTwoBravo
Army.ca Veteran
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I recently read Arthur Gullachsen's An Army of Never-Ending Strength - Reinforcing the Canadians in North-West Europe 1944-45. In the interests of transparency I should point out that Arthur, a serving Captain and history prof at RMC, and I served together in 2 RCR and we have remained friends. Gullachsen looks at Canadian doctrine, equipment, training and organization with a focus on the period between the landings in Normandy and the German surrender in 1945. He argues that the Canadian army was able to remain in a state of perpetual offensive operations due to a very robust personnel and equipment replacement system. The book should be of interest for those looking for a deeper understanding of the Canadian army in NW Europe, but it also offers some insights for current-day officers contemplating large scale combat operations.
The book describes in detail the personnel and vehicle replacement system in place for the Canadian army. The scale of personnel replacements to units in Normandy is stunning. Over 5,000 Canadian reinforcements were sent in August 1944 alone, with another 9,000 sent in September. Five reinforcement battalions managed this flow from England to the units fighting on the line. The book lays out how the system would flow, noting that excessive bureaucracy was an issue but also pointing out that the system worked.
Gullachsen studies the shortage of infantry reinforcements in August 1944 that precipitated the conscription crisis. A number of factor contributed to the shortage, but chief among them was incorrect forecasts of casualties by branch of service which in turn meant that reinforcements were available but in the wrong branch. Infantry casualty forecasts were too low, while those for other branches were too high. In June and July 1944 the forecasted loss rate for infantry other ranks had was 2,150 while 3,885 was the actual number. At the same time, 1,211 casualties had been forecast for non-infantry while 994 were the actual losses. As a result there were re-mustering programs for the reinforcements, but Gullachsen points out that training standards were maintained. By August 1944 new casualty rates had been produced to guide future reinforcement programs.
RCEME officers should take great interest in the third chapter which describes both the formation of their Corps and the breath-taking vehicle repair and replacement system in effect at the time. G3 and G4 staff officers should also find this chapter interesting. The contrast with the German vehicle repair and replacement system at the time is staggering - 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade starts one period of comparison with over 200 tanks and reaches a low of 100 on 16 August but is quickly back to 150 tanks a week later. Throughout most of the period there are losses but the tank strengths stays around 200 until Totalize/Tractable with constant replacements. The German Panzer Regiment 3, on the other hand, starts the period with over 150 tanks and steadily declines into nothing by 9 August.
Arthur notes that losses in Artillery units were much lower than in the infantry and armour, and partly as a result the Canadian artillery was able to maintain a high level of efficiency throughout the campaign. He describes the "bite and hold" tactics that evolved to leverage this artillery superiority along with improved combined-arms tactics.
The accounts in the book would have been interesting from an academic perspective to serving officers at the time of its publication last year. In the light of the current war in Ukraine, though, there are some areas that could be noted as Western countries contemplate a return to large scale combat operations. The need for a robust replacement system is clear. The WW2 Canadian standard for an infantry reinforcement/replacement was four months. The need for accurate forecasts of losses is also highlighted along with the need for replacements to be able to be remustered. The experience of the Ukrainian war should be studied to inform our estimates. Whether it is preferable to keep units "on the line" and reinforced in place or have units rotated out for the integration of reinforcements should also be examined. The Canadian practice of doing this forward was successful in 1944, but the Canadian army of that time was also able to dominate the artillery duel.
I recommend this book for those seeking a deeper understanding of the Canadian army's performance in NW Europe as well as serving officers who want to see an example of how a force is kept in action and the systems required to do so.
The book describes in detail the personnel and vehicle replacement system in place for the Canadian army. The scale of personnel replacements to units in Normandy is stunning. Over 5,000 Canadian reinforcements were sent in August 1944 alone, with another 9,000 sent in September. Five reinforcement battalions managed this flow from England to the units fighting on the line. The book lays out how the system would flow, noting that excessive bureaucracy was an issue but also pointing out that the system worked.
Gullachsen studies the shortage of infantry reinforcements in August 1944 that precipitated the conscription crisis. A number of factor contributed to the shortage, but chief among them was incorrect forecasts of casualties by branch of service which in turn meant that reinforcements were available but in the wrong branch. Infantry casualty forecasts were too low, while those for other branches were too high. In June and July 1944 the forecasted loss rate for infantry other ranks had was 2,150 while 3,885 was the actual number. At the same time, 1,211 casualties had been forecast for non-infantry while 994 were the actual losses. As a result there were re-mustering programs for the reinforcements, but Gullachsen points out that training standards were maintained. By August 1944 new casualty rates had been produced to guide future reinforcement programs.
RCEME officers should take great interest in the third chapter which describes both the formation of their Corps and the breath-taking vehicle repair and replacement system in effect at the time. G3 and G4 staff officers should also find this chapter interesting. The contrast with the German vehicle repair and replacement system at the time is staggering - 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade starts one period of comparison with over 200 tanks and reaches a low of 100 on 16 August but is quickly back to 150 tanks a week later. Throughout most of the period there are losses but the tank strengths stays around 200 until Totalize/Tractable with constant replacements. The German Panzer Regiment 3, on the other hand, starts the period with over 150 tanks and steadily declines into nothing by 9 August.
Arthur notes that losses in Artillery units were much lower than in the infantry and armour, and partly as a result the Canadian artillery was able to maintain a high level of efficiency throughout the campaign. He describes the "bite and hold" tactics that evolved to leverage this artillery superiority along with improved combined-arms tactics.
The accounts in the book would have been interesting from an academic perspective to serving officers at the time of its publication last year. In the light of the current war in Ukraine, though, there are some areas that could be noted as Western countries contemplate a return to large scale combat operations. The need for a robust replacement system is clear. The WW2 Canadian standard for an infantry reinforcement/replacement was four months. The need for accurate forecasts of losses is also highlighted along with the need for replacements to be able to be remustered. The experience of the Ukrainian war should be studied to inform our estimates. Whether it is preferable to keep units "on the line" and reinforced in place or have units rotated out for the integration of reinforcements should also be examined. The Canadian practice of doing this forward was successful in 1944, but the Canadian army of that time was also able to dominate the artillery duel.
I recommend this book for those seeking a deeper understanding of the Canadian army's performance in NW Europe as well as serving officers who want to see an example of how a force is kept in action and the systems required to do so.
