Op UNIFIER - CAF and the Ukraine Crisis

[Altair]

That would be a horrible message to send to Putin

I agree, but who has the stomach for the potential of 10s of thousands of dead over Ukraine?

NATO would dither, talk about sanctions, write strongly worded letters, grandstand in the UN, and meanwhile Russian tanks are on the road to Kiev.

Not a one would lift a finger. Crimea, Hong Kong, Georgia, the west has shown its true colours. We survive with the threat that we would do something, but I'm afraid if anyone calls our bluff we would fold.

 

[suffolkowner]

I agree, but who has the stomach for the potential of 10s of thousands of dead over Ukraine?

NATO would dither, talk about sanctions, write strongly worded letters, grandstand in the UN, and meanwhile Russian tanks are on the road to Kiev.

Not a one would lift a finger. Crimea, Hong Kong, Georgia, the west has shown its true colours. We survive with the threat that we would do something, but I'm afraid if anyone calls our bluff we would fold.

before or after NATO membership is the key. Ukraine is not a NATO member, neither is Georgia. Hong Kong is part of the PRC unlike Taiwan. If Ukraine was a NATO member and there was no real response what would stand in the way of Putin's takeover of the Baltics. The alliance would be useless.

 

[Altair]

before or after NATO membership is the key. Ukraine is not a NATO member, neither is Georgia. Hong Kong is part of the PRC unlike Taiwan.

Ukraine had security assurances for giving up their nukes, those have been ignored as Russia invaded the Crimea, and had Russian backed separatists take over the Donbass.

Hong Kong had British backing of democracy for 50 years that ended 20 years early, the west didn't do a thing.

The word of the West means nothing, not worth the paper its written on, and NATO, for all its bluster, is just a commitment of collective defense.

If the West and NATO were not willing to stand up to Russia and China over a commitment to Ukraine and Hong Kong, the calculus is what is the chance they stand up to Russia over article 5?

If Ukraine was a NATO member and there was no real response what would stand in the way of Putin's takeover of the Baltics. The alliance would be useless.

It would be.

This is why Ukraine will never be allowed into NATO, it would lay that bear for all to see.

 

[MilEME09]

Same thing with Georgia, the moment Russia knows we won't respond, the Baltics are done, with others to follow. The west doesn't have a back bone, and our armies are no longer set up for a protracted near peer conflict.

 

[suffolkowner]

Ukraine had security assurances for giving up their nukes, those have been ignored as Russia invaded the Crimea, and had Russian backed separatists take over the Donbass.

Hong Kong had British backing of democracy for 50 years that ended 20 years early, the west didn't do a thing.

The word of the West means nothing, not worth the paper its written on, and NATO, for all its bluster, is just a commitment of collective defense.

If the West and NATO were not willing to stand up to Russia and China over a commitment to Ukraine and Hong Kong, the calculus is what is the chance they stand up to Russia over article 5?

It would be.

This is why Ukraine will never be allowed into NATO, it would lay that bear for all to see.

so what differentiates Ukraine from any of the former east bloc countries?

I don't see Hong Kong and what has gone on in Ukraine up to now as equivalent to a NATO article 5

Has NATO been too soft on Russia? Yes, but better late than never, plus the US likes to arrive late to wars in Europe. The US has 50,000 personel in Europe at present. I can't see Russia being able to swallow Ukraine, just western material support should be enough to bleed Russia. Stronger support and signals to Russia are what are needed to avoid this going hot

 

[MilEME09]

so what differentiates Ukraine from any of the former east bloc countries?

I don't see Hong Kong and what has gone on in Ukraine up to now as equivalent to a NATO article 5

Has NATO been too soft on Russia? Yes, but better late than never, plus the US likes to arrive late to wars in Europe. The US has 50,000 personel in Europe at present. I can't see Russia being able to swallow Ukraine, just western material support should be enough to bleed Russia. Stronger support and signals to Russia are what are needed to avoid this going hot

One of the biggest areas of weakness in Donna's for the Ukrainians is EW, especially assets to counter the heavy AA Russia has placed in the region. If they had good SEAD assets to reclaim the skies, they could put the separatists on the back foot

 

[rnkelly]

Honest question. How does Chrystia play into this as far as Canada is concerned?

 

[MilEME09]

How real is the threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine?

Experts are divided on whether Moscow is planning an imminent incursion, or merely posturing to win geopolitical sway.

www.aljazeera.com

another angle on it all

 

[The Bread Guy]

Ukraine had security assurances for giving up their nukes, those have been ignored as Russia invaded the Crimea, and had Russian backed separatists take over the Donbass ...

27 years ago today, in fact ....

so what differentiates Ukraine from any of the former east bloc countries?

THAT's the question Baltic countries & Poland may be asking themselves at times like this when Russia gets antsy.

 

[Good2Golf]

Honest question. How does Chrystia play into this as far as Canada is concerned?

I think she’s leaving it to PMJT’s close friend…

 

[Edward Campbell]

There's a good article in Foreign Affairs (Jan/Feb 2020) which says, "that Ukraine is at the center of this storm should not be surprising at all. Over the past quarter century, nearly all major efforts at establishing a durable post–Cold War order on the Eurasian continent have foundered on the shoals of Ukraine. For it is in Ukraine that the disconnect between triumphalist end-of-history delusions and the ongoing realities of great-power competition can be seen in its starkest form ... [because] ... To most American policymakers, Ukraine has represented a brave young country—one that, despite the burden of history, successfully launched itself on a path of democratic development as part of a new world order after the fall of the Berlin Wall. To the Kremlin, meanwhile, it has remained an indispensable part of a long-standing sphere of influence, one that operates largely according to old rules of power. The difference between these two views goes a long way toward explaining why post–Cold War hopes have given way to the strife and uncertainty of the world today."

Further, the authors say, "U.S. and other Western policymakers have long skirted hard questions about both Ukraine’s place in the Eurasian order and its role in the fraught relationship between Washington and Moscow. Although the end of the Cold War may have marked the end of one geopolitical competition, it did not mark the end of geopolitics. Nor did the dissolution of the Soviet Union mean the disappearance of Russian anxieties, ambitions, and abilities. The Soviet Union may have ceased to exist on paper in December 1991, but its influence did not. Empires do not simply vanish. They die long and messy deaths, denying their decline when they can, conceding their dominions when they must, and launching irredentist actions wherever they sense an opening. And nowhere are the consequences of the still ongoing Soviet collapse clearer than in Ukraine—a country that has wrecked attempt after attempt at establishing a durable order on the Eurasian continent."

"Meanwhile," the authors concluded, almost two years ago: "the question of Ukrainian security remains open. The past decades have made clear that as long as Ukraine’s status is unsettled and insecure, the consequences will continue to reverberate beyond its borders. Washington believed that it could ensure Ukraine’s control over its own destiny without major effort and at low cost. The reality is that it could not. What is worse, the best means for promoting Ukrainian security are in the rearview mirror. Expanding NATO to include Ukraine now would most likely result in more, not less, conflict with Russia. Washington’s best option at this point is to strengthen its bilateral political and security ties with Ukraine while working closely with its European allies to ensure Ukraine’s ability to protect its sovereignty."

 

[Czech_pivo]

Unpopular opinion, but here it is.

If Ukraine was in NATO on Monday and invaded by Thursday, NATO isn't doing squat, member or not.

I disagree.
The current, nationalist, government in Poland would not sit by and allow the Russians to take over Lwow and Tarnopol. They would go into eastern Galicia.

 

[Czech_pivo]

I disagree.
The current, nationalist, government in Poland would not sit by and allow the Russians to take over Lwow and Tarnopol. They would go into eastern

I disagree.
The current, nationalist, government in Poland would not sit by and allow the Russians to take over Lwow and Tarnopol. They would go into eastern Galicia.

Spend some time and look at who the current Polish leader is, and more importantly, who is twin brother was and how he and 95 others died.

Jarosław Kaczyński - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Lech Kaczyński - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Poles hate Russians, almost as much as they hate Germans. The Poles are still willingly to go toe to toe against the Russians. Numbers don’t mean a lot to them, it’s about honour, history and religion and the belief that they are on the right side.

 

[Altair]

I disagree.
The current, nationalist, government in Poland would not sit by and allow the Russians to take over Lwow and Tarnopol. They would go into eastern Galicia.

Poland had war games recently that needed to be ended early due to how badly they were doing.

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In Poland, the simulation of the Russian invasion turns into a fiasco​

The defeat would have been even more bitter than the lightning invasion of 1939 by Germany, if the military deployment had not been a simple exercise, intended to test the capacity of the Polish army to resist external aggression of the Russia. The operation, simulated along the eastern border of Poland, consisted of holding the lines of defense for a period of at least 22 days.But these great maneuvers, entitled «Winter 20» (Winter 2020), obviously ended in a fiasco. At the end of this virtual war, the Russians had reached the banks of the Vistula, and besieged Warsaw in just four days, reveal several news sites, such as Interia, while this kind of training is in principle ultra-confidential.

They are not going to expose themselves in Ukraine.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Spend some time and look at who the current Polish leader is, and more importantly, who is twin brother was and how he and 95 others died.

Jarosław Kaczyński - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Lech Kaczyński - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Poles hate Russians, almost as much as they hate Germans. The Poles are still willingly to go toe to toe against the Russians. Numbers don’t mean a lot to them, it’s about honour, history and religion and the belief that they are on the right side.

It's also about geography, which is not in their favour as they are, essentially, 'Europe's Bowling Alley'.

Poland's Elusive Security​

Poland has two strategic problems. The first problem is its geography. The Carpathian Mountains and the Tatra Mountains provide some security to Poland's south. But the lands to the east, west and southwest are flat plains with only rivers that provide limited protection. This plain was the natural line of attack of great powers, including Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany.

Poland's Strategy

For Poland, geopolitics is an existential issue.

worldview.stratfor.com

 

[Czech_pivo]

It's also about geography, which is not in their favour as they are, essentially, 'Europe's Bowling Alley'.

Poland's Elusive Security​

Poland has two strategic problems. The first problem is its geography. The Carpathian Mountains and the Tatra Mountains provide some security to Poland's south. But the lands to the east, west and southwest are flat plains with only rivers that provide limited protection. This plain was the natural line of attack of great powers, including Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany.

Poland's Strategy

For Poland, geopolitics is an existential issue.

worldview.stratfor.com

Guys, they simply don’t care.
If the Ukraine is going to go under, the Poles will go for broke and look to take back eastern Galicia.
It’s a small enough piece that they could take and hold within a matter of hours. They, the Slovaks, the Hungarians and the Romanians don’t want a common border with a larger Russia. The others won’t won’t do much about this, but the Poles, with his current government, will do so.

 

[Altair]

Guys, they simply don’t care.
If the Ukraine is going to go under, the Poles will go for broke and look to take back eastern Galicia.
It’s a small enough piece that they could take and hold within a matter of hours. They, the Slovaks, the Hungarians and the Romanians don’t want a common border with a larger Russia. The others won’t won’t do much about this, but the Poles, with his current government, will do so.

If their military exercises show that the Russians will be at Warsaw in 4 days, I don't want to know how fast the Russians take Galicia from them.

And with Poland going outside their borders, I think NATO uses that as the reason to leave Poland out to dry in the attempt.

 

[FJAG]

... irredentist actions ...

Can't believe that I've never heard of this word before considering how relevant it is to so many scenarios we've been facing for so long.

 

[Czech_pivo]

If their military exercises show that the Russians will be at Warsaw in 4 days, I don't want to know how fast the Russians take Galicia from them.

And with Poland going outside their borders, I think NATO uses that as the reason to leave Poland out to dry in the attempt.

There are many ways that the Poles can spin this.
First off, they can say that they were simply pushing a force into eastern Galicia to support the existing CDN/US troops already based there on their current training mission with the Ukrainians. Pushing into Lwow could be construed as taking/holding the airport there as a means to extract said CDN/US troops.
The Ukraine is a vast West-East country and Russia coming in from the eat with only 100k troops would find it close to impossible to take and hold all of the country.
The further west they go, the more stretched their supply lines become.
If a single troops crosses the Belarus frontier this would expand the boundaries and lessen the Russians angle of it being only a Russia/Ukraine issue.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Can't believe that I've never heard of this word before considering how relevant it is to so many scenarios we've been facing for so long.

You could, quite fairly, I think, argue that French irredentism after 1870 was the proximate cause of the First World War (20 million dead) and, therefore, of the second (75 million dead), also, and albeit rather indirectly of the Russian Revolution (10 million dead) and Stalin's 'Great Terror' (1937) (20 million dead) and, therefore, stretching things just a wee bit, of the Chinese famine of 1959-61, which killed somewhere between 15 (very conservative estimate) and (at the high end) 55 million people, too.