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After the Battle of Panjwai

Mourning

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Conquering Canadians take stock
With the Taliban having melted away, commander reflects on lessons learned
GRAEME SMITH

From Wednesday's Globe and Mail

PANJWAI DISTRICT, AFGHANISTAN — Sitting on the rooftop of a shrapnel-scarred building in southern Afghanistan, Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie squinted into the sunset and looked over the swath of farmland that his soldiers had conquered.

About 10 days earlier, the commander of Canada's battle group was staring down hundreds of Taliban fighters in those fields. His command post was filled with urgent bursts of radio traffic.

But the Taliban appear to have run away, after enduring heavy attacks from the air and a steady Canadian advance on the ground, and the operation has slowed into a methodical mop-up. One officer compared yesterday's mood around the command post to a schoolyard in June.

On his metal folding chair, Col. Lavoie allowed himself a moment of quiet reflection. But the 40-year-old commander couldn't entirely relax while many of his troops were still pushing south, across this former Taliban stronghold about 15 kilometres southwest of Kandahar city. The steady drive from the north won't stop, Col. Lavoie said, until his soldiers meet their counterparts waiting for them on the southern edge of the battlefield, near the Arghandab River.

A NATO statement confirmed yesterday that most of the journey is already finished; about 65 per cent of the contested area, measuring perhaps four kilometres by five kilometres, has been formally cleared of insurgents. The only Canadian injury yesterday happened in a vehicle accident.

While still unwilling to declare victory, the Canadian commander was already musing about the lessons of the battle.

"If you'd asked me five months ago, 'Do you need tanks to fight insurgents?' I would have said, 'No, you're nuts,' " he said. "But . . . the tactics they've now transitioned to, very seldom do insurgents mass and concentrate the way they've done here and dig their feet into a stronghold. From my perspective, they're acting more like a conventional enemy."

Canada will send 15 Leopard tanks to Afghanistan, The Globe and Mail has reported, although this hasn't yet been confirmed by the military. Some military planners had considered the tanks obsolete, assuming the fight against insurgents in places such as Afghanistan would require nimble infantry.

But the boldness of the insurgents has forced a re-evaluation of the need for heavy war-fighting equipment, Col. Lavoie said.

"Because they're acting conventionally, then conventional assets like tanks, armoured engineering vehicles, and armoured bridge-laying vehicles certainly have their place here," he said. "The lesson learned is that you need to maintain those capabilities."

He continued: "If you're truly going to operate on the full spectrum of conflict, you've got to put your money where your mouth is. You need things that can operate on the far end, which are combat enablers like tanks, artillery and close-air support." Casualties are difficult to estimate, he said, but the operation appears to have killed 230 to 300 insurgents -- a number lower than NATO totals, but higher than the figure admitted by the Taliban.

"The numbers that came at us surprised me," he said. "I'd say their tenacity surprised me as well, to be honest. I wouldn't be honest if I said it didn't." Despite the fact that many insurgents escaped, he added, the showdown between Canadians and Taliban will probably improve the prestige of the foreign troops.

"Any misperception the insurgent forces may have had, that NATO didn't have the capacity to go in hard, well I'm sure there's no doubt in their mind now," he said. "I'm not sure they've ever seen, under any previous coalition, this amount of pressure." After the most serious battle Afghanistan has witnessed since the fall of the Taliban government in 2001, Col. Lavoie said he's hopeful that the insurgents won't repeat such large-scale escalations.

"They'll have no choice," he said "We had the combat power to break them. The remnants will have no choice but to go back to operating in a typical insurgent, two- to 10-man sort of insurgent sections.

"My mission statement still says, Task Force 76 battle group will conduct counterinsurgency operations in the province of Kandahar. That mission statement still stands, because after this is done we'll go back to conducting those operations."

*****

The battle for Panjwai

After more than a week of fighting to oust insurgents from the warren of lush farms and mud-walled compounds in Panjwai, NATO estimates that 65 per cent of the objective territory is now under their control.

Aug. 3, 2006: Soldiers from the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry are ambushed in the Pashmul area.

Aug. 19: Hours after the PPCLI transfers command to their replacements from the Royal Canadian Regiment, the RCR fights to stop an estimated 300 to 500 insurgents sweeping north through Panjwai toward the village of Panjwai District Centre. It was among the largest Taliban battle groups that NATO officials had witnessed in recent months.

Aug. 31: NATO officials warn villagers in Panjwai District about an impending attack, using local radio, television, and leaflets dropped from the air.

Sept. 2: Operation Medusa starts. Described by Canadian officials as the country's largest-ever mustering of forces since the Second World War, the operation is led by Canadian soldiers but involves Afghan forces and troops from four other NATO countries. It begins around daybreak with an intense aerial barrage from Canadian artillery; British Harrier jets; Dutch Apache helicopters and F-16 jets; and U.S. A-10 warplanes and B-1 bombers. Reconnaissance aircraft cover the area with intense surveillance.

Sept. 3: The ground offensive starts. Canadian soldiers hold blocking positions on the north edge of Panjwai District while others push up from the south, across the dry bed of the Arghandab River. Four Canadian soldiers are killed as they climb out of their troop carrier near the river's north bank. The casualties halt the offensive, temporarily. About 80 suspected insurgents are captured.

Sept. 4: The Canadians plan to re-launch their ground offensive in the early morning, but a U.S. A-10 Warthog mistakenly strafes a group of Canadian soldiers just minutes before the planned attack. One Canadian dies, more than 30 are injured, and the offensive is delayed again.

Sept. 5: A small patrol of Canadian troops advances from the north for reconnaissance but returns to their position near Highway 1 without taking any ground.

Sept. 6: Afghan officials complain that Taliban fighters are re-supplying themselves from the poorly guarded western side of the Canadian cordon around Pashmul.

Sept. 7: After some discussion, NATO decides to press ahead with the operation. The plan is reversed: The main force advances from the north, rolling out of the desert around Highway 1 and breaking into the lush farmland south of the highway.

The Canadians take ground in Panjwai for the first time, unopposed by the Taliban.

Sept. 8: Firefights erupt along the length of the northern front, in what military officials describe as a systematic effort to test the strength of the foreign troops. No NATO soldiers are killed or injured.

Sept. 10: Most of the Canadian and NATO forces along the northern front pull back to a staging ground north of Highway 1, gathering for a major attack.

Sept. 11: The gathered forces drive deep into the heart of Pashmul, seizing a warren of suspected insurgent hideouts. The mud-walled compounds contain weapons, ammunition, bomb-making supplies, and a crude medical station -- all left behind, showing the haste of the insurgents' retreat. Freshly dug trenches also suggest the Taliban had prepared to defend their enclave, before abandoning the plan. Western intelligence and the Taliban themselves say the insurgents have largely retreated and dispersed.

Sept. 12: Canadian troops continue mop-up operations in the area.

SOURCE: GRAEME SMITH IN AFGHANISTAN"

Link: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060913.wxafghan13/BNStory/International/home

Regards,

Mourning  8)
 
I can't remember where I read it but apparently Panjwai is the birth place of Mullah Omar.  Which explains the Taliban tactics involving the area a little more.  Its similar to the problems the Americans have been running into in Tikrit in Iraq, the birthplace of Saddam Hussein.  I just thought I would mention this seeing as I believe it had an impact on the tactics used there.
 
That would explain part of the reason why they suddenly started waging war and operating in it on a more conventional manner then what they usually appear to be doing.

Regards,

Mourning  8)
 
"Key strike puts Taliban to flight
Michael Smith, Kandahar


BRITISH special forces have played a key role in a defeat of the Taliban as part of Operation Medusa, the largest combat operation ever mounted by Nato.
Over the past fortnight Nato troops, led by the Canadians, have driven the Taliban out of the strategically important Panjwayi district between Maiwand and Kandahar.


Last week members of the newly formed British Special Forces Support Group (SFSG) pulled out of their hides to the southeast of Maiwand with their commanders satisfied that the Taliban had been defeated and expelled from the area.

“They chose to take us on,” said a senior Nato officer. “They have suffered heavy casualties. In fact, they haven’t suffered such extensive casualties since the fighting in 2001-02.”

The British special forces had spent the first 10 days guarding against any Taliban reinforcement from the west, and the last few picking off fleeing insurgents.

Senior officers cautioned that while Operation Medusa had been “a tactical success”, there was no room for complacency and nobody was about to use the word victory. “It has a tendency to come back and bite you on the arse,” one officer said.

This battlefield has a profound historical resonance. Maiwand was the scene of one of the most devastating defeats ever suffered by the British when, in July 1880, 2,700 British and Indian troops were outnumbered 10 to one by Afghan tribesmen. More than 1,000 British and Indian troops died but 7,000 of the enemy were killed in what was a pyrrhic victory for the Afghans.

The British suffered losses in the latest battle — 14 dead when a Nimrod spyplane crashed on the first day, including signallers from the Special Boat Service (SBS) and the SFSG who were relaying intelligence collected by RAF colleagues.

Five Canadian and two Afghan soldiers were killed on the ground. But Nato claimed that more than 500 Taliban — a third of those making a stand at Panjwayi — were killed.

The Taliban were using the area as a forward operations base to put pressure on the city of Kandahar, which is seen as the key to controlling the south.

During the Soviet occupation of the 1980s, the mujaheddin occupied the area, which is covered with grapevines, wheat and poppy fields, making it an ideal supply base for an insurgent army.

It is riddled with drainage ditches and high walled compounds providing perfect cover for a marauding guerrilla band and there are scores of escape tunnels and trenches built during the mujaheddin days.

General David Richards, the Nato commander, chose the area to demonstrate to the 70% of the population who, he believes, will back whoever appears stronger, that Nato and not the Taliban is in charge.

Richards had prepared the ground carefully. His commanders talked to tribal leaders to persuade the 40,000 population to leave for their own safety and to convince them that the alliance would rebuild once the Taliban had left.

The battle, which pitted more than 2,000 troops against 1,500 Taliban, opened on Saturday September 2 with a salvo of gunfire from Canadian and Dutch artillery. A company of 150 men from the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry advanced across the Arghandab river.

But the Taliban were lying in wait and the company took the brunt of their aggression, coming under intense mortar and machinegun fire that killed four Canadians. The Canadian commander temporarily withdrew his forces and replaced them with Taskforce Grizzly, comprising 200 Afghan infantry backed up by US troops.
On the left flank, Taskforce 31, comprising SBS and US Army Special Forces, were used temporarily to “shape the battlefield”, seizing the initiative from the Taliban.

Two other companies of the Princess Patricia’s were making slow progress against a Taliban trench system in the north. The third company was redirected to join the push, along with US infantry. They were backed up by direct fire support from Canadian and Dutch artillery and by air support from Apache attack helicopters, US B1 Lancer bombers, F16s, and US A10 Tankbusters — one of which killed a fifth Canadian soldier with “friendly fire” — plus RAF Harrier GR7s.

While the SBS and the US Special Forces gave the Nato advance a kick-start from the south, other US special operations troops spread across the area to the south of the battlefield. They were ordered to keep out Taliban reinforcements and supply columns attempting to make their way along the desert roads from the Pakistani towns of Nuski and Quetta.

The UK and US special forces boosted the southern advance considerably and after a few days the SBS were withdrawn and reassigned to other tasks.

To the north, the Canadians, whose light armoured vehicles were vulnerable to rocket- propelled grenades, were struggling. By the beginning of last week, an operation scheduled to last only 10 days looked like lasting a month. But sustained aerial and artillery bombardment were beginning to tell on the Taliban.

Suddenly one company of the Princess Patricia’s made a breakthrough, pushing forward to hold a position well ahead of the Canadian lines. A second company pushed forward and very soon all three Canadian companies were leap-frogging each other to the point that the American infantry could be withdrawn.

The effect was like a vice, squeezing the Taliban out to the west where they were awaited by Dutch infantry, a Danish armoured reconnaissance company and, further out towards Maiwand, the British SFSG, mostly former paratroopers.

By the end of last week, the vast majority of the Taliban were thought to have fled.

Senior Nato officers expressed astonishment that the Taliban had abandoned traditional guerrilla tactics that would have seen them dispersing the minute heavy artillery and aerial firepower were introduced.

“The next three to six months is a crucial period here,” Richards said. “We are establishing psychological ascendency over the Taliban in Panjwayi.

“Operation Medusa has not been about killing for no reason. The people there want to believe we can win and we’re beginning to demonstrate that we will win.”

Link: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-2361459_2,00.html

Regards,

Mourning  8)
 
Suddenly one company of the Princess Patricia’s made a breakthrough, pushing forward to hold a position well ahead of the Canadian lines.


I'm just sayin'.


;D
 
Hate to burst your bubble Para but the whole article calls the Canadian troops deployed as PPCLI some writter didn't do his homework.

I'm pretty sure I'm not a Patricia, nor was my company when we crossed the river.  ;D


It's ok Para everyone in the OP did superbly through out!
 
HitorMiss said:
Hate to burst your bubble Para but the whole article calls the Canadian troops deployed as PPCLI some writter didn't do his homework.

I'm pretty sure I'm not a Patricia, nor was my company when we crossed the river.  ;D


It's ok Para everyone in the OP did superbly through out!

Is that like a gold standard or sumptin' ??  ;D
 
You know I removed my inter Regiment jab thinking I would take the high road  :P

Sheeesh, You know I have been described as a Patricia traped in The RCR, though I can't imagine why people dislike me so much as to say that to my face  ;D
 
Re: NATO: Too Many Restrictions on Foreign Forces in AFG or How to Fight a War

An interesting read by the Chief of military history, U.S. Army in the Globe & Mail.  He does make points that not many people seem to be following.


http://www.theglobeandmail.com//servlet/story/RTGAM.20060927.wxcosimp27/BNStory/National/home

We ignore at our peril the rules of counterinsurgency
JEFFREY SIMPSON

From Wednesday's Globe and Mail


Conventional forces often lose unconventional wars because they lack a conceptual understanding of the war they are fighting.

Lieutenant-Colonel Matthew Moten,

chief of military history, U.S. Army

That Leopard tanks are being sent to Canadian forces in Afghanistan is bad news, intellectually and operationally.


The tanks are about the last piece of equipment an army needs in fighting an insurgency: powerful weapons to smash infrastructure, kill people, fight against other powerful machines and, ultimately, help occupy territory but useless if used against insurgents.

Fighting an insurgency is about winning local residents, not territory. If one side captures territory but, in the process, alienates local residents, it will eventually lose that territory. The war Canadians are fighting in Afghanistan is for the allegiance, help and support of local people.

Judged by that standard, Operation Medusa was a good deal less than the complete success that the Canadian military suggested. Yes, territory that had been controlled by enemy forces was occupied. Some of the enemy fighters were killed, along with a handful of Canadians.

The bulk of the enemy forces escaped, however, to the apparent mystification of the Canadians. They blended with the population and disappeared almost overnight, which is what happens in counterinsurgency warfare. Buildings and villages were pulverized by Canadian (and U.S.) firepower, turning residents into refugees. In a fight for the support of the local population, this was no way to win.

David Galula, the great French counterinsurgency expert, listed five rules for success against insurgents --none of which, it would appear, are being used by Canadians and other NATO forces in southern Afghanistan. They are: do not divide the military-civilian command; put a civilian in control of the overall operation, since counterinsurgency is ultimately a political affair; try to avoid large-scale conventional military operations; seal the frontier; and use minimum force in response.

Above all, remember that the target is the support of the local population.

When four Canadian soldiers were killed by a suicide bomber last week, the senior Canadian commander said the "cowardly" act showed that the Taliban were not prepared for an "honourable fight." That well-meaning expression reflected classic military thinking: that war is about armies and territories and firepower. But, to insurgents, as we see in Iraq, warfare is asymmetrical. The big guys -- Americans, British, Canadians -- have all the firepower, so the insurgents prefer to fight by other means, in places they choose.

We call the insurgents "Taliban." A more correct description is offered by the London-based Senlis Council, whose latest report should be mandatory reading for the depressing -- probably too depressing -- picture it paints of Afghanistan. (Senlis erodes its otherwise sensible reporting by unremitting gloom and too much hearsay.)

Senlis calls the insurgents "neo-Taliban," a collection of Taliban, opium smugglers and traffickers, nationalist Pashtuns, local warlords, poor people who receive better pay from this side than the Afghan army, religious conservatives, and people generally convinced that NATO forces are "invaders." This description mocks the notion of negotiating with the Taliban, as if there were one structured organization.

Most insurgents are Afghans who belong to tribal groups that sprawl across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. They move back and forth with impunity, thereby making their capture difficult and offending against the maxim that any successful counterinsurgency must seal borders.

Graeme Smith's outstanding reports in The Globe and Mail underscore another complication: that the insurgents who are fighting the Canadians are also struggling against what at least some of the population consider venal Afghan officials. (Trying to eradicate poppy production as a form of war on drugs isn't working, since opium production is way up.)

The Canadians, therefore, are supporting one side in a kind of civil war that is mixed with the tribal rivalries that have always predominated in this part of Afghanistan.

And further complicating matters is the insurgents' use of vicious intimidation and bribery, and their ability to blend into the local population. Hence, the absolute necessity of gaining local support to identify such people and anticipate their intentions.

Reconstruction is held out as the answer, but one dollar of aid is flowing for every eight dollars of military activity. The ratio is understandable, since reconstruction can't go forward without security.

It doesn't help focus these funds when reconstruction means reassembling buildings and villages destroyed by conventional firepower in an unconventional struggle.

 
HitorMiss said:
You know I have been described as a Patricia traped in The RCR

Isn't the CF paying for.... surgery.... to deal with that sort of thing these days?  ;D

Seriously, hope all is going OK, and thanks for being a good sport about sharing the video.
 
Mourning said:
  Suddenly one company of the Princess Patricia’s made a breakthrough, pushing forward to hold a position well ahead of the Canadian lines. A second company pushed forward and very soon all three Canadian companies were leap-frogging each other to the point that the American infantry could be withdrawn...  ...By the end of last week, the vast majority of the Taliban were thought to have fled... ...“The next three to six months is a crucial period here,” Richards said. “We are establishing psychological ascendency over the Taliban in Panjwayi...

Goddam, nice to see positive reporting for a change. 

 
15 tanks is not "bad news" it just means that the commanders have more tools to play with. if they use their tools improperly then that will be the "bad news". Our forces over there are smaller than the Toronto Police department, so any increase in forces will be a big help. The tanks with their gun and FCS can dominate a large area of terrain from a moderately raised feature.
 
And dominate it by repeated 'pivot' turns  ;D, they wll be a great force multiplier, timmie thinks the Lav is a tank, wish I could hear what he calls the Leo
 
boondocksaint said:
And dominate it by repeated 'pivot' turns  ;D, they wll be a great force multiplier, timmie thinks the Lav is a tank, wish I could hear what he calls the Leo
Panzerkampfwagen would be nice of them ;D
 
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